The single market and pharmaceutical industry in the European Union: Is there any evidence of price convergence? by Timur, Aysegul
University of South Florida
Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School
2006
The single market and pharmaceutical industry in
the European Union: Is there any evidence of price
convergence?
Aysegul Timur
University of South Florida
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the American Studies Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Scholar Commons Citation
Timur, Aysegul, "The single market and pharmaceutical industry in the European Union: Is there any evidence of price convergence?"
(2006). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/2728
 The Single Market and Pharmaceutical Industry in the European Union:  
Is There Any Evidence of Price Convergence?   
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Aysegul Timur 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Economics 
College of Business Administration 
University of South Florida 
 
 
 
 
Major Professor: Gabriel Picone, Ph.D. 
Donald M. Bellante, Ph.D. 
Jeffrey S. DeSimone, Ph.D. 
Mark G. Herander, Ph.D. 
Bradley P. Kamp, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
Date of Approval: 
December 14, 2006 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Market integration, European pharmaceutical market, unit root,  
hedonic regression, Laspeyres, Paasche 
 
© Copyright 2007 , Aysegul Timur 
  
Dedication 
This dissertation is dedicated to special friends, an institution, and most especially 
to my family, my son and my husband. To my dear friends, my mentors, Susan Casey, 
Katherine Dew and Barbara Caldwell: from the first day I started this journey, you have 
never stopped encouraging and helping me. I could not have made it without you.  
To International College and especially, Dr. Frederick Nerone: I am thankful for your 
belief in me, your continuing support and leadership. To my family: even though we are 
many miles apart on different continents, your spirit was with me and helped me 
accomplish this goal. Finally, to my son Efehan and my husband Mete: I would not be 
where I am today without your never ending love, support and patience. You both gave 
me strength to move forward and reach my goal. We dreamed and did it together. I love 
you so much.  
  
Acknowledgments 
I am truly thankful to my dissertation committee, Bradley P. Kamp, Ph.D., 
Donald M. Bellante, Ph.D., Jeffrey S. DeSimone, Ph.D., and Mark G. Herander, Ph.D. 
for their helpful comments and advice, and most especially I would like to thank my 
dissertation committee chair, Gabriel Picone, Ph.D., for his tremendous help, patience 
and advice. I could not have finished this dissertation without their support. 
I also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Kenneth O. Johnson 
Endowed Professorship Fund at the Kenneth Oscar Johnson School of Business, 
International College, and the Gaiennie Foundation at the College of Business 
Administration, University of South Florida. These two funds helped me purchase the 
data used in this dissertation.  
I also appreciated the helpful comments and suggestions from Dr. Naci Bitik, 
Turgan Gurmen, Cihangir Topkar, Mine Kurtay, M.D., Pierre Wertheimer and Jacques 
Perrotto at the beginning of my research that led me to the right resources.  
Lastly, I would like to thank IMS Health, Barbara Doyle, IMS Account Manager, 
and Brigitte Baker, Senior Market Research Analyst, for providing me with unlimited 
assistance in understanding the data set. Without their support, I would not have been 
able to utilize the data.
 i
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... iii 
 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... vi 
 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ viii 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction .........................................................................................................1 
1.1 The Formation of the European Union ..............................................................1 
1.2 The Impact of European Integration on Price Convergence:  
Theory ................................................................................................................2 
1.3 The Single Pharmaceutical Market ...................................................................4 
 
Chapter 2 The Background of the EU Pharmaceutical Industry..........................................8 
2.1 Distinguishing Characteristics of the Pharmaceutical Industry .........................8 
2.2 Regulating Pharmaceuticals in the EU ..............................................................9 
2.2.1 National Health Care Systems ..........................................................11 
2.2.2 Regulating European Pharmaceutical Prices and 
Reimbursement ................................................................................ 11 
2.2.2.1 Supply-Side Regulations........................................................12 
2.2.2.2 Demand-Side Regulations .....................................................14 
2.2.3 Parallel Importing in Pharmaceuticals in the EU..............................15 
2.2.4 EU Pharmaceutical Background Summary ......................................18 
 
Chapter 3 Literature Review..............................................................................................19 
3.1 Market Integration and Price Convergence in the EU.....................................19 
3.2 Impact of Parallel Trade in the EU ..................................................................23 
3.3 Cross Country Price Differences for Pharmaceuticals.....................................25 
  
Chapter 4 Research Design................................................................................................28 
4.1 Objectives and Hypothesis...............................................................................28 
4.2 Description of Data ..........................................................................................29 
4.2.1 Definition of Drug and Characteristics of  
IMS Health Data ...............................................................................29 
4.2.2 Sample Construction ........................................................................32 
4.3 Methodology ...................................................................................................33 
4.3.1 Price Indexes.....................................................................................33 
 4.3.1.1 Specification of the Indexes..................................................35 
 ii
  
4.3.2 Quasi-Hedonic Price Regressions  ...................................................37 
4.3.2.1 Specification of the Quasi-Hedonic  
Price Models .........................................................................38 
4.3.2.2 Description of Variables .......................................................39 
4.3.3 Price Convergence Regressions  ......................................................41 
4.3.3.1 Specification of the Price Convergence Models...................42 
 
Chapter 5 Research Results ..............................................................................................45 
5.1 Unadjusted Bilateral Standard Unit Price Differences ....................................45 
5.1.1 Standard Unit Price Differences for Bilaterally  
 Matched Molecules...........................................................................46 
5.1.2 Standard Unit Price Differences for  
Global Molecules .............................................................................51 
5.1.3 Country Price Differences for All and  
 Global Molecules, Relative to 1994..................................................55 
5.2 Quality Adjusted Standard Unit Price Differences .........................................55 
5.2.1 Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics..................56 
5.2.2 Quality Adjusted Standard Unit Price Differences for 
 All Molecules....................................................................................58 
5.2.3 Quality Adjusted Standard Unit Price Differences for  
 Global Molecules .............................................................................62 
5.3 Price Convergence Results ..............................................................................65 
 
Chapter 6 Conclusions .......................................................................................................71 
6.1 Main Findings ..................................................................................................71 
6.2 Limitations .......................................................................................................75 
6.3 Future Research ...............................................................................................76 
 
References..........................................................................................................................79 
 
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................91 
 
Appendices.........................................................................................................................92 
Appendix A: Tables ...............................................................................................93 
Appendix B: Figures ............................................................................................143 
 
About the Author ................................................................................................... End Page 
 
 
 
 
 iii
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1 Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for  
 All Molecules, Relative to Germany .........................................................47 
 
Table 2 Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for  
 Global Molecules, Relative to Germany....................................................52 
 
Table 3 Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition)  
 Characteristics for All Molecules Overall .................................................56 
 
Table 4 Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition)  
 Characteristics for Global Molecules Overall............................................57 
 
Table 5 Quasi-Hedonic Price Regression Results for  
 All Molecules, Relative to Germany .........................................................60 
 
Table 6 Quality Adjusted (by RE) Standard Unit Price  
 Differentials for All Molecules, Relative to Germany...............................61 
 
Table 7 Quasi-Hedonic Price Regression Results for  
 Global Molecules, Relative to Germany....................................................63 
 
Table 8 Quality Adjusted (by RE) Standard Unit Price  
 Differentials for Global Molecules, Relative to Germany.........................64 
 
Table 9 Results for Price Convergence Estimations for  
 All Molecules (Adjusted by FE) ................................................................67 
 
Table 10 Results for Price Convergence Estimations  
 for Global Molecules (Adjusted by RE) ....................................................70 
 
Table A.1 National Controls for Pharmaceutical on the Supply-Side ........................93 
 
Table A.2 Summary of Approaches in the Regulation of Pharmaceutical  
 Prices by On-Patent and Off-Patent Drugs (2003) ....................................94 
 
Table A.3 Demand-Side Policies in the Member States.............................................95 
 
Table A.4 ATC Therapeutic Categories for Cardiovascular Disease .........................96 
 
 iv
Table A.5 Largest Pharmaceutical Markets in the World...........................................97 
 
Table A.6 Balanced Sample ATC/Molecule and Country  
 Availability for 1994-2003 ........................................................................98 
 
Table A.7 Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for  
 All Molecules, Relative to Spain .............................................................101 
 
Table A.8 Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for  
 Global Molecules, Relative to Spain .......................................................105 
 
Table A.9 Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for  
 All Molecules, Relative to 1994 ..............................................................109 
 
Table A.10 Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for  
 Global Molecules, Relative to 1994.........................................................111 
 
Table A.11 Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition)  
 Characteristics for All Molecules by Country .........................................112 
 
Table A.12 Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition)  
 Characteristics for Global Molecules by Country ...................................114 
 
Table A.13 Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition)  
 Characteristics for All Molecules by Country by Year ...........................116 
 
Table A.14 Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition)  
 Characteristics for Global Molecules by Country by Year......................126 
 
Table A.15 Quality Adjusted (by RE) Standard Unit Price  
 Differentials for All Molecules, Relative to Spain ..................................136 
 
Table A.16 Quality Adjusted (by FE) Standard Unit Price  
 Differentials for All Molecules, Relative to Germany.............................136 
 
Table A.17 Quality Adjusted (by FE) Standard Unit Price  
 Differentials for All Molecules, Relative to Spain ..................................137 
 
Table A.18 Quality Adjusted (by RE) Standard Unit Price  
Differentials for Global Molecules, Relative to Spain.............................137 
 
Table A.19 Quality Adjusted (by FE) Standard Unit Price  
 Differentials for Global Molecules, Relative to Germany.......................138 
 v
Table A.20  Quality Adjusted (by FE) Standard Unit Price  
 Differentials for Global Molecules, Relative to Spain.............................138 
 
Table A.21 Results for Price Convergence Estimations for  
 All Molecules (Adjusted by RE)..............................................................139 
 
Table A.22 Results for Price Convergence Estimations for  
 All Molecules (Unadjusted).....................................................................140 
  
Table A.23 Results for Price Convergence Estimations for  
 Global Molecules (Adjusted by FE) ........................................................141 
 
Table A.24  Results for Price Convergence Estimations for  
 Global Molecules (Unadjusted) ...............................................................142 
 
 
 vi
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1 Quality Adjusted (by RE) Standard Unit Price Differentials  
 for All Molecules, Relative to Germany....................................................62 
 
Figure 2 Quality Adjusted (by RE) Standard Unit Price Differentials  
 for Global Molecules, Relative to Germany ..............................................65 
 
Figure B.1 Summary of EU Pharmaceutical Background .........................................143 
 
Figure B.2 Pharmaceutical Production in the European Union .................................144 
 
Figure B.3 Total Pharmaceutical Sales in the European Union.................................145 
 
Figure B.4 Bilateral Price Differences for All Molecules Between  
 1994-2003 by Laspeyres Index, Relative to Germany.............................146 
 
Figure B.5 Bilateral Price Differences for All Molecules Between  
 1994-2003 by Paasche Index, Relative to Germany................................146 
 
Figure B.6 Bilateral Price Differences for All Molecules Between  
 1994-2003 by Laspeyres Index, Relative to Spain ..................................147 
 
Figure B.7 Bilateral Price Differences for All Molecules Between  
 1994-2003 by Paasche Index, Relative to Spain......................................147 
 
Figure B.8 Bilateral Price Differences by for Global Molecules Between  
 1994-2003 Laspeyres Index, Relative to Germany..................................148 
 
Figure B.9 Bilateral Price Differences for Global Molecules Between  
 1994-2003 by Paasche Index, Relative to Germany................................148 
 
Figure B.10 Bilateral Price Differences for Global Molecules Between  
 1994-2003 by Laspeyres Index, Relative to Spain ..................................149 
 
 vii
Figure B.11 Bilateral Price Differences for Global Molecules Between  
 1994-2003 by Paasche Index, Relative to Spain......................................149 
 
Figure B.12 Country Price Changes for All Molecules  
 by Laspeyres Index, Relative to 1994......................................................150 
 
Figure B.13 Country Price Changes for Global Molecules 
 by Laspeyres Index, Relative to 1994......................................................151 
 
Figure B.14  Quality Adjusted (by RE) Standard Unit Price  
 Differentials for All Molecules, Relative to Spain ..................................152 
 
Figure B.15 Quality Adjusted (by FE) Standard Unit Price  
 Differentials for All Molecules, Relative to Germany.............................152 
 
Figure B.16 Quality Adjusted (by FE) Standard Unit Price  
 Differentials for All Molecules, Relative to Spain ..................................153 
 
Figure B.17 Quality Adjusted (by RE) Standard Unit Price  
 Differentials for Global Molecules, Relative to Spain.............................153 
 
Figure B.18  Quality Adjusted (by FE) Standard Unit Price  
 Differentials for Global Molecules, Relative to Germany.......................154 
 
Figure B.19 Quality Adjusted (by FE) Standard Unit Price  
 Differentials for Global Molecules, Relative to Spain.............................154 
 
 viii
 
 
The Single Market and Pharmaceutical Industry in the European Union:  
Is There Any Evidence of Price Convergence?   
Aysegul Timur 
ABSTRACT 
During the last two decades, the European Union (EU) has experienced closer 
market integration through the removal of trade barriers, the establishment of a single 
market, and the reduction of exchange rate volatility.  In addition, there have been several 
structural reforms in product markets designed to increase competition, monitor cross-
country price differences and increase transparency.  One anticipated effect of market 
integration is price convergence, because of the reduced potential for price discrimination 
across the EU.  This dissertation explores market integration and price convergence in the 
European pharmaceutical market, which is the fifth largest industry in the EU.  Since 
1985, many EU directives have been adopted to achieve a single EU-wide 
pharmaceutical market, with the aim of enhancing the quality of life for European 
citizens and the European pharmaceutical industry’s competitiveness and research and 
development capability.  Using annual 1994–2003 data from five EU countries on prices 
of drugs used to treat cardiovascular disease, this dissertation explains how the 
integration process has affected cross-country drug price dispersion in the EU.  The 
results show strong evidence of price convergence in the pharmaceutical market, with 
long term price differences arising from country fixed effects.
 1
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 The Formation of the European Union  
After World War II, there was a strong belief among a number of European 
leaders that the only way to secure a lasting peace between their countries was to unite 
them economically and politically.  This effort began in 1951 when the Treaty of Paris 
created the European Coal and Steel Community, consisting of Belgium, West Germany, 
Luxembourg, France, Italy and the Netherlands.  To integrate other sectors of their 
economies, these six countries signed the Treaties of Rome in 1957, which created the 
European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic Community (EEC).  
The task of the latter was “by establishing a common market and progressively 
approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the 
Community a harmonious development of economic activities” (Wertheimer 2003).  The 
member states set about removing trade barriers between them to form a “common 
market,” and in 1967 the institutions of the three Communities were merged, establishing 
a single Commission. Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined in 1973, 
followed by Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986. 
In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht formed the European Union (EU) with the 
introduction of the Single Market Program (SMP), which created a common market with 
a free flow of goods, services, labor and capital.  Austria, Finland and Sweden joined in 
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1995, and the European Monetary Union (EMU) replaced national currencies in 11 of the 
member countries (all except Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and UK) by the single 
currency “euro” on January 1, 2002.  The EU then welcomed ten new countries in 2004, 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia, raising total membership to 25 countries.  Bulgaria and Romania 
expect to follow in 2007, and Croatia and Turkey began membership negotiations in 2005 
(EUROPA 2005;Fontaine 2003). 
 
1.2 The Impact of European Integration on Price Convergence: Theory 
The SMP was originally established in a 1985 White Paper with the goals of 
eliminating targeted trade barriers in product markets and forming policies aimed to 
ensure that integration brought more competition (Flam 1992).  A 1988 European 
Commission report on “costs of non-integrated Europe,” commonly known as the 
Cecchini report, estimated that the completion of a single European market would 
generate microeconomic gains of 4.3–6.4 percent of GDP, with an additional 2.5 percent 
if supplemented by appropriate macroeconomic policies, a reduction in consumer prices 
of 6.1 percent and an employment increase of 1.8 million (Peck 1989;Smith and Wanke 
1993).  Theory suggests that the SMP, along with the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), have led the continuous European Integration process since the 1990s.  The SMP 
has been an important driver of change in product markets through the elimination of 
trade barriers, whereas the EMU supports the internal market by facilitating cross-border 
transactions and making markets more transparent with the use of common notes and 
coins across the euro area.  However, it is impossible to make a clear distinction between 
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the effects of the SMP and EMU on product markets because their different elements are 
continuously and dynamically interacting.  
The analytical framework suggests three distinct effects of European integration 
on product markets (European Commission 2002).  First, integration provides firms 
easier access to each other’s markets, thus increasing competitiveness by eliminating 
trade barriers.  Second, integration increases market size by raising efficiency, because of 
resource reallocation or economies of scale, and reducing transaction costs.  Third, 
integration and the use of a single currency facilitate price comparisons across markets, 
making consumers more aware and responsive to price differences, producers more 
aware of their competitors’ responses, and multinational firms less able to segment 
national markets and maintain profit margins.  
A result of these three effects should be arbitrage among the member countries 
which ultimately leads to price convergence.  According to the law of one price, the price 
of a specific good should not differ significantly across geographic locations, beyond 
differences arising from transport costs, tax differences, and other systematic location-
specific factors.  Price convergence is expected in an integrated market, and thereby 
provides important evidence regarding product market integration.  However, the 
relationship between integration and price convergence depends on many structural, 
behavioral, and policy factors that influence price trends.  Since these factors vary across 
markets, price convergence patterns may deviate across industries. 
The absolute version of the law of one price states that, in absence of transfer 
costs, identical traded products should sell for the same price in different countries when 
expressed in a common currency.  The intuition is that international arbitrage should 
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operate until prices are aligned.  A less extreme version of the law of one price is the 
relative version, which holds that common currency prices for a particular product should 
change in the same way over time in different countries, but allows a stable price 
differential across markets.  
 
1.3 The Single Pharmaceutical Market  
The European Commission recognizes that the impact of market integration on 
the pharmaceutical industry is very complex.  Different health care regimes in member 
states cause difficulties in achieving a single market and cause price variations between 
countries for the same product.  This is unlike price differentials in other sectors which 
are the result of market forces, and has brought about the issue of parallel trade.  The 
Commission has viewed distortions as barriers to establishing a single pharmaceutical 
market and has tried different strategies to address the issues (Permanand and Mossialos 
2004). 
Since 1985, several Community level directives were adopted to achieve a single, 
EU-wide market for pharmaceuticals, guided in parts by the Treaty of Rome objectives, 
particularly Articles 8, 30, 36, 85, 86 and 92 (Burstall 1991).  Formation of the single 
market (1) gives patients access to the medicines they need at affordable prices, and (2) 
creates incentives for innovation and industrial development (European Commission 
2005). 
In response to concerns that the EU pharmaceutical industry was losing its 
competitiveness due to market divergence, in May 1998 the Internal Market Council 
recommended that Community policy be aimed at moving further towards a single 
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market (Communication Commission 1998a, 1998b).  The Third Round Table of 
December 1998 established one goal in this effort as the development of a single price for 
pharmaceuticals (Huttin 1999). Among other barriers, many member governments have 
monopsony power (Read 1998).  Although subsequent communications and further 
evidence revealed awareness of such problems,1 little progress on the policy side was 
made until 2001, when the Commission set up a new High Level Group on Innovation 
and the Provision of Medicines (G10 Medicines 2002).  In 2002, the new group issued 
fourteen specific recommendations in five different areas regarding the attainment of a 
single pharmaceutical market (European Commission 2003). 
The most relevant recommendation for this dissertation is the sixth, which 
addresses the issue of the functioning and evaluation of the single market in 
pharmaceuticals.  Specifically, it covers moving toward a competitive market structure 
for over-the-counter (OTC) products limiting the member states’ regulatory authority to 
only medicines purchased or reimbursed by the state.  The implementation of this 
recommendation could be seen as the beginning of EU pharmaceutical market 
liberalization (Pollard 2002).  
Even though the single EU market was formally completed at the end of 1992, the 
pharmaceutical industry has lagged behind because of its unique structural and regulatory 
components (Kanavos 2000).  This makes it quite uncertain whether price convergence 
has actually taken place in the EU pharmaceutical market. 
                                                 
1 The report on global competitiveness in pharmaceuticals concluded that “Europe as a whole is lagging 
behind in its ability to generate, organize, and sustain innovation processes that are increasingly expensive 
and organizationally complex” (Gambardella, A., Orsenigo, L., and Pammolli, F. 2000. "Global 
Competitiveness in Pharmaceuticals: A European Perspective," Report prepared for the Directorate General 
Enterprise of the European Commission, pp. 1-100.). 
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Two pertinent developments that occurred during this time frame, i.e. the 1994–
2003 sample period, concern medicinal product licensing and patenting.  In 1995, two 
new Community licensing procedures were introduced (Liikanen 2004).  One, a 
“centralized procedure,” involves applying directly to the European Medicines 
Evaluation Agency (EMEA) for community-wide marketing approval.  The other is a 
“mutual recognition” procedure whereby applications are made to particular member 
states and approvals are mutually recognized by national marketing authorities (European 
Commission 2000b) although evaluation of product safety, efficacy and quality is still 
coordinated by EMEA (EFPIA 2002).  Both procedures are designed to achieve a 
“European” rather than country-specific decision (Jefferys 1995). Implementation of 
these procedures has had a significant impact on pharmaceutical companies, particularly 
with regard to the structure of regulatory affairs departments. 
On the intellectual property side, patent protection is currently provided by both 
national patent systems and the European Patent Systems.  Patents granted by the latter 
become a bundle of patents enforceable in the designated states, which are each subject to 
national rules.  In 2000, the Commission proposed a Community Patent, aiming to 
establish a single patent that is valid throughout the EU.  However, EU agreement on the 
Community Patent is still pending (European Commission 2000a).  On the other hand, 
the pharmaceutical industry is offered up to 15 years of effective protection from the date 
of first authorization in the Community, slightly more than the 14 year maximum in the 
US.  The licensing process further protects the data used for license applications for 6–10 
years, compared to a maximum of 5 years in the US.  
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The 2010 industry goal of national market pricing for all medicines does not 
necessarily mean a community-wide single price.  Different prices may be negotiated 
with different customers to maximize access and affordability, but free movement of 
goods will ensure that there is no artificial segmentation of the market.  In addition, the 
industry wants immediate access to all national markets after licensing for all medicines 
(EFPIA 1998).  
The results of this study provide strong evidence of drug price convergence, with 
half lives of drug price shocks of 3-5 years.  Long term price differentials between 
member states persist despite the removal of trade barriers, because prices are primarily 
determined by each country’s distinct health care system and pharmaceutical pricing 
regulations.  However, these price differences have recently been undermined by parallel 
trade, in which traditionally high price countries import lower priced goods from other 
EU countries.  In addition, attempts to establish a single overall market in the EU over the 
last decade have reduced price differentials in the pharmaceutical industry. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 provides a 
detailed look at the background of the pharmaceutical industry.  Chapter 3 reviews the 
literature on market integration and price convergence in the EU, the impact of parallel 
trade in the EU, and cross country pharmaceutical price differences.  Chapter 4 describes 
the data and empirical strategy.  Chapter 5 presents and describes the results of the 
analysis.  Finally, chapter 6 summarizes the main findings, limitations and areas for 
further research. 
 
 
 8
 
 
Chapter 2 
The Background of the EU Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the European Union pharmaceutical 
industry.  It discusses various important characteristics, including market structure, 
national health systems, price regulations and reimbursements, and parallel imports. 
 
2.1 Distinguishing Characteristics of the Pharmaceutical Industry 
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the world’s most research-intensive 
industries, generating new drugs that satisfy vital consumer needs in health care by 
saving lives and significantly increasing quality of life. The industry is a crucial 
component in delivering health care (Scherer 2000). A defining difference from other 
industries is that several third parties, besides the manufacturer and consumer, are 
involved on both the demand and supply sides. Physicians, not the consumer, usually 
determine what drugs to purchase. Pharmacists usually follow physicians’ instructions on 
what to dispense, but their decisions can be influenced by payment methods when multi-
sourced products are available (Kanavos 2001). The consumer rarely pays the full price 
of the drug, with subsidies coming from governments, health insurance funds, and private 
insurance companies. They take part in pricing and reimbursement decisions. Because of 
these unique characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry and their interactions with 
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regard to size and intensity, the drug market fails to meet the criteria for a perfectly 
competitive market (Mossialos et al. 2004).  
In the pharmaceutical industry, there are market imperfections on both the 
demand and supply sides. On the demand side, the demand does not reflect the marginal 
benefit to consumers, because the demand might to some extent reflect the doctor’s 
preferences rather than the consumers.  Also, if the patient has insurance coverage, the 
price the patient pays is lower than the market price.  Even if market price is equal to 
marginal cost (MC), therefore, there is no guarantee that these equal the marginal benefit.  
Further, there is often monopsony power, particularly when there is a national health care 
system. On the supply side, supply is characterized by economies of scale because drugs 
have a high proportion of cost in R&D, patent restrictions allow producers to act as 
monopolists, and governments impose marketing restrictions through the approval 
processes and testing requirements (Capri and Levaggi 2005;2004). As a result, the 
pharmaceutical industry is among the most heavily regulated industries (Folland et al. 
2004). Few aspects of the industry are unaffected by regulatory controls.   
 
2.2 Regulating Pharmaceuticals in the EU  
Regulating the pharmaceutical industry is a particularly difficult challenge for 
policy makers, who seek low health care costs and affordable drugs, but also want 
accessibility to the highest quality medicines and more generally a successful industry 
(Permanand and Mossialos 2004).  Despite the earlier described EU-level movement 
toward the single pharmaceutical market and the European Commission’s expanding role 
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in this area, pharmaceutical policy is still primarily determined at the national level by 
differences in health care systems, pricing and reimbursement regulations, demographics, 
cultures and attitudes towards consuming medicine (Norris 1998).  Pharmacoeconomics, 
parallel importing, and generic substitution also impact policy decisions (Seget 2003). 
Despite four decades of Community level attempts at convergence, European 
pharmaceuticals remain 25 separate national markets rather than a single “internal” 
market.  The Commission has never proposed legislative measures to address 
pharmaceutical price controls and reimbursement regulations at the EU level, considering 
this to be primarily a national concern.  Even though the industry continues requesting 
that the Commission remove certain forms of national price regulation, the industry 
cannot be wholly protected from inter-brand competition from generics following patent 
expiration or intra-brand competition created by parallel importing from lower priced EU 
countries (Mossialos et al. 2004)  However, some national governments have been taking 
“me-too” approaches for regulating drug prices and controlling reimbursement (Redwood 
1994), imitating policies of other governments despite the limited effectiveness and 
evaluation of many of the measures adopted.  This is described in the literature as the 
“penguin effect” (Guillen and Cabiedes 2003).  Consequently, both industrial policy and 
regulation of the pharmaceuticals remain responsibilities shared between the EU level 
and the member states.  The Commission has no power to determine national prices, 
reimbursement regulations or profit controls, but attempts to ensure that national 
procedures are efficient, transparent and fair. 
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2.2.1 National Health Care Systems  
A common political belief in Europe is that governments should ensure that 
medical care is available to everyone. Each Member State has its own health care system 
to protect public health, provide patient access to safe and effective medicine, maintain 
quality of care, and establish measures to meet these expectations. EU actions are limited 
by the member states’ own decisions in managing pharmaceutical goals and budgets 
(Huttin 1999).  
The current EU national health care systems are diverse in both funding and 
delivery of health care.  Table A.1 shows the differences in health care systems in the five 
major pharmaceutical markets in Europe.  National governments have implemented many 
different measures, from controls and incentives to directly influence supply and demand 
or indirectly reduce expenditures, which in terms of overall health have grown faster than 
GNP in all European countries over the last 20 years (Ess et al. 2003).  To slow this 
growth, some countries have emphasized direct price controls and supply side cost 
containment regulations, while others have emphasized demand side financial incentives, 
quantity controls and physician educational initiatives (Kanavos 2001;Mossialos et al. 
2004).  
 
2.2.2 Regulating European Pharmaceutical Prices and Reimbursement  
Regulating pharmaceuticals involves both supply and demand side regulations, 
various aspects of which are explained in the next two sections. 
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2.2.2.1 Supply-Side Regulations 
Supply regulations and cost containment measures consist primarily of direct 
fixed price controls, profit (or rate of return) controls and reference pricing.  Tables A.1 
and A.2 show how pharmaceutical prices are regulated in the five major EU markets, 
which are Germany, France, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom.  
Direct price controls include negotiated prices, price-caps (fixed maximum price), 
cost-plus prices, price comparison to other countries or similar products within the same 
country, price cuts or freezes or price-volume agreements.  Almost all EU countries 
except Germany and the UK apply direct price controls to on-patent drugs.  In the UK 
new patent drugs can be freely launched but the prices are indirectly controlled by the 
rate of return controls that ensure pharmaceuticals are not realizing excessive profits.  
The permitted rate of return on capital is around 17-21% (Ess et al. 2003).  France also 
introduced free pricing in 2003, but only for products defined as innovative by the 
National Transparency Commission with some limitations.  In some countries such as 
France, Italy, Spain, Austria, and Portugal, prices are directly controlled through 
negotiations.  In others, prices are fixed by national authorities according to a list of 
factors that depend on whether the main objective is to achieve the lowest possible price 
or a price that balances profitability with cost containment.  Many countries have 
additionally applied cuts and freezes to the maximum fixed prices, often in an attempt to 
meet short-term budget constraints.  In France, prices are set initially for 5 years.  In most 
countries, price cuts have been the norm.  
Some countries, like Spain, reward companies that contribute to the economy or 
invest in research and development.  In addition to using a cost-plus formula, Spain 
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considers therapeutic value.  Price comparisons are another common measure.  However, 
there is concern about accuracy of the comparisons because of methodological 
difficulties and differences across countries in strength, formulation and pack sizes 
available (Mossialos et al. 2004).  
Another measure, reference pricing, has gained popularity over the years in places 
like Germany, Italy, France, and Spain. Reference pricing is “a system where the buying 
agent decides on a reimbursement price and then the user/patient or insurer pays the 
difference if the chosen medicine is more expensive” (Lopez-Casasnovas; Puig-Junoy 
2000).  Reference pricing aims to control pharmaceutical expenditures by defining a 
fixed amount to be paid by the government or other third party payer and can effectively 
eliminate price gaps between therapeutically similar products and improve market 
transparency by increasing patient and physician awareness of actual price levels 
(Dickson 1992). The latter can bring about switches to cheaper drugs that lead to price 
decrease for the more expensive version (Mossialos et al. 2004), which encourages 
downward price convergence (Lopez-Casasnovas; Puig-Junoy 2000).  
Current EU price control systems limit the returns to any added therapeutic value 
of the drug.  Reimbursement levels reflect negotiations between the pharmaceutical 
company (a monopolist with respect to a new drug) and the government or insurer (a 
monopsonist).  A number of countries have started to incorporate further economic 
evaluations into the decision-making process, either as an additional tool to determine the 
reimbursement price (e.g. Finland) or as a mechanism to guide prescribers (e.g. the UK 
National Institute of Clinical Excellence).  However, there has been little consistency in 
EU reimbursement regulations. 
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2.2.2.2 Demand-Side Regulations  
Key elements of demand-side policies in member states are shown in table A.3.  
One is to influence the doctors who prescribe medicines for patients (Caves et al. 1991).  
This can be done through positive and negative lists, issuing guidelines to which 
medications can be prescribed for certain conditions, and monitoring prescribing 
practices (doctors act as a “gatekeeper”).  Additionally, budgets are imposed to force 
doctors to take costs into consideration when selecting between alternative treatments 
(e.g. individual doctor or group practice budgets in the UK, budgets for all doctors in a 
region in Germany). 
The second key element is restrictive lists that all member states operate in 
various ways.  Regulatory approval that is necessary before a drug can be marketed does 
not imply that the drug will be covered by the health care system; in principle, drugs that 
are less effective or more expensive than substitutes should not be reimbursed.  These 
lists operate in three different ways. In some countries, the drug must be on the “positive 
list” to be reimbursed, while inclusion on the “negative list” implies no government 
reimbursement. In others, only one list is used. In positive list counties, the drug must be 
on the list to be reimbursed. In negative list countries, only drugs on the negative list are 
not reimbursable.  
Some countries (e.g. France) have been altering the system of paying physicians, 
moving from a fee-for-service and access to any physician/specialist regime to more 
restrictive gatekeeper systems.  An alternative way to regulate demand is regulating what 
products pharmacists can sell, who may sell prescription medicines, what they can 
dispense, how prescriptions are written and substitution procedures (Kanavos 2001).  
 15
Another option is patient cost-sharing through paying some combination of a proportion 
of the total price, a fixed charge per prescription, and an annual deductible (Noyce et al. 
2000).  For example, in Spain co-payments are 40% of the sales price, while in France 
the majority of the population pays less than 5% of retail prices out of pocket.  
Finally, the size of the generic market has grown recently in several EU countries.  
For example, in the UK, the use of generic drugs has increased from 16% of prescriptions 
in 1977 to 54% in 1994 (Ess et al. 2003).  Table A.2 shows off-patent drug regulations.  
The two EU approaches to regulating generic drug prices are limiting the generic price to 
a fixed percent less than the originator product or the cheapest generic equivalent, and to 
apply a reference price scheme (Mossialos et al. 2004).  In some countries (e.g. 
Germany), generic substitution has been a successful short-term cost containment policy 
(Ess et al. 2003). 
  
2.2.3 Parallel Importing in Pharmaceuticals in the EU 
Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) define parallel imports as “legitimately produced 
goods imported legally into a country without the authorization of a trademark, copyright, 
or patent holder.”  The legal foundation is the principle of the free movement of goods, 
while the legal doctrine governing the permissibility of parallel imports is exhaustion.  
Patent distribution rights are exhausted over a pre-defined area upon first sale, after 
which the patent holder can no longer restrict the circulation of the product.  Parallel 
trade is thus permitted in the geographical area where the rights to control distribution 
have been exhausted but not from regions or countries outside (Ganslandt and Maskus 
2004).  Under national exhaustion the right holder may prevent such importation. In the 
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EU, the exhaustion regime is the Community (Maskus and Chen 2004), and the 
Commission recognizes the manufacturer’s right to control the use of the brand but not 
necessarily of the product.  Specifically, the manufacturer’s industrial and commercial 
property right cannot be used to prevent the parallel import of a medicinal product that 
has already been lawfully placed on the market in another member state. 
The purpose of parallel importing is arbitrage between countries with different 
prices.  Seget (2003) explains that parallel importing is the “transportation of a 
pharmaceutical product from its original market, where it was sold directly by its 
manufacturer or marketing partner, to a different market for resale by the importer.  
Parallel importing only occurs where there is sufficient difference in the price of the 
product in two markets to cover the importer’s costs and generate some profit to the 
importing company.  In most industries where it happens, parallel importing had led to 
the convergence of prices.”  Parallel imports emerge where international price differences 
exceed the costs of transportation and selling the product across borders, and hence 
would not exit without pharmaceutical price differences between member states.  
According to the Commission, a parallel import must (1) have been granted a marketing 
authorization in the origin country and (2) be sufficiently similar to a product that has 
already received marketing authorization in the destination country. 
Recently, parallel imports have been growing as a fraction of EU pharmaceutical 
sales, as arbitrage opportunities have persisted despite the goal of a single market, while 
EMEA harmonization of regulatory requirements for registration (dosage requirements, 
labeling) has reduced repackaging costs.  The major supplying countries are Belgium, 
France, Italy, Greece and Spain, while the main importers are Denmark, Germany, the 
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Netherlands and the UK (Chaudhry and Walsh 1995).  As of 1999, parallel imports 
composed 15% of the prescription drug market in the Netherlands, 10% in Denmark and 
7% in the UK.  Overall, parallel imports made up 8% of the EU market in 2001 and are 
forecast to rise to 10% by 2006.  The income loss from being undercut by parallel 
imports is estimated at $5.5–7.6 billion in 2001 (Arfwedson 2003). 
Parallel imports have complex effects on markets (Maskus 2001), but should 
cause prices to fall in high price countries, and may reciprocally cause prices to rise in 
low price countries (OECD 2000).  According to Danzon (1998), parallel trade reduces 
economic welfare by undermining price differentials between markets.  Theoretically, 
pharmaceutical R&D, which accounts for roughly 30% of total pharmaceutical costs, is a 
global joint cost of serving all consumers worldwide. Optimal pricing to cover joint costs, 
i.e. Ramsey pricing, requires setting lower prices in markets with higher demand 
elasticities.  However, parallel trade tends to force price convergence  Moreover, in the 
long run, uniform prices might reduce drug development by limiting returns to R&D 
(Darba and Rovira 1998;Vogel 2004).  
The economic literature on parallel trade is limited because of the data 
availability.  Most studies finds ambiguous welfare effects (Maskus and Chen 2004). 
However, these studies provide insights that are useful for framing policy and are thus 
summarized in the subsequent chapter. 
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2.2.4 EU Pharmaceutical Background Summary  
As shown in Figure B.1, all member countries have different health care systems 
and pharmaceutical price controls that create market distortions, resulting in price 
differences.  This creates the opportunity for parallel trade, which in combination with 
the EU single market principle calling for the free movement of goods could lead to price 
convergence (Danzon 1997b).  As discussed in chapter 1, solutions to this conflict 
between national price regulations, open competitive markets, and reasonable profits for 
R&D are being debated by the EC.  Currently, EU pharmaceutical prices are relatively 
low, i.e. 45 percent below US prices. One potential solution, a single European 
administered price control, is politically infeasible, and it is further unlikely that member 
nations would give up their market power while having to maintain the responsibility for 
their health care budgets (Pollard 2003). Therefore, the G10 recommends coordination of 
national results, not of the underlying regulations themselves.  
An important question is how this conflict impacts price convergence among the 
member states. This dissertation helps enlighten this issue for the EU pharmaceutical 
industry by looking at empirical evidence of price convergence between 1994 and 2003. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature relating to three different 
areas: market integration and price convergence in the EU, the impact of parallel trade on 
prices, and cross country price differences in pharmaceuticals.  
 
3.1 Market Integration and Price Convergence in the EU 
The European Commission recognizes the importance of price competition and 
price convergence through a single market program:  “The removal of barriers and the 
freedom of supply which businesses will enjoy as a result of the single market program 
should lead, through increased competitive pressure, to some downward convergence of 
prices of benefit to the customer.  From the point of view of producers, the competitive 
pressure will be exerted first and foremost on price-cost margins, particularly in those 
sectors in which they held a certain monopoly power or position.  Producers will also be 
induced – urged on by pressure on their margins – to become more efficient and thus cut 
their production and distribution costs.  The increased pressure which will be brought to 
bear in this way on costs and price-cost margins will be a powerful means of causing 
prices to converge on levels more consistent with economic and technical efficiency” 
(DRI 1996).  Furthermore, the EU Treaty also requires the Commission and the European 
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Central Bank to report on convergence at the macroeconomic level because convergence 
will ensure that a single EMU interest rate is appropriate for all participants. Moreover, 
when the EMU is hit by a macroeconomic shock, a high degree of convergence limits 
asymmetric economic developments at the country level, which can no longer be 
addressed by adjusting the exchange rate (European Commission 2004).  Finally, price 
convergence indicates the evolution of product market integration.  
DRI (1996) showed a trend towards price convergence in the EU-12 during 1980–
1993 using price indexes for detailed product and service categories collected by 
Eurostat.  This trend was more pronounced for consumer and equipment goods than for 
energy, services, and construction.  The convergence in consumer products and services 
has accelerated since the single market program.  Convergence has been comparatively 
greater for the three 1989 entrants (Greece, Portugal and Spain) than the EU-9, which 
may reflect a catch-up effect of integration.  The product categories with the greatest 
convergence were in highly traded (more open) industries.  Four products and services 
related to health care had the highest price disparities in 1993.  The study concluded that 
78 product/services categories, representing 60% of EU private consumption 
expenditures, had significant price convergence, compared to only eight cases of price 
divergence (DRI 1996). 
Using Eurostat panel data for 1975–1995 on monthly consumer price indexes for 
12 EU countries, Sosvilla-Rivero and Gil-Pareja (2004) examined how European market 
integration has affected cross-country price dispersion in the EU.  They used the Levin 
and Lin (1992) convergence equation to test for unit roots with panel data, with Germany 
as the benchmark country based on its central role in the EMS.  The estimated speed of 
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convergence (β) for the general CPI was –0.006, which implies a half life of a shock of 
115 months. The highest estimated β was for fruits (–0.073) with a half life of 9 months, 
and the lowest estimated β was for recreation (–0.001) with a half-life of 693 months. 
The study concluded that there was empirical evidence of price convergence, especially 
for traded goods. The study failed to obtain such evidence in the cases of non-tradable 
goods or goods that are subject to special taxes or regulations. 
A similar study by Gil-Pareja and Sosvilla-Rivero (2004) examined the degree 
and recent evolution of export-price dispersion between 1988 and 2001 among seven EU 
countries (Belgium-Luxembourg, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the 
UK) for a number of eight-digit products using the Eurostat data.  The data set was based 
on the annual free on board (f.o.b.) value and quantity of exports to selected OECD 
countries.  It is expected that relatively fixed exchange rates established by EMS would 
result in price convergence by imposing price discipline among its members.  As a 
measure of export-price dispersion, they used the coefficient of price variation, i.e. the 
ratio of the standard deviation to the mean, which is invariant to changes of scale.  To 
assess price convergence, the time series of variation for each source country-product 
pair were regressed on a constant and a linear time trend. The results of the study showed 
that export-price dispersion was usually lower in the sample than across OECD countries. 
There was little evidence of convergence, but this was also stronger across the EU 
countries.  The conclusion was that although monetary stability may aid price 
convergence, it does not necessarily lead to complete convergence. 
Two other studies, Rogers (2001) and Rogers et al. (2001), found direct evidence 
of price convergence in Europe, using European price indices from actual prices of 168 
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goods and services, in 26 cities, in 18 countries, between 1990 and 1999.  Prices became 
less dispersed in the euro area and convergence was evident for traded goods, more in the 
first half of the 1990s than the second half.  By some measures, traded goods price 
dispersion across the euro area was close to that across US cities. 
European Commission (2004) also concluded that there is a continuing 
convergence of prices of recent entrants towards the considerably higher levels in the 
EU-15, again due to the catching-up process and price deregulation. As a result, price 
convergence in the new member states has been faster than in the EU-15.  
Camarero et al. (2000) examined price and inflation convergence between three 
European countries (Italy, Spain and the UK). The results rejected long-run convergence 
in all cases but found that prices catch up with the European average.  
There have been several studies of price convergence in specific EU product 
markets, particularly the car market (Gaulier and Haller 2000;Goldberg and Verboven 
2001, 2004;Verboven 1996).  Goldberg and Verboven (2005) investigated the 
relationship between integration and price convergence using panel data on car prices 
between 1970 and 2000.  Approximately 150 vehicles per year and five markets 
[Belgium (the benchmark country), France, Germany, Italy and the UK] were included.  
They found strong evidence of both the absolute and relative versions of the Law of One 
Price.  Hedonic regressions were estimated to control for possible variations in 
characteristics of models across countries, and these quality-adjusted prices were used to 
form the dependent variable for the Levin and Lin (1992) convergence equations.  The 
relative version of the Law of One Price implied half lives of shocks between 1.3 and 1.6 
years.  
 23
Kerem et al. (2005) estimated the convergence of health care expenditures in the 
EU using β- , σ- , γ- convergence for the 1992–2001 period.  The study demonstrated that 
even though economic integration has facilitated economic growth, the EU’s enlargement 
process has not brought about harmonization of health care expenditures in the EU-8 new 
member states (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia).  It would take approximately three years for health care expenditures as a 
share of GDP in the EU-8 countries to move halfway to the EU-15 average.  
Lastly, Ratfai (2006) examined price convergence among geographically close 
locations that share the same currency, using a sample of highly disaggregated product 
level prices of very narrowly defined homogeneous items in Hungary.  Employing a 
series of panel data unit root tests using the Levin et al. (2002) procedure, the results 
showed that price differentials fading away quickly, with an estimated half-life of 
between 2.2 and 12.0 months and a median half-life of 4.0 months.   
Price convergence in pharmaceutical markets has not been subject to empirical 
investigation.  However, the pharmaceutical industry was placed high among the most 
sensitive sectors of the single market program (Allen et al. 1998). 
 
3.2 Impact of Parallel Trade in the EU   
Parallel imports, also called gray-market imports, is the process whereby goods 
protected by an intellectual property right (i.e. patent, trademark or copyright) are placed 
into circulation in one market, and then re-imported into a second market without the 
authorization of the local owner of the intellectual property right. There is debate as to 
whether parallel trade leads to lower prices for consumers or whether it undermines 
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intellectual property protection or both and therefore weakens the incentives to invest in 
R&D, which may in turn harm the consumer in various ways (Arfwedson 2003). A 
country’s law concerning the territorial exhaustion of these rights is an important 
component of how it regulates and limits their use. The EU pursues community (regional) 
exhaustion but excludes parallel trade coming from nonmembers (Maskus 2001). 
Parallel imports of pharmaceuticals dramatically increased during the last decade. 
PI were estimated at € 4,265 million in the EU in 2003, which represents 5% of the 
pharmacy market value (at ex-factory prices) (EFPIA 2005).  
Economic theory predicts that parallel trade (imports) forces price convergence 
(Danzon 1998;Ganslandt and Maskus 2004;Huttin 1999;Maskus 2001;Towse 1998). 
However, there is limited empirical work on the impact of parallel imports on prices.  
Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) develop a model using bi-weekly pharmaceutical product 
data from Sweden.  They use an OLS specification in which prices are affected by the 
number of parallel importers, the potential for parallel import competition and a time 
trend.  The Swedish market provided a natural test of parallel trade because it was 
prohibited until 1995, when Sweden entered the EU and adopted the EU exhaustion 
principle.  They found that the prices of drugs subject to competition from parallel 
imports fell relative to those of other drugs between 1994 and 1999, concluding that 
parallel imports significantly reduced prices of manufactured products by 12–19%.  
Chaudhry et al. (1994) interviewed 36 multinational pharmaceutical managers 
about their expectations of parallel trade in the EU.  A majority expected parallel imports 
to continue to exist, but opinions were mixed regarding whether future parallel imports 
threatened the industry.  Pharmaceutical firms have been considering ways of reducing 
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the impact of drugs entering EU markets by way of parallel trade, especially from Spain 
(Chaudhry et al. 1997). 
 
3.3 Cross Country Price Differences for Pharmaceuticals 
International price comparisons in the pharmaceutical industry have been the 
subject of several empirical studies.  Schut and Van Bergeijk (1986) compared the prices 
of identical packages of pharmaceutical products for 32 countries during 1975 and 
examined whether factors including GDP per capita, volume of consumption, population, 
volume of consumption per capita, patent protection, indirect price controls, and direct 
price controls contributed to price differences. From the OLS estimate, a 10% increase in 
per capita GDP was associated with 8% higher drug prices.  In addition, direct price 
control measures resulted in a 20% price reduction.  Bulk purchasing through a 
centralized government agency, promotion of the use of generics and excluding patent 
protection were also successful in lowering pharmaceutical prices.     
To date, most studies have focused on pharmaceutical price differences for the 
US, Europe and Japan as a measure of industry competitiveness.  Recently, cross-national 
price comparisons have been used for drawing conclusions about differences in average 
prices, evaluating regulatory system performance, and setting domestic prices as a 
regulatory policy. 
Danzon and Kim (1998) argued that previous international price comparison 
studies were biased due to unrepresentative and small samples.  They analyzed IMS data 
for the sales of cardiovascular products in the seven countries listed below during the 
year October 1991 to September 1992, defining the drug by molecule-therapeutic 
 26
category and using units of one tablet, one capsule, and five ml of a liquid as proxies for a 
single dose. They reported Laspeyres, Paasche and Fisher price indices relative to the US. 
The Laspeyres differentials of Japan 19.1%, Canada 16.6%, Germany –11.8%, Sweden –
12.9%, Italy –29.6%, UK –35.4 and France –49.8% implies that other studies overstated 
US price differentials.  A general conclusion was that international price comparisons are 
extremely sensitive to choices made about sample selection, price and quantity units, the 
relative weight given to consumption patterns in different countries, and the use of 
exchange rates. 
Danzon and Chao (2000b) investigated cross-country price differences using IMS 
data on all molecules for the October 1991 to September 1992 period.  They examined 
the contribution of various product and market characteristics to the dispersion of relative 
prices in the same countries as the previous study, using both price indices and the 
hedonic regression model.  The conclusion was that the countries with strict price 
regulation, France, Italy and Japan, have systematically lower prices for older molecules 
and global products, relative to less-regulated regimes such as the US and UK.  In 
addition, generic competition provides more effective price control in less regulated 
regimes such as the US.  With the same data, Danzon and Chao (2000a) tested the 
hypothesis that the regulation of manufacturer prices and retail pharmacy margins 
undermines price competition.  They found that price competition between generic 
competitors is significant in unregulated or less regulated markets (the US, the UK, 
Canada and Germany) but that regulation undermines generic competition in strict 
regulatory systems (France, Italy, Japan).  Earlier, Danzon (1997a) found that the most 
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stringent regulatory regimes (France and Italy) have performed relatively poorly in terms 
of innovation, while Japan has produced many new drugs but few global drugs.     
Recently, Danzon and Furukawa (2003) compared the average prices of 
pharmaceuticals in eight countries (Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Mexico and the UK) to those in the US, using post-1992 IMS data for 249 leading 
molecules.  The results showed Japan’s prices to be 27% higher than US prices, and other 
countries’ prices ranging from 6% (the UK) to 33% (Canada) lower than US prices.  
They also concluded that income differentials contribute, both directly and indirectly, to 
price differentials.    
Garattini et al. (1994) analyzed the differences between the pharmaceutical 
markets of Italy, the UK, Germany and France from both the supply and demand sides, 
taking into account public policy differences that affected public expenditure and 
industry turnover.  The sample included eight drugs that were top sellers in all four 
countries in 1992.  In most cases, retail prices were lowest in France and highest in 
Germany.  The analysis concluded that on both the demand and supply sides, sectoral 
differences across in the four countries were striking.  Price regulation was one of several 
variables involved in pharmaceutical policy, with demand side regulations being equally 
important.  
Ess et al. (2003) showed that, as a consequence of pharmaceutical market 
fragmentation, prices varied across Europe.  Prices were substantially lower in Greece, 
Spain and France but higher in Belgium, Switzerland, the UK and Denmark. 
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Chapter 4 
Research Design 
 
This chapter focuses on the data and methods used in this dissertation.  The first 
section describes the objectives and hypotheses tested.  The second section describes the 
data analyzed.  The third section describes the methodologies applied, including the 
variables and model specifications. 
 
4.1 Objectives and Hypothesis 
As previously outlined, it is expected that market integration of sourcing, retailing 
and distribution contributes to price convergence among EU countries (Coopers 1996). 
However, because the relationship between European integration and price convergence 
depends on many different structural, behavioral, and policy factors that differ across 
markets, price convergence patterns are expected to vary by industry.  The objective of 
this dissertation is to test the hypothesis of price convergence in the EU pharmaceutical 
industry, which has not yet been studied.   The methods of controlling for the quality and 
market characteristics and the model specifications are adopted from Goldberg and 
Verboven (2005) and Danzon and Chao (2000b).  The analysis also examines bilateral 
price differences using Laspeyres and Paasche indexes without these adjustments. 
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4.2 Description of Data 
The data for this dissertation represent selected cardiovascular pharmaceuticals.  
They come from IMS Health, which collects and reports sales and price data at the level 
within the pharmaceutical market supply and distribution chain that provides the most 
accurate information for a country (IMS 2005a).  Products are classified by the Anatomic 
Therapeutic Category (ATC) system, which is similar to the World Health Organization 
(WHO) system (WHO 2002), and is developed and maintained by EphMrA (EPHMRA 
2004).  Products are categorized in the sales, medical and promotional audits according to 
the EphMrA/PBIRG Anatomical Classification System, the main principle of which is 
that there is only one Anatomical Classification code allocated to a product/pack.  This 
allows each product to be classified consistently in all countries (EphMrA/PBIRG 2005).  
 
4.2.1 Definition of Drug and Characteristics of IMS Health Data 
Prior to Danzon (1999), cross country studies compared the price for a single pack 
in the base country, but this pack may not be typical or even available in other countries 
(Berndt 2000).  Danzon recognized that samples using only comparison packs with the 
same ingredient, manufacturer, brand name, dosage form, pack size and strength in each 
country will exclude generic and OTC products.  These are likely close substitutes for 
originator and prescription drugs, respectively, so their omission will potentially result in 
unrepresentative samples (Hellerstein 1998), a problem that might be exacerbated by not 
including all forms and strengths (Ellison et al. 1997;Scherer 1993;Scherer 2000).  
Danzon therefore defined the drug by active ingredient, i.e. molecule (MOL), and ATC 
without regard to manufacturer and brand name.  All forms of a given molecule, 
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including generics and licensed products, are combined to form a weighted average price 
per MOL/ATC.  Differences between products with identical MOL and ATC are ignored, 
but this is presumed to be much less problematic than failing to sample substitutes and all 
forms and strengths. 
The IMS Health measure that meets the criteria of being available for all dosage 
forms and strengths is the IMS Standard Unit (SU), which defines a single dose as one 
tablet or capsule, five milliliters of a liquid (i.e. one teaspoon), or one ampoule or vial of 
an injectable product (IMS 2002, 2005b).  Aggregation of all dosage forms, strengths, 
and packs minimizes sample selection bias.  Danzon and Kim (1998) found that this 
strategy permits over 90% of sales to be included for the US, the UK and Canada, and 
encompasses over two-thirds of sales for most other countries.   
The ATC divides products into four hierarchical groups according to anatomical 
site of action, their indications, therapeutic use, composition and mode of action, etc. in 
the Anatomical Classification System, with levels beyond the 1st identifying therapeutic 
and pharmacological subgroups.  For instance, the following scheme illustrates the 
complete structure of the data for one of the ATC categories (C10) used in this research: 
C - CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM 
 (1st level, anatomical main group) 
 
C10 - LIPID-REGULATING/ANTI-ATHEROMA PREPERATIONS 
(2nd level, therapeutic main group) 
 
C10A - CHOLESTEROL & TRIGLYCERIDE REDUCTION PREPERATIONS  
(3rd level, pharmacological/therapeutic subgroup) 
  
C10A1 - STATINS (HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors) 
(4th level, chemical/pharmacological/therapeutic subgroup). 
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Consider the example of Zocor® (Merck), a well-known drug in the C10A 
category used to reduce the risk of heart attack and stroke in patients with multiple risk 
factors for heart disease such as high cholesterol and high blood pressure.  It is difficult to 
compare the price of Zocor® across countries because strengths, forms and pack sizes 
vary greatly.  In the UK, Zocor® is available in strengths of 10, 20, 40, and 80 MG, pack 
sizes of 10, 28, 30, and 100 tablets, and 20 different forms.  In Germany, strength levels 
are 5, 20, 40 MG and MGFT (e.g. FT=Forts means strong), pack sizes are 28, 30, 50, 
100, and there are more than 50 different forms.  Moreover, many other products have the 
exact same MOL, Simvastatin, and are thus close substitutes.  And Lipitor® (Pfizer) 
serves the same purpose and is thus under the same therapeutic category (C10A) as 
Zocor®, but has a different MOL, Atorvastatin, as well as different pack sizes, strengths 
and forms.   
To avoid the above problem, the main unit of analysis in this study is the 
molecule-indication, defined by a single MOL and three-digit (3rd level) ATC (although 
results change little if the ATC requirement is dropped and the drug is defined simply as 
the MOL).  A country’s SU price for a MOL/ATC is its volume-weighted average price 
per dose over all presentations, including generics, licensed, OTC, and parallel imported 
products (Danzon and Furukawa 2003).  Multiple molecule drugs are excluded because 
the relative mix of active ingredients varies across countries.   
Because of data availability and cost, this study is limited to retail sales of drugs 
for cardiovascular disease (CVD), which is among the top three causes of death in OECD 
countries.  CVD treatment has significant health policy implications, because once CVD 
patients begin drug therapy, it must continue for the remainder of their lives.  Of the 29 
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IMS Health three-digit CVD categories, this dissertation samples the eight studied by 
Dickson and Jacobzone (2003).  Listed in table A.4, these categories cover a wide range 
of both newer and older innovations that form the core of pharmacotherapy for CVD. 
The five countries in the sample are Germany, the UK, Italy, Spain, and France.  
These countries have the largest pharmaceutical production (Figure B.2) and sales 
(Figure B.3) in the EU-15 (OECD 2003) and represent the five largest pharmaceutical 
markets in the world after the US and Japan (Table A.5) (Pammolli et al. 2004). 
Restricted as described above, the IMS Health data include 658 molecules (119 for 
France, 177 for Germany, 135 for Italy, 119 for Spain and 108 for the UK) for the 1994–
2003 period. 
 
4.2.2 Sample Construction 
Different data sets are constructed for different parts of the analysis.  Index 
calculations are based on bilateral matches (to Germany and Spain) across countries for 
each year.  Depending on the benchmark country, an average of 50% of retail sales do not 
match bilaterally and thus are not included.  A similar index calculation data set (for 
global molecules) is constructed based on matches for all five countries for each year.  
The match rate varies from 21% (Germany) to 32% (Spain) depending on the benchmark 
country.  As Danzon and Chao (2000b) comment, “This heterogeneity in product-mix 
across countries implies that even the price indexes, which start with the universe of 
sales, may be unavoidably biased.” 
Quasi-hedonic price regressions are based on two separate samples, a balanced 
panel of all 379 molecules and the 38 global molecules over the 10 years and five 
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countries, yielding sample sizes of 3,790 and 1,900, respectively.  Table A.6 provides 
details for this data set by ATC/MOL and country. 
To form the dependent variable in the price convergence regressions, two distinct 
bilateral matched samples are constructed, with 3,210 and 2,940 observations depending 
on whether Germany or Spain, respectively, serves as the base country.  Another sample 
is constructed to form the dependent variable measured in deviations from the cross 
country average.  This sample includes all 379 molecules and has 3,790 observations. A 
final sample for global molecules contains 38 molecules and has 1,900 observations.  
 
4.3 Methodology 
The first part of the analysis calculates price indexes by examining bilateral 
standard unit price differences for all molecules and global molecules using selected 
benchmark countries.  The second part estimates quasi-hedonic regressions in order to 
generate price measures that control for variation in characteristics of the drugs.  The 
third part uses the residuals from these regressions as the prices in the price convergence 
regressions.  The next three sections describe the methods and model specifications used 
in each component of the analysis. 
 
4.3.1 Price Indexes 
The differences across sample countries in average drug prices, unadjusted for 
quality characteristics, are calculated using weighted price indexes.  Previous studies 
showed that indexes using weighted averages are more accurate than those using 
unweighted averages (Gilles 1940). The most common price indexes, both generally and 
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in this literature, are the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes.  Griliches and Cockburn (1994) 
used these indexes to show significant differences in effects of patent expiration and 
generic entry estimated using various price indexes.  For one of the drugs studied, the 
standard price index rose by 14% over 45 months following patent expiration, while the 
preferred alternative index fell by 48%.  A commentary response to their study by 
Feenstra (1997) supported their approach.  Berndt et al. (1993) found that the BLS drug 
price index grows approximately 50% more rapidly than an alternative index using the 
IMS aggregate price data that includes generic drugs.  Berndt et al. (1996) estimated 
weighted Laspeyres and Paasche price indexes using the IMS universe of antidepressant 
drug prices and found large differences between the fixed-weight and average-weighted 
versions.  Berndt et al. (1999) reviewed the conceptual and measurement issues 
underlying the construction of US medical care consumer and producer price indexes.  
Recently, Berndt et al. (2002) estimated Laspeyres, Paasche and Fisher indexes 
that showed a small rise in price and quantity for treatments of depression during 1991–
1996.  Kokoski (1992) had earlier used these indexes to make inter-area cost of living 
comparisons.  In sum, the literature suggests these indexes are powerful tools that are 
useful for making bilateral and multilateral price, output, input and productivity 
comparisons but can come to different conclusions (Caves et al. 1982).  
In this study, Laspeyres and Paasche price and quantity indexes are calculated 
both across areas and over time for individual country, using samples of all molecules 
and only global molecules, to examine quality-unadjusted price differences.  In addition, 
the Bortkiewicz decomposition formula is used to examine the ratio of Paasche and 
Laspeyres index differentials. 
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4.3.1.1 Specification of the Indexes  
The set of prices and quantities at time t are denoted pt and qt, respectively, and 
weights are fixed at time zero.  The Laspeyres, i.e. base-weighted, price (quantity) index 
weights the price (quantity) of each good by the quantity (price) of that good at time zero: 
∑
∑=
00
0
0 qp
qp
P tt    (Laspeyres Price Index)  
∑
∑=
00
0
0 qp
qp
Q tt  (Laspeyres Quantity Index) 
The Laspeyres price index, for example, is a weighted average of individual good price 
changes, with the weights equaling the expenditure share for each good in the base 
period.  It compares the price of a base period basket of goods with the price of the same 
basket in the current period.  In contrast, the Paasche price index compares the price of a 
current basket of goods with the price of the same basket in the base period: 
∑
∑=
t
tt
t qp
qp
P
0
0  (Paasche Price Index) 
∑
∑=
0
0 qp
qp
Q
t
tt
t (Paasche Quantity Index) 
Because prices are weighted by current period quantities (and vice versa for the 
quantity index), the weights change for each period in which a Paasche index is 
calculated (Allen 1975).  Additionally, because Laspeyres uses base weights while 
Paasche uses current weights, the two indexes are generally different even for the same 
period, but usually are similar when the periods being compared are not too far apart (as 
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in this study).  The Paasche price index tends to be lower than the Laspeyres when prices 
are increasing and higher when prices are decreasing. 
The ratios of the Paasche and Laspeyres price and quantity indexes are the same.  
This ratio, P/L, depends on the dispersion in price and quantity relatives to their means.  
Specifically, denoting price and quantity with the subscripts p and q, the Bortkiewicz 
decomposition formula, Pp/Lp=Pq/Lq=1+(r Vp Vq), shows that P/L differs from one based 
on the coefficient of correlation between price and quantity ( r ) , and the coefficients of 
variation of price (Vp) and quantity (Vq), all measured relative to the respective Laspeyres 
index (Jonas and Sardy 1970).  The divergence between P and L increases with the 
correlation between price and quantity and their individual dispersions. 
Because Vp and Vq are positive, P > L if r > 0, i.e. prices and quantities tend to 
move in the same direction between years 0 and t, while P < L if r < 0, i.e. prices and 
quantities tend to move in opposite directions.  This is known as the Gerschenkron effect 
(Gerschenkron 1947, 1955) that price and quantity indexes change in different industries.  
The characteristics of Gerschenkron effect is a negative coefficient of correlation 
between price and quantity, which accounts for the direction of the divergence between 
Laspeyres and Paasche indexes.  The typical economic case of P > L is a market 
dominated by suppliers, so that the reaction to a price increase is an outward shift in 
supply.  Examples include exporters selling on a large international market and suppliers 
selling both domestic and imported goods in a market.  The typical economic case of L > 
P is a demand-dominated market where consumers purchases vary inversely with price 
movements.  The leading example is the market for consumer goods (Allen 1975).  In 
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addition, L > P might simply reflect a substitution effect, with each country using 
relatively more of those products that are relatively cheap in that country. 
 
4.3.2 Quasi-Hedonic Price Regressions 
When making international price comparisons, international differences in 
product specifications pose a problem (Kravis and Lipsey 1969).  Products serving the 
same purpose might not only be highly differentiated across domestic producers, but 
might further have considerable differences in characteristics across countries.  For 
example, a Honda Accord might have different horsepower in different countries, or 
come with automatic transmission in some countries and manual transmission in others.  
More relevant for this study, drugs come in different forms, pack sizes, and strength 
levels in different countries. 
This study uses hedonic regressions to address this problem.  Framing a product 
in terms of the characteristics that affect its value, hedonic regression estimates the 
marginal contribution of each characteristic (Sirmans et al. 2005), thus explaining the 
price of a good in terms of these characteristics (Wooldridge 2003).  Here, hedonic price 
regressions estimate the value of observed characteristics of the drugs/molecules.  Drug 
characteristics and prices also differ across countries because of their regulatory and 
reimbursement environments.  Because market (competition) variables are used as 
explanatory variables along with drug quality characteristics, and pure hedonic models 
control for only the latter (Diewert 2003, 2005), the corresponding models in this study 
are more appropriately termed quasi-hedonic price regressions (Danzon and Chao 
2000b).   
 38
4.3.2.1 Specification of the Quasi-Hedonic Price Models 
The model is a semi-log model, 
tjkktjjttjktjk ucXP ,,,,,,,ln +++++= θδγβ ,  
where lnPk,j,t  is the log price per SU for molecule k in country j and year t, X is a vector 
of quality and market characteristics for that molecule, country and year t, γt is year 
indicators, δj is country indicators, θj,t is an interactions between indicators for country j 
and year t, ck  is an indicator for molecule k, and uk,j,t  is the remaining error.  The main 
goals of this regression are to obtain consistent estimates of θj,t, which reflects the pattern 
of bilateral country price differences over time when the molecule and observable quality 
and market characteristics are held constant, and uk,j,t , which represents cross country 
price differences that cannot be explained by observable drug characteristics, specific 
molecules available and average year-specific price differences. 
This model is estimated using panel data methods that account for time- and 
country-invariant unobserved heterogeneity associated with each specific molecule.  Both 
fixed and random effect models are estimated.  These vary according to their treatment of 
the unobserved molecule-specific effect ck , which is called a “random effect” when 
treated as a random variable and a “fixed effect” when treated as a parameter to be 
estimated for each molecule.  Both models require zero conditional mean to hold, i.e. 
E(uk,j,t | Xk,j, ck) = 0, in order to generate consistent parameter estimates.  Because the 
random effect model implicitly places ck in the error term, for consistency it further 
requires zero correlation between the observed explanatory variables and the unobserved 
effect, i.e. Cov(Xk,j,t, ck) = 0.  In contrast, the fixed effect model allows arbitrary 
correlation between ck and Xk,j,t.  The fixed effect model is therefore more robust than the 
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random effect model.  The tradeoff is that the effects of time-constant variables can be 
estimated in the latter but not the former, because there is no way to distinguish the 
effects of time-constant observables and unobservables (Baltagi 2005;Wooldridge 2001). 
Lastly, the Hausman (1978) test is used to check whether the random effects model gives 
similar results to the fixed effects model and is therefore valid.   
Most measures of molecule quality and market competition in the data are time-
varying, as are the country/year interactions.  In principle, drug quality also encompasses 
therapeutic value and convenience, characteristics that are of intrinsic value but are not 
observable.  If these are time-invariant and molecule-specific, the fixed effect model is 
appropriate.  However, in order to include ATC3 indicators to proxy for market and 
regulatory factors that might differ across ATC3 categories, a random effect model is also 
estimated.  One time-invariant market competition variable, therapeutic substitute 
molecule entry lag, is also included as an explanatory factor in the random effect model. 
 
4.3.2.2 Description of Variables  
Price (Leusuprice) is the average price per standard unit for each ATC/molecule, 
defined as the volume-weighted average retail price over all forms and packs.  Local 
currency prices are converted to euros by IMS Health using constant exchange rates, 
which minimize effects of exchange rate fluctuations.  
Molecule Age (Molage) is the number of years since the first product launch of 
molecule k in country j, and is the same for all products in a molecule.  
Strength (Strengthg) is the mean grams of active ingredient per standard unit, 
averaged over all packs.  Standard units are multiplied by the different strength levels, 
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and this quantity is divided by the total standard units. This variable was complicated to 
calculate due to the various measurements in the reported strength levels for packs in 
each molecule for the sample countries.  All reported units, including international units, 
micrograms, percent, milligrams, pints, and qualitative units such as strong, weak, extra 
strong and mild, were converted to grams in consultation with IMS Health experts. 
Form Code (Formcode) represents the number of different formulations of the 
products in each molecule, and is included as a measure of the choice and convenience 
available to patients.  Forms include different types of tablets (e.g. film, chewable, gel), 
capsules, ampoules, powders, drops, syrups, syringes, and liquids, along with different 
strengths and pack sizes.  For example, the molecule metoprolol (in C7A) was available 
in 118 different formulations/presentations in Germany in 2003.  
Pack Size (Packsize) is the average number of standard units over all packs in a 
molecule.  Pack sizes were converted to IMS standard units according to guidelines 
provided by IMS Health (IMS 2006), multiplied by standard units per molecule and 
divided by the total standard units in the molecule. 
Global Penetration-Diffusion (Globpenet) is the number of sample countries (i.e. 
between 0 and 5) in which the molecule is available, as a measure of therapeutic value.  
Generic Competitors (Gencompet) is the number of manufacturers of the products 
in the molecule, including originators, licensees, parallel imports and generics. 
Therapeutic Substitute Molecules (Thsubsmol) is the number of therapeutic 
competitors that are chemically distinct but used to treat the same indication, i.e. the 
number of molecules in the ATC3. 
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Therapeutic Substitute Molecule Entry Lag (Thsubsmolentlag) is the number of 
years between this molecule’s launch date and the launch of the first molecule in the 
ATC3, to control for any first mover advantage, and is time-invariant. 
 
4.3.3 Price Convergence Regressions  
The earlier described quasi-hedonic price regressions (without time, country and 
time-country interaction indicators) are used to form the dependent variable in the price 
convergence equations.  In particular, the residuals capture price variation that cannot be 
attributed to observable characteristics, trends in price differences specific to country 
pairs, or specific molecules.  These thus form the relevant prices in the price convergence 
regressions.  Goldberg and Verboven (2005) used a similar method to test price 
convergence in the EU car market. 
A common approach to examining price convergence is to apply a unit root test to 
determine whether price differential series are stationary, i.e. have mean and variance that 
do not vary systematically over time and are thus stable.  The rejection of the unit root 
hypothesis implies that relative prices have stationary time series and will thus converge 
in the long run.  Failure to reject the unit root hypothesis implies that relative prices 
follow a random path, so that any deviation from a single price becomes permanent (Fan 
and Wei 2006).  Moreover, presence of a unit root implies that a shock today has a long 
lasting impact, determining whether a process has a unit root is of interest in its own 
right.  Unit root tests for a single time series, such as the often used Augmented-Dickey 
Fuller test, have low power in the sense that they too often reject stationarity.  Levin et al. 
(2002) showed that use of a unit root test for panel data can significantly increase test 
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power (Maddala 1999;Maddala and Wu 1999).  Their model assumes that each panel unit 
shares the same AR(1) coefficient, but allows for individual and time effects and a time 
trend.  This test maybe viewed as a pooled Dickey-Fuller test or an Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test when lags are included, with the null hypothesis of nonstationary (Bornhorst 
and Baum 2001). 
 
4.3.3.1 Specification of the Price Convergence Models   
The following convergence equations are based on the panel data unit root test 
developed by Levin and Lin (1992;Levin and Lin 1993) and Levin et al. (2002): 
Model 1: tjkltjk
L
l
ltjktjk ppp ,,,,
1
1,,,, εγβ +Δ+=Δ −
=
− ∑  
Model 2: tjkltjk
L
l
ltjkjktjk ppp ,,,,
1
1,,,,, εγβα +Δ++=Δ −
=
− ∑  
Model 3: tjkltjk
L
l
ltjkjktjk ptpp ,,,,
1
1,,,,, εγδβα +Δ+++=Δ −
=
− ∑  
In model 1, the null hypothesis H0: β = 0 is tested against the alternative H1: β < 0. 
In model 2, individual molecule/country fixed effects are added, and H0: β = 0 
and αj,k = 0 is tested against H1: β < 0 and αj,k ≠ 0. 
In model 3, a time trend is added, and H0: β=0 and δ=0 is tested against H1: β <0 
and δ ≠ 0.    
These three models serve different purposes. The first is used to test the absolute 
version of the Law of One Price, while the second model is used to test the relative 
version of the Law of One Price.  Model 3 is not preferred in the literature but it is 
estimated for both adjusted and unadjusted price convergence estimations to compare the 
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results.  For series that have clear time trends, the process must be modified to test for 
unit roots.  A trend stationary process can be mistaken for unit root process if we do not 
control for a time trend.  
The convergence equation dependent variable represents the first difference in the 
log-price of molecule k in country j.  This first difference is specified relative to a base 
country in one specification, and relative to the cross country average in another.  In other 
words, if q represents log price, the two dependent variable specifications are 
1) 1,,,,,, −−=Δ tjktjktjk ppp , where tyBaseCountrktjktjk qqp ,,,,,, −=  and p k,BaseCountry,t = 1;  
2) 1,,,,,, −−=Δ tjktjktjk ppp  with tjryaverageCrosscounttjktjk qqp ,,,,,, −= .  
The test for unit roots relates the first difference to the log price of the previous 
period; if the coefficient of the previous period’s price is negative, price differentials 
across countries become smaller over time (β <0) and the hypothesis of a unit root is 
rejected. Therefore, β denotes the speed of convergence.  Under the null hypothesis of no 
convergence, β = 0 and a shock to pk,j,t is permanent (i.e. has a unit root).  If β ≥ 0, the 
price differential is non-stationary, implying persistent price divergence.  If β < 0, prices 
converge.  The coefficient estimate is tested according to the critical values reported in 
Levin and Lin (1992, 1993) and t-star statistics (adjusted t statistics, tabulated in Levin et 
al. 2002) are also reported. After transformation by factors provided by Levin and Lin 
(1992, 1993), the t-star statistic is distributed standard normal under the null hypothesis 
of nonstationarity. The half-life of a shock to the price differential is 
)1ln(
)2ln(
β+
− . 
Model 2, used to test the relative version of the Law of One Price, is the primary 
focus of this study.  The αk,j capture price differences that are specific to country pairs and 
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molecules.  Large values would indicate market segmentation.  Even in integrated 
markets, some permanent cross-country price dispersion might remain, reflecting local 
factors that cannot be arbitraged away.  If this dispersion fully explains any price 
differentials, the relative version of the Law of One Price holds.  If instead prices of 
identical products are equal across countries, the absolute version of the law of one price 
holds (Goldberg and Verboven 2004).  Dividing these fixed effects by –β yields the long-
term systematic price differentials across countries.  For brevity, the average αj,k across 
molecules by country is reported. 
The lags (L) ltjkp −Δ ,,  are used to account for possible serial correlation in the 
error term.  Because of the limited number of years available in the data set, the 
estimations include lags of zero, one or two years, consistent with previous studies.  In 
addition to these, Campbell and Perron’s top-down approach (Pammolli et al. 2004) is 
also used to find optimum amount of lag order when the equations are estimated.  In this 
approach, the lag order is set to a maximum of two lags for each molecule/country 
estimation.  If the absolute value of the t-statistic of γ2 is less than 1.96, the lag order is 
set to one lag and the equation is re-estimated.  If this t-statistic is less than 1.96, no lags 
are included. 
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Chapter 5 
Research Results  
 
This chapter describes the estimation results.  The first section discusses the price 
indexes, the second section discusses the quasi-hedonic price regressions and the last 
section discusses price convergence.  
 
5.1 Unadjusted Bilateral Standard Unit Price Differences  
This section reports the estimated Laspeyres and Paasche price and quantity 
indexes, as well as the decomposition of P/L differentials, with Spain and Germany as the 
benchmark countries.  Spain typically has the lowest drug prices in Europe and the most 
pharmaceutical regulations, while Germany has high prices and fewer regulations.  The 
standard unit is the volume measure and the fixed euro is the monetary measure.  The 
Laspeyres index uses benchmark country weights, whereas the Paasche index uses own 
country weights.  The indexes are measured for both bilateral matched molecules and 
global molecules.  In addition, to investigate country specific temporal fluctuations, year 
by year price differentials are measured for each country.    
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5.1.1 Standard Unit Price Differences for Bilaterally Matched Molecules 
Table 1 shows SU prices relative to Germany.  In 1994, Laspeyres prices are 
higher by 7.5% in the UK and 14.9% and France, but lower by 4.3% in Italy and 27.5% 
in Spain.  In 2003, prices are higher in all four other countries, by 41.4% in the UK, 
35.3% in France, 28.5% in Italy and 0.25% in Spain.  The Paasche index generally shows 
smaller price differentials.  In 1994 prices are lower by 1.7% in Italy, 2.3% in the UK, 
11.7% in France and 27.8% in Spain.  In 2003, prices are higher by 39.4% in the UK, 
12.8% in Italy and 2.7% in France, but lower by 9.0% in Spain.  Thus, both the 
magnitude and rank ordering of the price differentials depend on which weights are used. 
The Laspeyres index may be most relevant from the German perspective since it uses 
weights for Germany, and can thus be interpreted as an estimate of how much Germany 
might save by adopting another country’s prices, although it is a lower-bound savings 
estimate because it assumes no change in German consumption patterns.  The Paasche 
index provides an upper-bound estimate of potential savings because it assumes that 
while Germany would adopt the other country’s consumption patterns, changes in prices 
and quantities would not affect R&D.  Figures B.4 and B.5 show these bilateral 
Laspeyres and Paasche price differences.  
The Laspeyres quantity index shows less consumption than in Germany for all 
countries except France, and the Paasche quantity index indicates consistently less 
consumption than in Germany for all countries.  Indexes normalized by population size 
show that all countries have lower per capita consumption than Germany.  The results 
reveal large cross-national differences in per capita drug consumption.
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Table 1 
Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for All Molecules, Relative to Germany 
1994 1995 1996 Index Measures SPN UK FR ITY SPN UK FR ITY SPN UK FR ITY 
Number of ATC/Molecule Matching 81 73 74 89 78 73 72 89 78 74 73 85 
Laspeyres Price Index (GR weighted) 0.7248 1.0754 1.1489 0.9571 0.7727 1.1250 1.2020 0.9334 0.8115 1.1745 1.2150 0.9986 
Paasche Price Index (Own weighted) 0.7220 0.9775 0.8836 0.9834 0.7632 1.0861 0.9184 0.9053 0.7956 1.1186 0.9341 0.9643 
Laspeyres Quantity Index 0.4342 0.5293 1.2233 0.6214 0.4393 0.5041 1.1681 0.6145 0.4294 0.5159 1.0794 0.5992 
Paasche Quantity Index 0.4326 0.4811 0.9408 0.6385 0.4338 0.4867 0.8925 0.5960 0.4210 0.4913 0.8298 0.5786 
Normalized Laspeyres Quantity Index 
by Relative Population Size 0.2095 0.3760 0.8657 0.4343 0.2120 0.3582 0.8273 0.4284 0.2070 0.3663 0.7643 0.4163 
Normalized Paasche Quantity Index  
by Relative Population Size 0.2087 0.3418 0.6658 0.4462 0.2093 0.3459 0.6322 0.4155 0.2029 0.3489 0.5876 0.4020 
Population Ratio (Comparison/GR) 0.4825 0.7105 0.7077 0.6989 0.4825 0.7106 0.7083 0.6972 0.4819 0.7101 0.7081 0.6948 
Pp/Lp=Pq/Lq 0.9961 0.9090 0.7691 1.0275 0.9876 0.9654 0.7641 0.9700 0.9804 0.9525 0.7688 0.9657 
r -0.0067 -0.0045 -0.1098 0.0123 -0.0205 -0.0171 -0.3023 -0.0144 -0.0270 -0.0328 -0.0572 -0.0142 
Vp 0.4035 0.4017 0.4584 0.4985 0.4053 0.3800 0.4241 0.5403 0.4403 0.3861 0.4103 0.5460 
Vq 1.4224 50.7645 4.5873 4.4643 1.4956 5.3272 1.8404 3.8708 1.6528 3.7541 9.8455 4.4123 
r.Vp.Vq -0.0039 -0.0910 -0.2309 0.0275 -0.0124 -0.0346 -0.2359 -0.0300 -0.0196 -0.0475 -0.2312 -0.0343 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for All Molecules, Relative to Germany 
1997 1998 1999 Index Measures SPN UK FR ITY SPN UK FR ITY SPN UK FR ITY 
Number of ATC/Molecule Matching 77 78 74 84 78 79 76 82 77 78 75 83 
Laspeyres Price Index (GR weighted) 0.8754 1.2225 1.2590 1.0863 0.9154 1.2921 1.2574 1.1234 0.9304 1.2972 1.2361 1.1557 
Paasche Price Index (Own weighted) 0.8383 1.1818 0.9617 1.0062 0.8651 1.2234 1.0275 1.0437 0.8647 1.2586 0.9778 1.0746 
Laspeyres Quantity Index 0.4380 0.5353 1.0988 0.5740 0.4596 0.5733 0.9813 0.5849 0.4774 0.6156 1.0189 0.5934 
Paasche Quantity Index 0.4194 0.5175 0.8393 0.5317 0.4343 0.5429 0.8019 0.5434 0.4436 0.5973 0.8060 0.5517 
Normalized Laspeyres Quantity Index 
by Relative Population Size 0.2111 0.3801 0.7786 0.3981 0.2220 0.4080 0.7300 0.7238 0.2316 0.4396 0.7266 0.4116 
Normalized Paasche Quantity Index  
by Relative Population Size 0.2021 0.3675 0.5948 0.3688 0.2098 0.3863 0.5697 0.3769 0.2152 0.4265 0.5747 0.3828 
Population Ratio (Comparison/GR) 0.4819 0.7101 0.7086 0.6935 0.4831 0.7116 0.7105 0.6935 0.4852 0.7141 0.7131 0.6938 
Pp/Lp=Pq/Lq 0.9576 0.9667 0.7639 0.9263 0.9450 0.9469 0.8171 0.9291 0.9294 0.9703 0.7910 0.9298 
r -0.0500 -0.0287 -0.0650 -0.0241 -0.0610 -0.0351 -0.1382 -0.0233 -0.0788 -0.0200 -0.1996 -0.0208 
Vp 0.4819 0.3935 0.4639 0.5793 0.5146 0.4991 0.5016 0.5745 0.5338 0.4926 0.5467 0.6007 
Vq 1.7619 2.9478 7.8313 5.2862 1.7511 3.0365 3.1691 5.3005 1.6799 3.0124 1.9152 5.6167 
r.Vp.Vq -0.0424 -0.0333 -0.2361 -0.0737 -0.0550 -0.0531 -0.2196 -0.0709 -0.0706 -0.0297 -0.2090 -0.0702 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for All Molecules, Relative to Germany 
2000 2001 2002 Index Measures SPN UK FR ITY SPN UK FR ITY SPN UK FR ITY 
Number of ATC/Molecule Matching 78 77 73 83 76 73 73 83 74 73 70 80 
Laspeyres Price Index (GR weighted) 0.9288 1.3144 1.2500 1.2063 0.8976 1.2551 1.2278 1.2151 0.9371 1.3122 1.2869 1.2709 
Paasche Price Index (Own weighted) 0.8504 1.2718 0.9711 1.1059 0.8148 1.2152 0.9509 1.0969 0.8347 1.2548 0.9712 1.1326 
Laspeyres Quantity Index 0.4811 0.6280 1.0248 0.6125 0.4781 0.6692 0.9748 0.6199 0.4778 0.7031 0.9085 0.5869 
Paasche Quantity Index 0.4405 0.6077 0.7962 0.5615 0.4340 0.6479 0.7550 0.5596 0.4256 0.6723 0.6856 0.5230 
Normalized Laspeyres Quantity Index 
by Relative Population Size 0.2345 0.4493 0.7334 0.4244 0.2353 0.4800 0.7009 0.4293 0.2374 0.5050 0.6557 0.4057 
Normalized Paasche Quantity Index  
by Relative Population Size 0.2147 0.4348 0.5698 0.3891 0.2135 0.4647 0.5429 0.3875 0.2115 0.4829 0.4948 0.3616 
Population Ratio (Comparison/GR) 0.4874 0.7155 0.7156 0.6929 0.4921 0.7172 0.7190 0.6925 0.4969 0.7183 0.7217 0.6913 
Pp/Lp=Pq/Lq 0.9156 0.9676 0.7769 0.9168 0.9077 0.9682 0.7745 0.9027 0.8907 0.9563 0.7547 0.8912 
r -0.0847 -0.0211 -0.1900 -0.0196 -0.1030 -0.0193 -0.1734 -0.0198 -0.1141 -0.0253 -0.1666 -0.0198 
Vp 0.5637 0.5143 0.6045 0.6371 0.5175 0.5136 0.6334 0.6439 0.5571 0.5464 0.6779 0.6846 
Vq 1.7677 2.9850 1.9418 6.6707 1.7311 3.2135 2.0532 7.6203 1.7194 3.1633 2.1716 8.0274 
r.Vp.Vq -0.0844 -0.0324 -0.2231 -0.0832 -0.0923 -0.0318 -0.2255 -0.0973 -0.1093 -0.0437 -0.2453 -0.1088 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes  
for All Molecules, Relative to Germany 
2003 Index Measures SPN UK FR ITY 
Number of ATC/Molecule Matching 72 73 70 79 
Laspeyres Price Index (GR weighted) 1.0025 1.4142 1.3528 1.2845 
Paasche Price Index (Own weighted) 0.9100 1.3936 1.0273 1.1281 
Laspeyres Quantity Index 0.4439 0.6673 0.8402 0.5475 
Paasche Quantity Index 0.4029 0.6576 0.6381 0.4808 
Normalized Laspeyres Quantity Index 
by Relative Population Size 0.2241 0.4806 0.6093 0.3803 
Normalized Paasche Quantity Index  
by Relative Population Size 0.2034 0.4736 0.4627 0.3339 
Population Ratio (Comparison/GR) 0.5048 0.7201 0.7252 0.6945 
Pp/Lp=Pq/Lq 0.9077 0.9854 0.7594 0.8782 
r -0.0968 -0.0089 -0.1695 -0.0223 
Vp 0.5155 0.5183 0.6190 0.6266 
Vq 1.8495 3.1537 2.2930 8.7072 
r.Vp.Vq -0.0923 -0.0146 -0.2406 -0.1218 
 
The ratios of the Paasche to Laspeyres indexes, P/L, are uniformly less than one, 
except for Italy in 1994.  This is consistent with a negative correlation between price and 
quantity, i.e. a Gerschenkron effect, and can be interpreted as a demand-dominated drug 
market in which equilibrium quantity responds more to shifts in supply than in demand.  
It could also reflect a substitution effect in which consumers use relatively more of 
products that are relatively cheap.  As in Danzon’s (2000) study of price differentials 
relative to the US, the magnitudes of the correlation between price and quantity and 
coefficients of variations are small, showing that there are less variation in prices and 
quantities among the countries. 
Table A.7 and figures B.6 and B.7 report price and quantity indexes relative to 
Spain for bilaterally matched molecules.  The Laspeyres price index shows that Spain has 
the lowest drug prices in the sample, with prices higher in the UK, Germany, France and 
Italy by 38.5%, 38.0%, 32.8% and 46.6% in 1994 and 44.9%, 9.9%, 23.9% and 30.5% in 
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2003.  The Paasche price index reports smaller but similar differentials for all countries 
except France.  The quantity indexes show that per capita consumption is lower in Spain 
than in the other countries.  On the other hand, P/L ratios are again less than one for all 
countries except France between 1994 and 2001.  
 
5.1.2 Standard Unit Price Differences for Global Molecules  
The price indexes for global molecules relative to Germany (table 2) generally 
show similar but some cases smaller price differences between countries than the indexes 
based on the larger bilaterally matched samples (figure B.8 and B.9).  The P/L ratios are 
again below one for all countries except Spain between 1994 and 1997.  The smaller 
coefficients of variation for both quantity and price indicate that consumption and prices 
variation falls as drugs become more universally available.  This could reflect the 
European Commission’s efforts to coordinate the EU pharmaceutical industry, 
particularly by increasing parallel trade and using the international price comparison 
regulatory method.  Similar results are reported in table A.8 and figures B.10 and B.11 
for global molecules relative to Spain. 
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Table 2 
Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for Global Molecules, Relative to Germany 
1994 1995 1996 Index Measures SPN UK FR ITY SPN UK FR ITY SPN UK FR ITY 
Number of ATC/Molecule Matching 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Laspeyres Price Index (GR weighted) 0.7716 1.0671 1.0809 0.9778 0.8257 1.1189 1.1765 0.9670 0.8751 1.1720 1.2267 1.0601 
Paasche Price Index (Own weighted) 0.8103 1.0365 0.9550 1.0531 0.8614 1.0929 0.9980 0.9721 0.9008 1.1325 1.0164 1.0393 
Laspeyres Quantity Index 0.4108 0.5281 1.0769 0.5780 0.4072 0.5354 1.0348 0.5820 0.3990 0.5605 0.9838 0.5625 
Paasche Quantity Index 0.4314 0.5130 0.9516 0.6225 0.4247 0.5230 0.8778 0.5851 0.4107 0.5416 0.8151 0.5515 
Normalized Laspeyres Quantity Index 
by Relative Population Size 0.1982 0.3752 0.7622 0.7360 0.1965 0.3805 0.7329 0.4057 0.1923 0.3980 0.6966 0.3908 
Normalized Paasche Quantity Index  
by Relative Population Size 0.2082 0.3644 0.6734 0.4351 0.2049 0.3717 0.6217 0.4079 0.1979 0.3846 0.5772 0.3832 
Population Ratio (Comparison/GR) 0.4825 0.7105 0.7077 0.6989 0.4825 0.7106 0.7083 0.6972 0.4819 0.7101 0.7081 0.6948 
Pp/Lp=Pq/Lq 1.0503 0.9713 0.8836 1.0770 1.0432 0.9768 0.8483 1.0053 1.0293 0.9663 0.8285 0.9803 
r 0.1188 -0.0675 -0.1973 0.1143 0.1000 -0.0632 -0.2544 0.0084 0.0584 -0.0903 -0.2677 -0.0303 
Vp 0.3677 0.4060 0.3841 0.4830 0.3764 0.3864 0.3787 0.5218 0.4213 0.4014 0.4108 0.5548 
Vq 1.1506 1.0480 1.5364 1.3955 1.1473 0.9500 1.5749 1.2042 1.1912 0.9297 1.5590 1.1710 
r.Vp.Vq 0.0503 -0.0287 -0.1164 0.0770 0.0432 -0.0232 -0.1517 0.0053 0.0293 -0.0337 -0.1715 -0.0197 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for Global Molecules, Relative to Germany 
1997 1998 1999 Index Measures SPN UK FR ITY SPN UK FR ITY SPN UK FR ITY 
Number of ATC/Molecule Matching 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Laspeyres Price Index (GR weighted) 0.9468 1.2196 1.3003 1.1495 0.9795 1.2684 1.3120 1.1892 0.9940 1.2952 1.2882 1.2241 
Paasche Price Index (Own weighted) 0.9482 1.1979 1.0230 1.0874 0.9732 1.2392 1.0325 1.1296 0.9708 1.2688 1.0209 1.1609 
Laspeyres Quantity Index 0.4208 0.5998 1.0208 0.5518 0.4412 0.6587 1.0403 0.5557 0.4532 0.7033 0.9977 0.5713 
Paasche Quantity Index 0.4215 0.5891 0.8030 0.5220 0.4383 0.6436 0.8187 0.5279 0.4427 0.6890 0.7907 0.5418 
Normalized Laspeyres Quantity Index 
by Relative Population Size 0.2028 0.4259 0.7233 0.3827 0.2131 0.4688 0.7336 0.7834 0.2199 0.5022 0.7114 0.3964 
Normalized Paasche Quantity Index  
by Relative Population Size 0.2031 0.4183 0.5690 0.3621 0.2117 0.4580 0.5817 0.3661 0.2148 0.4920 0.5638 0.3759 
Population Ratio (Comparison/GR) 0.4819 0.7101 0.7086 0.6935 0.4831 0.7116 0.7105 0.6935 0.4852 0.7141 0.7131 0.6938 
Pp/Lp=Pq/Lq 1.0015 0.9822 0.7867 0.9460 0.9936 0.9770 0.7870 0.9499 0.9767 0.9796 0.7925 0.9484 
r 0.0026 -0.0463 -0.2795 -0.0772 -0.0104 -0.0570 -0.2449 -0.0724 -0.0377 -0.0494 -0.2146 -0.0756 
Vp 0.4803 0.4185 0.4840 0.6064 0.5022 0.4318 0.5237 0.6106 0.5035 0.4393 0.5527 0.6322 
Vq 1.2222 0.9187 1.5768 1.1533 1.2312 0.9349 1.6608 1.1339 1.2289 0.9399 1.7496 1.0797 
r.Vp.Vq 0.0015 -0.0178 -0.2133 -0.0540 -0.0064 -0.0230 -0.2130 -0.0501 -0.0233 -0.0204 -0.2075 -0.0516 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for Global Molecules, Relative to Germany 
2000 2001 2002 Index Measures SPN UK FR ITY SPN UK FR ITY SPN UK FR ITY 
Number of ATC/Molecule Matching 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Laspeyres Price Index (GR weighted) 1.0118 1.3495 1.3224 1.2915 0.9634 1.2798 1.3276 1.3107 1.0092 1.3928 1.4220 1.3807 
Paasche Price Index (Own weighted) 0.9775 1.2897 1.0146 1.2258 0.9156 1.2172 0.9998 1.2214 0.9396 1.2847 1.0261 1.2842 
Laspeyres Quantity Index 0.4521 0.7084 0.9971 0.5649 0.4487 0.7529 0.9691 0.5704 0.4392 0.7776 0.9238 0.5235 
Paasche Quantity Index 0.4367 0.6770 0.7651 0.5362 0.4265 0.7161 0.7299 0.5315 0.4089 0.7172 0.6666 0.4869 
Normalized Laspeyres Quantity Index 
by Relative Population Size 0.2204 0.5068 0.7135 0.3914 0.2208 0.5400 0.6968 0.3950 0.2182 0.5585 0.6667 0.3619 
Normalized Paasche Quantity Index  
by Relative Population Size 0.2129 0.4844 0.5475 0.3715 0.2098 0.5136 0.5248 0.3681 0.2032 0.5152 0.4811 0.3366 
Population Ratio (Comparison/GR) 0.4874 0.7155 0.7156 0.6929 0.4921 0.7172 0.7190 0.6925 0.4969 0.7183 0.7217 0.6913 
Pp/Lp=Pq/Lq 0.9661 0.9557 0.7673 0.9491 0.9504 0.9511 0.7531 0.9319 0.9311 0.9224 0.7216 0.9301 
r -0.0531 -0.0994 -0.2151 -0.0754 -0.0864 -0.1091 -0.2132 -0.1054 -0.1206 -0.1575 -0.2367 -0.1027 
Vp 0.5000 0.4909 0.5905 0.6477 0.4424 0.5038 0.6057 0.6413 0.4294 0.5334 0.5937 0.6422 
Vq 1.2765 0.9084 1.8321 1.0423 1.2970 0.8902 1.9113 1.0083 1.3308 0.9237 1.9813 1.0598 
r.Vp.Vq -0.0339 -0.0443 -0.2327 -0.0509 -0.0496 -0.0489 -0.2469 -0.0681 -0.0689 -0.0776 -0.2784 -0.0699 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes  
for Global Molecules, Relative to Germany 
2003 Index Measures SPN UK FR ITY 
Number of ATC/Molecule Matching 38 38 38 38 
Laspeyres Price Index (GR weighted) 1.0980 1.5679 1.5275 1.4675 
Paasche Price Index (Own weighted) 1.0590 1.5168 1.1217 1.3771 
Laspeyres Quantity Index 0.3770 0.6946 0.8214 0.4576 
Paasche Quantity Index 0.3636 0.6720 0.6031 0.4294 
Normalized Laspeyres Quantity Index 
by Relative Population Size 0.1903 0.5002 0.5956 0.3178 
Normalized Paasche Quantity Index  
by Relative Population Size 0.1835 0.4839 0.4374 0.2982 
Population Ratio (Comparison/GR) 0.5048 0.7201 0.7252 0.6945 
Pp/Lp=Pq/Lq 0.9645 0.9674 0.7343 0.9384 
r -0.0649 -0.0676 -0.2373 -0.0959 
Vp 0.3578 0.4876 0.4931 0.5735 
Vq 1.5306 0.9891 2.2706 1.1200 
r.Vp.Vq -0.0355 -0.0326 -0.2657 -0.0616 
 
 
5.1.3 Country Price Differences for All and Global Molecules, Relative to 1994    
Tables A.10 and A.11 and figures B.12 and B.13 show the price and quantity 
indexes over the years for all bilaterally matched and global molecules in each country. 
For all bilateral matched molecules, prices consistently decreased in Germany and France 
starting in 1998, whereas they increased until around 2000 and then decreased in the 
other three countries.  The results for global molecules are similar. 
 
5.2 Quality Adjusted Standard Unit Price Differences  
This section shows the results of quasi-hedonic regressions that examine the 
contribution of various quality and market competition characteristics to the large cross-
country dispersion of drug prices just documented.  The residuals of these regressions 
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will then form the price variables in the price convergence regressions to be discussed in 
the subsequent section.  
 
5.2.1 Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics  
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for quality and market characteristics in the 
bilaterally matched data on 3,790 molecule/country/year observations, while table 4 
presents the same information for the 1,900 observations on globally diffused molecules.  
In the latter data, the SU price is lower while quantity and retail sales are higher. 
 
Table 3 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for  
All Molecules Overall 
Variable Description N 
Overall 
Mean 
Overall 
SD 
Within 
SD 
Suthnds Standard units in thousands 3,790 73,189 125,996 41,562 
Leuthnds 
Total standard unit retail 
sales in thousands in 
euro 
3,790 18,343 33,034 13,665 
Leusuprice Standard unit prices in euro 3,790 0.39 1.25 0.43 
Quality Characteristics 
Strengthg Strength per gram 3,790 0.15 0.55 0.06 
Molage Molecule age 3,790 19.62 12.15 2.87 
Packsize Pack size 3,790 57.27 65.02 35.22 
Formcode Form Code 3,790 7.67 11.99 2.59 
Globpenet Global penetration 3,790 4.16 1.20 0.27 
Market(Competition) Characteristics 
Gencompet Generic Competition 3,790 4.80 7.44 2.55 
Thsubsmol Therapeutic Substitute Molecule 3,790 15.95 6.31 1.37 
Thsubsolentlag Therapeutic Substitute Molecule Entry Lag 3,780 17.70 12.59 0.00 
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Table 4 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for 
Global Molecules Overall 
Variable Description N 
Overall 
Mean 
Overall 
SD 
Within 
SD 
Suthnds Standard units in 
thousands 
1,900 107,664 144,484 54,522 
Leuthnds Total standard unit retail 
sales in thousands in 
euro 
1,900 27,242 41,213 18,320 
Leusuprice Standard unit prices in 
euro 
1,900 0.27 0.22 0.04 
Quality Characteristics 
Strengthg Strength per gram 1,900 0.18 0.58 0.09 
Molage Molecule age 1,900 20.58 11.59 2.87 
Packsize Pack size 1,900 58.08 74.38 41.44 
Formcode Form Code 1,900 9.97 14.97 3.31 
Globpenet Global penetration 1,900 5 0.00 0.00 
Market(Competition) Characteristics 
Gencompet Generic Competition 1,900 6.46 9.36 3.15 
Thsubsmol Therapeutic Substitute 
Molecule 
1,900 14.73 5.47 1.28 
Thsubsolentlag Therapeutic Substitute 
Molecule Entry Lag 
1,900 13.53 9.99 0.00 
 
In table A.11, the SU price is €0.58, €0.54, €0.30, €0.27 and €0.21 in Germany, 
the UK, Italy, France and Spain, respectively.  Similarly, average SU retail sales are the 
greatest in Germany and the smallest in Spain, while average total retail sales are the 
highest in France and the lowest in Spain.  For globally diffused molecules, SU prices, in 
the order listed above, are €0.29, €0.32, €0.28, €0.27 and €0.21 (table A.12).  The 
descriptive statistics are also listed by molecule, country and year, for all molecules in 
table A.13 and for global molecules in table A.14. 
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5.2.2 Quality Adjusted Standard Unit Price Differences for All Molecules 
Table 5 shows the results of the quasi-hedonic price regressions estimated by both 
fixed and random effect models, with Germany as the base country. Most of the quality 
and market variables have the expected sign and are statistically significant, but their 
effects are small in magnitude, indicating overall reimbursement and regulation effects. 
Standard unit price is increasing in strength. The number of forms available is expected 
to be positively related in markets, if range of formulation enhances effectiveness, 
convenience and value.  Additionally, introducing a new formation is a method of 
obtaining a price increase in countries that do not permit price increases for established 
products or when the product life cycle declines (Danzon and Chao 2000a). Here, form 
code is inversely related due to possible explanations of therapeutic category-specific 
differences in medical norms and insurance.  Further investigation is needed for this 
relationship in the regulated markets.  SU price is inversely related to molecule age, 
suggesting that newer molecules offer improved therapeutic quality, although molecule 
age may also reflect life-cycle regulatory effects, but it is not significant.  Price decreases 
with pack size, consistent with economies of scale in packaging, and global penetration, 
which is a proxy for diffused therapeutic value.  Generic competition lowers price as it is 
expected.  Therapeutic substitute molecule is expected to be inversely related to price due 
to substitution effect (Danzon and Chao 2000b) but here again, it is directly related to the 
price.  When a new molecule is introduced, assuming better therapeutic treatment, a few 
good substitutes will be available and the drugs with the new main ingredient will have 
high prices.  But after time, competition eliminates some of the substitutes while at the 
same time lowers prices.  Further investigation is needed for therapeutic substitute 
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molecules.  Lastly, therapeutic substitute molecule entry lag has a positive price effect 
but it is insignificant.  All of the ATC3 dummies are significant in the random effect 
model, implying significant differences in prices for different indications, presumably 
due to differences in therapeutic value and insurance coverage.  
The Hausman test for fixed effect (FE) vs. random effect (RE) models tests the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the random effects estimator, which is 
efficient but possibly inconsistent, are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent 
fixed effects estimator. Therefore, a failure to reject the null hypothesis means either that 
RE and FE estimates are sufficiently close so that it does not matter which is used, or the 
sampling variation is so large in the FE estimates that one cannot conclude practically 
significant differences are statistically significant.  A rejection using Hausman test is 
taken to mean that the key RE assumption, i.e. Cov(Xk,j,t, ck) = 0, is false, so that the FE 
estimates should be used.  Here, the Hausman test fails to reject the null hypothesis, so 
the random effect estimator is presumed consistent and hence used to interpret the price 
differentials.  
The main interest in these regressions is the coefficients of the country/year 
interactions, which trace out the pattern of price differences over time controlling for 
quality and market characteristics and molecule identity. The individual country dummy 
coefficients give the 1994 price differential between country and Germany, while the 
individual year dummy coefficients give the price differential for Germany between each 
year and 1994. Table 6 and Figure 1 show the price differences in percentages, estimated 
with the random effect model, relative to Germany in 1994 (the omitted country/year 
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combination), while table A.15 and figure B.14 do the same for prices relative to Spain in 
1994.   
Table 5 
Quasi-Hedonic Price Regression Results for All Molecules, 
Relative to Germany 
 Fixed Effect Model 
Random Effect  
Model 
Dependent variable: logleusuprice 
Explanatory Variables  Coefficient (Standard Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error)a 
Quality Characteristics 
STRENGTHG 0.0341*** 
(0.0185) 
0.0313*** 
(0.0172) 
MOLAGE -0.0007 
(0.0029) 
-0.0039 
(0.0028) 
PACKSIZE -0.0020* 
(0.0001) 
-0.0021* 
(0.0001) 
FORMCODE -0.0046* 
(0.0009) 
-0.0049* 
(0.0009) 
GLOBPENET -0.0430*** 
(0.0236) 
-0.0627* 
(0.0203) 
Market (Competition) Characteristics  
GENCOMPET -0.0044* 
(0.0016) 
-0.0044* 
(0.0016) 
THSUBSMOL 0.0123* 
(0.0018) 
0.0123* 
(0.0020) 
THSUBSMOLENTLAG - 0.0006 (0.0017) 
Country dummies Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes 
Country/Time dummies Yes Yes 
ATC dummies  No Yes 
N 3,790 3,780 
R2 (Within) 0.2495 0.2490 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 
                                                 
a Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. *, ** and *** reflect p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.10.  
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Table 6 
Quality Adjusted (by RE) Standard Unit Price Differentials for All Molecules, 
Relative to Germanya 
Year Germany France Italy United  Kingdom Spain 
1994 - -31.91% -38.02% -12.12% -51.23% 
1995 0.21% -29.25% -41.05% -10.47% -50.24% 
1996 1.99% -29.16% -38.06% -10.84% -50.15% 
1997 0.70% -27.71% -35.10% -10.57% -48.23% 
1998 -0.11% -26.58% -32.51% -3.20% -47.35% 
1999 -0.39% -25.65% -29.61% 1.96% -46.49% 
2000 -0.78% -25.17% -27.84% -0.27% -46.65% 
2001 -0.30% -25.76% -26.97% -1.98% -47.03% 
2002 -4.83% -22.42% -22.52% 1.68% -44.60% 
2003 -6.10% -22.43% -24.20% 2.57% -43.43% 
 
 
The main result is that price differences are still significant, but the percentage 
differences are consistent with the expectations that price differentials are decreasing 
over time.  All the countries have lower prices relative to Germany during the time period 
except the United Kingdom between 2002 and 2003. Prices in France, Italy and Spain 
move similarly, which is likely attributable to their pharmaceutical industries having 
similar characteristics. UK prices are getting higher at small percentages in 1999. It is 
observed that the price differences are decreasing at increasing rate, of possibly due to 
increased parallel imports and the European Commission’s coordination efforts.  
 
                                                 
a These are the coefficients of the country/time effects (θj,t) in the random effect quasi-hedonic regression 
model. Percentages are calculated as 100[Exp(θ)-1].  
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Figure 1 
Quality Adjusted (by RE) Standard Unit Price Differentials  
for All Molecules, Relative to Germany a 
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Price differentials estimated from the fixed effect model are reported in tables 
A.16 and A.17 and figures B.15 and B.16. As expected, the results are quite similar. 
Additionally, the same models are estimated without year and country indicators.  The 
quality adjusted prices, i.e. the residuals, from these latter models are used to form the 
dependent variable in the price convergence equations.  
 
5.2.3 Quality Adjusted Standard Unit Price Differences for Global Molecules   
Table 7 shows the results from applying the same model to the globally diffused 
molecules. Coefficient signs are the same, and magnitudes remain similar. Molecule age 
variable is significant in these specifications, indicating that older molecules have lower 
prices.  
                                                 
a Normalized to Germany. 
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Table 7  
Quasi-Hedonic Price Regression Results for Global Molecules, 
Relative to Germany 
 Fixed Effect Model 
Random Effect  
Model 
Dependent variable: logleusuprice 
Explanatory Variables  Coefficient (Standard Error)a 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error)a 
Quality Characteristics 
STRENGTHG -0.1975* 
(0.0534) 
-0.1735* 
(0.0465) 
MOLAGE -0.0104** 
(0.0044) 
-0.0158* 
(0.0033) 
PACKSIZE -0.0019* 
(0.0002) 
-0.0019* 
(0.0002) 
FORMCODE -0.0056* 
(0.0010) 
-0.0055* 
(0.0010) 
Market (Competition) Characteristics  
GENCOMPET -0.0028*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0030*** 
(0.0017) 
THSUBSMOL 0.0094* 
(0.0022) 
0.0106* 
(0.0025) 
THSUBSMOLENTLAG - -0.0019 (0.0017) 
Country dummies Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes 
Country/Time dummies Yes Yes 
ATC dummies  No Yes 
N 1,900 1,900 
R2 (Within) 0.2593 0.2593 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 
                                                 
a Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. *, ** and *** reflect p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.10.  
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The estimated price differentials are reported in the table 8 and figure 2, relative 
to Germany, for global molecules. Price differences are significant and large relative to 
Germany, also much larger relative to Spain (tables A.18 and figure B.17).  All countries 
price differences are decreasing at increasing rates. In 2003, Spain has the highest price 
differences for all the years, representing the lowest priced country, relative to Germany.  
Table 8 
Quality Adjusted (by RE) Standard Unit Price Differentials for Global Molecules,  
Relative to Germany a 
Year Germany France Italy United  Kingdom Spain 
1994 - -35.18% -40.37% -10.63% -50.84% 
1995 1.26% -31.41% -43.44% -11.15% -49.78% 
1996 2.87% -29.62% -39.71% -11.38% -48.88% 
1997 0.60% -26.35% -35.67% -10.43% -45.12% 
1998 0.52% -25.71% -32.66% -5.08% -43.25% 
1999 1.79% -26.03% -29.49% -3.36% -41.80% 
2000 1.01% -24.19% -26.46% -4.53% -40.75% 
2001 1.69% -23.48% -24.38% -7.61% -40.76% 
2002 -3.26% -18.58% -19.43% -4.36% -37.02% 
2003 -6.32% -16.39% -18.32% -0.82% -34.03% 
 
 
Not surprising results are obtained when price differentials are observed relative 
to Spain. Price difference decreases from 82% (1994) to 25% (2003) in the UK, where it 
decreases from 103% (1994) to 26% (2003) in Germany. Italy and France are –2% and 
1% higher priced than Spain in 2003.  Again, price differences decrease at increasing 
rates relative to Spain over the sample time period.  
 
 
 
                                                 
a These are the coefficients of country/time effects (θj,t) in the random effect quasi-hedonic regression 
model. Percentages are calculated as 100[Exp(θ)-1]. 
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Figure 2 
Quality Adjusted (by RE) Standard Unit Price Differentials for Global Molecules,  
Relative to Germanya  
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Fixed effect model price differences for global molecules are reported in tables 
A.19 and A. 20 and figure B.18, with similar results. Moreover, the same models are 
estimated without year and country indicators. The quality adjusted prices, i.e. the 
residuals, from these latter models are used to form the dependent variable in the price 
convergence equations for global molecules.  
 
5.3 Price Convergence Results  
This section shows the price convergence results. The regression coefficients 
provide estimates of the speed of the convergence to the law of one price, which indicates 
how quickly deviations from long term price differentials are eliminated.  
                                                 
a Normalized to Germany. 
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Table 9 reports estimation results with Spain and Germany as base countries. The 
Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of fixed and random effects equivalence, thus 
fixed effects models are used to form the dependent variables for the convergence 
equations.  The results are robust for zero, one and two lags, in addition to Campbell and 
Perron (1992) top down approach, with the latter reported in the tables.  
Model 1 does not include molecule/country fixed effects and thus tests for 
convergence to the absolute version of the law of one price.  The null hypothesis is that 
the price differences converge toward zero in the long run, i.e. β < 0.  The β coefficient is 
negative in the specification where Germany is the base country, with implied half-life of 
a shock, i.e. –ln(2)/ln(1+β), of 34.3 years.  This half-life of 34.3 years is longer than the 
typical life cycle of a drug and provides of little, if any evidence of convergence.  When 
Spain is the base country, the β coefficient is positive, indicating that there is no evidence 
of the absolute version of law of one price holding.  The positive sign of the coefficient 
actually implies persistent price divergence.  The results are mostly consistent with the 
international trade literature.  
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Table 9 
Results for Price Convergence Estimations for All Molecules 
(Adjusted by FE) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent 
Variable: ΔPi,k,t 
Base: 
SPN Base: GR 
Base: 
SPN Base: GR 
βa 0.01 -0.02 -0.18 -0.17 
Half-life of Shock 
(in years) - 34.3 3.5 4.4 
FRb - - 0.02 0.01 
GRb - - 0.08 - 
UKb - - 0.15 0.00 
SPNb - - - -0.08 
ITYb - - 0.06 -0.08 
Lags of ΔPi,k,t Yes(1)c Yes(1)c Yesd Yesd 
t-star 
P>t 
8.89 
1.000 
-19.25 
0.000 
-8.39 
0.000 
-8.34 
0.000 
Molecule/Country 
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
Time Trend No No No No 
N 2,940 3,210 2,940 3,210 
 
Model 2 tests the relative version of the law of one price and finds estimated β 
ranges between –0.17 and –0.18.  Based on the adjusted t statistics (t-star) values, the unit 
root hypothesis is rejected, signifying significant evidence of price convergence. The 
implied half-lives of shocks, according to these β estimates, are between 3.5 and 4.4 
years.  These half-lives are longer than found in the recent international trade literature 
(Goldberg and Verboven 2005). 
                                                 
a β coefficients are estimated by the Levin et al. (2002) panel unit root test module in StataTM 9.2 (levinlin).  
b Country fixed effects are estimated for each molecule/country by the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
regressions in StataTM 9.2 (dfuller) and then averaged for each country. 
c The average number of lags for each molecule/country is 1.  
d The number of lags is determined by using the Campbell and Perron top-down approach.  
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The αi,k in model 2 captures molecule country fixed effects that account for non-
time dependent, molecule specific price differences across countries. Such effects could 
include transportation costs, unobserved quality differences that vary by destination, or 
markup differences. The presence of molecule/country fixed effects in the estimations 
implies testing the relative version of law of one price. The average molecule/country 
specific fixed effects are displayed in table 9. These large values of molecule/country 
fixed effects indicate market segmentation even if the relative version of law of one price 
holds in the data, consistent with other studies in the literature.  By dividing the fixed 
effects by –β, long-term systematic price differences relative to Spain of 83% for the UK, 
33% for Italy, 11% for France, and 44% for Germany are obtained.  When Germany is 
the base country, long term price differentials are 6% for France, 0% for the UK, and –
47% for Spain and Italy.  
Similar convergence coefficients are obtained for both the absolute and the 
relative version of law of one price, using prices from random effect models (table A.21).  
Slightly smaller molecule/country price differentials emerge, which are higher than Spain 
by 11% for France, 47% for Germany, 53% for the UK and 37% for Italy, and lower than 
Germany by 50% for Spain, 39% for Italy, 0% for France and the United Kingdom. In 
addition, all specifications are also estimated using model 3, which includes a time trend. 
The expected results, that the deviations from the long term differences are eliminated in 
approximately a year, are obtained.  This is shorter than without the time trend in model 
2, but the long term price differences remain about the same.  
In addition, the same hypotheses are tested for unadjusted prices.  In this case, 
model 3, which includes a time trend, is also reported in the tables for comparison 
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purposes.  Table A.22 reports the results for the three models.  The results remain robust 
for the absolute version of the law of one price. In model 2, the estimated rates of 
convergence are very similar to the adjusted price estimates, but molecule/country fixed 
effects show very high price differences which are expected due to not accounting for 
quality adjustments.   
The random effect quality adjusted price residuals for the globally diffused 
models are also used to test for price convergence because the Hausman test fails to reject 
the null hypothesis. Table 10 shows that these results are similar to those from before.  
Model 1 rejects the hypothesis of a unit root where Germany is the base country and fails 
to reject the unit root where Spain is the base. Model 2 shows that β coefficients are 
negative, showing evidence of price convergence and implied half-lives of shocks of 2.9 
and 4.6 years.  The long term price differentials are 36% (Germany), 186% (UK), 64% 
(Italy) and 0% (France) higher than Spain and 24% (Spain) and 38% (Italy) less and 19% 
(UK) and 33% (France) higher than Germany. The results are similar when prices are 
formed using the residuals from the fixed effect model (table A.23).  Lastly, the same 
three models are re-estimated for global molecules for unadjusted prices (table A.24).  
Again, all estimations remain the same but molecule/country fixed effects are larger than 
adjusted estimation results. In model 2, the long term price differentials are much higher 
than the previous estimations.
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a β coefficients are estimated by the Levin et al. (2002) panel unit root test module in StataTM 9.2 (levinlin).  
b Country fixed effects are estimated for each molecule/country by the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
regressions in StataTM 9.2 (dfuller) and then averaged for each country. 
c The average number of lags for each molecule/country is 1.  
d The number of lags is determined by using the Campbell and Perron top-down approach.  
Table 10 
Results for Price Convergence Estimations for  
Global  Molecules (Adjusted by RE) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent 
Variable: ΔPi,k,t 
Base: 
SPN Base: GR 
Base: 
SPN Base: GR 
βa 0.01 -0.02 -0.14 -0.21 
Half-life of Shock 
(in years) - 34.3 4.6 2.9 
FRb - - 0.00 0.07 
GRb - - 0.05 - 
UKb - - 0.26 0.04 
SPNb - - - -0.05 
ITYb - - 0.09 -0.08 
Lags of ΔPi,k,t Yes(1)c Yes(1)c Yesd Yesd 
t-star 
P>t 
11.50 
1.000 
-17.08 
0.000 
-5.71 
0.000 
-12.40 
0.000 
Molecule/Country 
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
Time Trend No No No No 
N 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter summarizes the main findings regarding pharmaceutical prices in the 
European Union.  Additionally, limitations and opportunities for future research are 
discussed. 
 
6.1 Main Findings 
This dissertation is the first attempt to investigate the convergence of 
pharmaceutical prices in the EU.  It uses annual panel data from 1994–2003 on molecule 
level standard unit prices in the five largest pharmaceutical producing countries.  
The analysis has three main findings: 
1. The first part of the analysis uses weighted price indexes to compare price 
differences in the data for the selected nations.  This approach is one of the suggested 
methods in the cross country price differences literature in the pharmaceutical industry 
(Danzon 2000).  Using unadjusted per dose prices of bilaterally matching and global 
molecules, Laspeyres and Paasche indexes show that there are substantial diverse 
pharmaceutical price differences across EU markets.  Bilaterally and using Germany as 
the base country, the results (tables 1 and figure B.4) indicate that Spain has consistent 
decreases in prices from -28% (1994) to 0.3% (2003) while the prices increase from the 
beginning (1994) to the end (2003) of the time period by 7.5% to 41.4% in the UK, 15% 
 72
to 35% in France, and -4.3% to 29% in Italy by Laspeyrex index.  Similar results are 
obtained when the indexes are calculated in the global molecules (table 2 and figure B.8) 
such that price differences increase from -23% to 10% in Spain, 7% to 59% in the UK, 
8% to 53% in France and -2% to 47% in Italy.  When the base country is Spain (tables 
A.7 and A.8 and figures B.6 and B.10), the results show that prices decrease in Germany, 
the UK and Italy but increase in France for all molecules; increase in the UK, France and 
Italy and decrease in Germany for global molecules.  Besides the choices of base country 
and index, these price differences depend on the sample and method used.  On their own, 
these price differences show price divergence across the countries and do not provide 
evidence of price convergence.   
2.  Even though the analysis employs molecule level standard unit prices, 
observed molecule characteristics vary across countries, particularly with regard to drug 
quality (form availability, pack sizes, strength levels) and market (competition) 
characteristics.  Using quasi hedonic price regressions to control for this variation, price 
differentials are re-analyzed.  The results show stronger evidence of decreasing price 
differences than those imputed from the index calculations.  Price differences in all 
countries consistently decrease from 1994 and 2003 regardless of the choice of the base 
country, method and the sample.  Price differentials decrease from 32% to 22% in 
France, 38% to 24% in Italy, 51% to 43% in Spain and -12% to 2.6% in the UK, relative 
to Germany for all molecules; there are smaller and again consistent decreases for global 
molecules in the time period of the study (tables 6 and 8, figures 1 and 2).  Similar results 
are obtained relative to Spain (tables A.15 and A.18, figures B.14 and B.17).  However, 
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the price differences across countries still remain substantial even when the observed 
quality and market characteristics are controlled in the analysis.  
3. Controlling for variation in quality and market characteristics across countries, 
both the absolute and relative versions of the law of one price are tested by employing 
panel data unit root tests.  Price convergence is expected in integrated markets like the 
European Union, but factors like transportation costs, tax differences and regulatory 
regimes that vary across countries, might produce fixed country-specific price 
differences.  The relative version of the law of one price states that these price gaps tend 
to return to some long-run level over time, even if this level is not zero. Despite the fact 
that the data in this analysis control for observable quality and market characteristics, 
systematic price differences across countries could persist because of the nature of the 
pharmaceutical market and differences across countries with regard to demographics, 
culture and medicine consumption attitudes. 
 For the absolute version, the half life of a shock is 34 years, indicating very 
slow convergence.  The main interest in this study is not the absolute version of the law 
of price because it is expected that cross country drug price differences cannot be 
completely eliminated.  Results provide evidence in support of the relative version of the 
law of one price, which is a narrower definition of price convergence and is the key 
interest of the study.  For the relative version, half lives are between 3 and 5 years.  The 
estimated rates of convergence in the EU pharmaceutical industry are comparatively 
slower than the rates for analogous studies of different European industries, e.g. half lives 
of 1.3–1.6 years in the automobile industry.  This could be explained by the different 
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health care systems, pricing and reimbursement regulations by the national governments 
across countries.  
Long term price differentials imputed from the estimated molecule/country fixed 
effects show price differences across markets between 0% and 40% for countries other 
than the UK, providing evidence of market segmentation. Possible sources of the larger 
long term price differences between the UK and other countries include the fact that the 
UK is not a member of the “euro zone”, transportation costs (e.g. the UK is not 
contiguous like the other nations) and other different policies by the UK government.  
According to Kotzian (2004), the reason for these price differences could be the political 
arena in the EU: some governments grant high prices for newly introduced products to 
encourage therapeutic innovations, others set a very low price due to health care budget 
concerns.   
   This study contributes new results to the existing literature on European 
integration and pharmaceutical price convergence.  The results show that even though the 
pharmaceutical industry is one of the most heavily regulated markets with divergent 
methods (tables A.1-A.3) in the EU and there are no legislative actions by the European 
Commission for the pharmaceutical industry toward a single market, price differences 
across countries do converge over time, albeit relatively slowly, conditional on the 
molecule/country fixed effects.  Although price differences still exist, progress toward the 
single pharmaceutical market is evident.  One of the possible explanations of finding the 
evidence of price convergence could be parallel import.  However, this study does not 
test the direct impact of the parallel import on price convergence which also is not the 
scope of this dissertation.  However, Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) analyzed the direct 
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impact of parallel imports on drug prices in Sweden, and concluded that parallel imports 
represented a significant form of competition in markets and reduced manufacturing 
prices by 12–19%.  Another possible explanation could be international reference pricing 
that create spillover of price levels from one country to another.  
The unique molecule level data set in this dissertation includes branded drugs 
along with generics, licensed, OTCs and parallel imports, and allows controlling for 
quality and market characteristics.  The empirical results not only demonstrate consistent 
decrease in the prices overall but also provide evidence of relative price convergence in 
the pharmaceutical industry.  As it is emphasized by the European Commission that there 
is no reason to exempt pharmaceuticals from the single market ideal. 
Finally, this study attempts to be the first detailed empirical investigation of the 
drug price convergence in the EU.  
 
6.2 Limitations 
This research has several limitations that should be noted.  First, the data set 
analyzed in this study spans only ten years.  Several other studies in the literature use 
periods of similar length, but as with all time series, a longer series would permit a 
stronger test of the price convergence hypothesis.  It would also allow for testing whether 
molecule/country effects are declining over time and if the speed of convergence has 
changed over time.   
Second, the data set is based on bilaterally and globally matched samples of 
molecule/ATC3 criteria that failed to match nearly 50% of the total retail sales 
observations.  Therefore, even the price indexes may be unavoidably biased by selection.  
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Third, quality and market characteristics are based on the measurability of 
variables in the data set.  A better market characteristic variable, such as an “index” 
variable compiling all the different regulations and reimbursements in different countries, 
might be created in order to better capture the differences in prices. 
Fourth, since IMS fixed euro standard unit prices are used to flatten exchange 
rate fluctuations, the role of exchange rate changes must be investigated separately.  
Fifth, the data include all formations of the drugs including brand, OTC, parallel 
imports, etc. Because the structure of the data and variables, it is not possible to 
determine if the evidence of the price convergence is due to parallel importing or the 
alignment of government politics.  
Lastly, of the 25 members of the European Union only the largest five members 
are part of this study.  
 
6.3 Future Research  
Future research should address several of the limitations mentioned above.  The 
data should extend to more years, including exchange rates, and other quality and market 
characteristics to capture price differences.  In particular, further research should 
investigate whether molecule/country effects are declining over time along with the 
investigation of the speed of convergence.  
As a follow up, data from this dissertation should employ a similar analysis but 
match data by molecule/ATC4 category, product level under the same ATC and 
international product name (IPN).  IMS assigns drugs the same IPN that have two of the 
following: same chemical compositions, same brand name, or same corporation.  
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The effect of price regulations (mostly demand-side regulations) on consumption 
patterns in relationship to the price convergence is an important topic for further research 
due to various cultural and consumption attitudes across countries.     
Even though the European Commission has never proposed any common policy 
for the EU pharmaceuticals, only recommendations, it should be investigated if the 
European Commission, the G10 Medicine Group or the establishment of the EMEA in 
1995 has had any impact on price convergence.  In addition, because of the 
standardization in packaging and labeling, it is expected that there will be an increase in 
parallel importing and therefore an impact on the price convergence.  This could be 
another area of future research.     
Tables A.1-A.3 show all the different regulations across countries on both the 
demand and the supply side.  It should be investigated if the penguin effect has resulted 
in any convergence of regulations in the EU pharmaceutical industry.   
It is expected that parallel imports will impact price differences. Ganslandt and 
Maskus (2004) developed a theoretical model and also empirically tested whether parallel 
import reduced the price differences. As a follow up of this work, the theoretical work 
could be extended to the impact of the parallel import on the relative version of the law of 
one price and half life of a shock in the regulated markets. Moreover, a detail 
investigation of the determinants of price convergence in the EU pharmaceutical industry 
is subject to future research.   
Finally, continued research in this area would give a better understanding of the 
relationship between market integration and price convergence in the pharmaceutical 
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industry in the EU. This dissertation represents a preliminary investigation of this subject; 
however it does seem to be very open area for future research.  
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Appendix A: Tables  
 
Table A.1 
National Controls for Pharmaceuticals on the Supply-Side 
COUNTRY: NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEMS: * PRICING: REIMBURSEMENT: 
Germany GKV, statuary health insurance 
covers 88% of the population. 
Most of the remaining 
population had private 
insurance.  
Price freedom for new products a) Reference price for off-patent sector (products subjected to 
generic competition; reference price for identical molecule 
only) 
b) Drug budgets with caps re-introduced in 1999. 
c) Negative list 
d) Positive list  
UK The National Health Service 
since 1948 financed through 
central government. 
a) PPRS: Agreement with industry on profit control, renewed in 1999 
for a five-year period 
b) Price cut, as part of PPRS, of 4.5% 
c) Free price modulation by 2001.  
a) Negative List 
b) Homogeneous budget given to PCGs 
c) Practice guidelines 
d) Guidance on cost-effectiveness by NICE, influences 
prescribing  
France Universally covered (99% of 
the population) by statuary 
health insurance.  
a) Price fixing through negotiation (product’s medical value, prices of 
comparable medicines, volume sales and conditions used) 
b) Comparisons with other European Countries for “innovative” 
products 
c) Periodic price reductions for new and expensive products  
d) Price freedom has been introduced since 2003** 
a) Comite Economique du Medicament decides on 
reimbursable prices on advice from Transparency 
committee 
b) Positive List 
c) Medical References 
d) Targets for “gate-keeping” GP 
e) Pharmacoeconomic guidelines under development 
f) Prices of generics 30% lower than those of the original 
Italy SSN: National Health Service. 
Funds are supplemented by 
local taxes and health service 
charges.  
a) Average European Price (all EU countries) for “old” products and 
products registered with the national procedure; AEP is calculated on 
ex-manufacturer’s price (excl. VAT), of top five selling equivalents, 
including generics.  
b) Price negotiation (contractual model) for new and innovative 
products (for drugs registered with EMEA or for those for which 
AEP cannot be calculated) 
c) Price freedom for non-reimbursable drugs 
d) Generics are priced at least 20% below the original 
e) Frequent use of price cuts/freezes   
a) Positive list 
b) Reference listing and same prices for same drugs’ principle 
for off-patent drugs 
c) Formal requirement for economic evaluation during price 
negotiations 
d) Guidelines and protocols defined and managed at local 
level 
e) Official earmarked budget for innovative drugs introduced 
in 1998, representing 1% of national drug budget 
Spain The National statuary health 
insurance 
a) Price control trough negotiation on a cost-plus basis 
b) International price comparisons 
c) Price-volume agreement for expensive products 
a) Positive list 
b) Negative list 
c) Reference pricing for estimating maximum reimbursement 
for multi-source products 
Adapted from (Kanavos 2001) 
* Compiled from (Seget 2003), (Blachier and Kanavos), (Jommi), (Kullman), (Mossialos et al. 2004), ** Added from (Mossialos et al. 2004) 
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Table A.2 
Summary of Approaches in the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Prices 
by On-Patent and Off-Patent Drugs (2003) 
Countries: Market 
segment 
Free Pricing Direct Price 
Controls 
Use of 
international 
price 
comparisons 
Profit 
Controls 
Reference 
Pricing 
On-patent  X X   France 
Off-patent     X 
On-patent X     Germany 
On-patent     X 
On-patent  X X   Italy 
Off-patent     X 
On-patent  X X   Spain 
Off-patent   X  X 
On-patent X   X  UK 
Off-patent  X    
Adapted from (Mossialos et al. 2004)
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Table A.3 
 Demand-Side Policies (Prescribing, Dispensing and Consumption) in the Member States 
Country: Positive List Negative 
List 
Budget Guidelines / 
Monitoring 
Generic 
Prescribing 
Substitution Incentives Co-payment 
France Yes No Yes Yes Yes (limited-
gatekeepers) 
 
Yes Yes 
(gatekeepers)
% 
Germany No (but 
planned) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Flat Fee 
Italy Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No % + flat fee 
Spain Yes Yes No Yes Yes (limited) No  No % up to a 
max per 
item 
UK No Yes Yes Yes Yes (limited) No Yes Flat 
Adapted from (Kanavos 2001) 
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Table A.4 
ATC Therapeutic Categories for Cardiovascular Disease 
ATC Code Category Name 
C1A Cardiac Glycosides and Combinations 
C2A Antihypertensives (of non-herbal origin) Plain: 
It includes plain antihypertensives and combinations other than those with 
diuretics, eg combinations of two synthetic antihypertensives or 
combinations of one synthetic antihypertensive with reserpine.      
C3A Diuretics: Combinations with potassium belong to C3A1, C3A2 or C3A3. 
C4A Cerebral and Peripheral Vasotherapeutics: This group includes all 
products (including citicoline) which are mainly recommend for cerebral 
vascular diseases or peripheral circulatory disorders excluding venous 
diseases. Combination products are only classified in this group if they do 
not belong to group C1-C3, C7-C11.   
C7A Beta-Blocking Agents, Plain: Includes, eg acebutolol, alprenolol, 
amosulalol, arotinol, atenolol, befunolol, betaxolol, bevantolol, bisoprolol, 
bopindolol, bucumolol, bufetolol, bunitrolol, bupranolol, butofilolol, 
carazolol, carteolol, carvedilol, celiprolol, cloranolol, dilevalol, esmolol, 
indenolol, labetolol, levobunolol, mepindolol, metipranolol, metoprolol, 
nadolol, nifenalol, nipradilol, oxprenolol, penbutolol, pindolol, practolol, 
propranolol, sotalol, tertanolol, tilisolol, timolol, toliprolol.  
C8A Calcium Antagonists, Plain 
C9A Ace Inhibitors, Plain : Angiotensin-Converting-Enzyme inhibitors. It 
includes eg alacepril, benazepril, captopril, cilazepril, delapril, enalapril, 
fosinopril, imidapril, lisinopril, moexipril, perindopril, quinapril, ramipril, 
spirapril, temocapril, trandolapril.  
C10A Cholesterol and Triglyceride Regulating Preparations: Includes all 
products regulating cholesterol and triglycerides only. Combinations with 
products of group C4 should be classified here.  
Adopted from (Jacobzone 2000)  
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Table A.5 
Largest Pharmaceutical Markets in the World, 
National Currency (million), growth: US$, NC 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 
Rank 
03 Country Mill NC +($) +NC Mill NC +($) +NC Mill NC +($) +NC Mill NC +($) +NC 
1 USA 150,952 14 14 176,748 17 17 197,602 12 12 219,522 11 11 
2 Japan 6,231,585 8 2 6,502,706 -7 4 6,603,811 -2 2 7,059,335 12 7 
3 Germany 18,157 -8 6 19,921 7 10 21,515 14 8 24,631 30 14 
4 France 18,111 -6 9 19,418 4 7 20,183 9 4 22,583 27 12 
5 Italy 11,990 -1 15 13,441 9 12 14,136 11 5 15,592 25 10 
6 United 
Kingdom 7,380 0 7 8,180 5 11 9,111 16 11 10,386 20 14 
7 Spain 7,711 2 18 8,349 5 8 9,174 16 10 10,794 34 18 
13 Australia 5,452 0 11 6,227 2 14 6,854 16 10 8,088 30 18 
17 Belgium  2,722 -7 8 2,862 2 5 3,049 12 7 3,521 31 15 
18 Poland 11,013 12 22 11,913 15 8 12,373 4 4 14,407 18 16 
19 Greece 1,504 -1 19 1,805 15 20 2,281 33 26 2,898 44 27 
20 Sweden 19,690 0 11 21,051 -5 7 22,737 15 8 24,711 22 9 
21 Switzerland 2,971 -4 8 3,279 10 10 3,517 16 7 3,926 26 12 
23 Austria 1,766 -9 6 1,864 3 6 2,038 15 9 2,284 27 12 
24 Portugal 1,702 -6 8 1,848 5 9 1,998 14 8 2,183 24 9 
29 Finland 1,071 -5 10 1,201 9 12 1,330 17 11 1,491 27 12 
33 Denmark 7,105 -5 10 7,782 6 10 8,799 19 13 9,762 26 11 
35 Norway 6,945 -3 9 7,742 9 11 8,912 30 15 9,384 16 5 
36 Czeck 
Republic 28,254 0 11 29,896 7 6 32,763 27 10 38,138 29 16 
Adapted from (Pammolli et al. 2004) 
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Table A.6 
Balanced Sample ATC/Molecule and Country Availability for 1994-2003 
ATC Molecule Country Availability Global Molecule 
C7A Acebutolol FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C10A Acipimox GR,UK  
C4A Alprostadil Alfadex GR  
C3A Amiloride FR, UK  
C8A Amlodipine FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C7A Atenolol FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C3A Azosemide GR  
C9A Benazepril FR,GR,ITY,SPN  
C4A Bencyclane GR  
C3A Bendroflumethiazide UK  
C10A Benfluorex FR,ITY,SPN  
C8A Bepridil FR  
C7A Betaxolol FR, GR, ITY, UK  
C10A Bezafibrate FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C7A Bisoprolol FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C4A Blood GR  
C4A Buflomedil FR,GR,ITY,SPN  
C3A Bumetanide FR, SPN,UK  
C2A Bunazosin GR  
C2A Cadralazine ITY  
C3A Canrenoic Acid FR,GR,ITY  
C9A Captopril FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C7A Carteolol FR,GR,SPN  
C7A Carvedilol GR,ITY,SPN, UK  
C7A Celiprolol FR,GR, SPN, UK  
C3A Chlortalidone GR,ITY, SPN, UK  
C2A Cicletanine FR,GR  
C9A Cilazapril FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C4A Cinnarizine GR,ITY,SPN,UK  
C10A Ciprofibrate FR,UK  
C4A Citicoline ITY,SPN  
C2A Clonidine FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C3A Clopamide GR  
C10A Colestipol GR,SPN,UK  
C10A Colestyramine FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C4A Cyclandelate FR,GR,ITY  
C1A Digitoxin GR,SPN  
C1A Digoxin FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C2A Dihydralazine GR  
C4A Dihydroergocristine GR, ITY,SPN  
C4A Dihydroergotoxine FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C8A Diltiazem FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C2A Doxazosin GR,ITY,SPN, UK  
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Table A.6 (Continued) 
Balanced Sample ATC/Molecule and Country Availability for 1994-2003 
ATC Molecule Country Availability (1993-2003 Period) 
Global 
Molecule 
C9A Enalapril FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C7A Esmolol GR,SPN  
C10A Etofibrate GR  
C10A Etofylline Clofibrate GR  
C8A Felodipine FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C10A Fenofibrate FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C4A Flunarizine ITY  
C10A Fluvastatin GR,SPN  
C9A Fosinopril GR,ITY, SPN, UK  
C3A Furosemide FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C8A Gallopamil GR,ITY  
C10A Gemfibrozil FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C4A Ginkgo Biloba FR,GR,SPN  
C4A Glycosaminoglycan 
Polysulfate(S) 
ITY 
 
C2A Guanfacine FR  
C2A Hydralazine SPN,UK  
C3A Hydrochlorothiazide FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C4A Ifenprodil GR  
C3A Indapamide FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C2A Indoramin GR,UK  
C8A Isradipine FR,GR,ITY,UK  
C4A Kallidinogenase GR  
C2A Ketanserin ITY  
C7A Labetalol FR, ITY, SPN,UK  
C8A Lacidipine FR,ITY, SPN,UK  
C9A Lisinopril FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C10A Lovastatin GR, SPN  
C7A Mepindolol GR  
C2A Methyldopa FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C1A Metildigoxin GR, ITY,SPN   
C3A Metolazone GR, ITY,UK  
C7A Metoprolol FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C2A Minoxidil FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C4A Moxisylyte FR,UK  
C2A Moxonidine GR  
C7A Nadolol FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C4A Naftidrofuryl FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C8A Nicardipine FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C4A Nicergoline FR, GR,ITY,SPN  
C8A Nifedipine FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C8A Nilvadipine GR  
C4A Nimodipine GR,ITY,SPN,UK  
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Table A.6 (Continued) 
Final Balanced Sample ATC/Molecule and Country Availability for 1994-2003 
ATC Molecule Country Availability (1993-2003 Period) 
Global 
Molecule 
C8A Nisoldipine GR,ITY,SPN  
C8A Nitrendipine FR,GR,ITY,SPN  
C7A Oxprenolol FR,GR, SPN,UK  
C10A Pantethine ITY,SPN  
C7A Penbutolol GR  
C4A Pentoxifylline FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C9A Perindopril FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C4A Phenoxybenzamine GR  
C4A Phentolamine UK  
C7A Pindolol FR,GR,ITY,UK  
C3A Piretanide FR,GR,ITY,SPN  
C4A Piribedil GR, ITY  
C10A Pravastatin FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C2A Prazosin FR,GR,SPN,UK  
C10A Probucol SPN  
C7A Propranolol FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C9A Quinapril FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C9A Ramipril FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C2A Rilmenidine FR  
C10A Simvastatin FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C7A Sotalol FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C3A Spironolactone FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C7A Talinolol GR  
C2A Terazosin GR,ITY,UK  
C7A Tertatolol FR  
C7A Timolol FR,ITY,UK  
C3A Torasemide GR,ITY,UK  
C9A Trandolapril FR,GR,SPN,UK  
C3A Triamterene UK  
C2A Urapidil FR,GR,ITY  
C8A Verapamil FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
C4A Vincamine FR,GR,ITY,SPN  
C3A Xipamide FR,GR,ITY,SPN,UK X 
Summary of Data Set by ATC, Molecule, Country and Global Molecules 
C1A=3 
C2A=17 
C3A=16 
C4A=16 
C7A=20 
C8A=13 
C9A=10 
C10A=16 
Total Molecules: 118 
Country Totals:  
FR  = 70 
GR  =94 
ITY =75 
SPN=69 
UK  =71 
Σ=379 
Total Global 
Molecules: 38 
C1A=1 
C2A=3 
C3A=5 
C4A=3 
C7A=7 
C8A=6 
C9A=7 
C10A=6 
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Table A.7 
Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for All Molecules, Relative to Spain 
1994 1995 1996 Index Measures GR FR UK ITY GR FR UK ITY GR FR UK ITY 
Number of ATC/Molecule Matching 81 63 71 82 78 62 67 78 78 65 68 79 
Laspeyres Price Index (SPN weighted) 1.3851 1.3798 1.3284 1.4659 1.3104 1.3779 1.3303 1.3032 1.2570 1.3663 1.3253 1.3245 
Paasche Price Index (Own weighted) 1.3797 1.2787 1.4740 1.3244 1.2941 1.2517 1.4795 1.1753 1.2323 1.2400 1.4615 1.2126 
Laspeyres Quantity Index 2.3118 1.1846 2.5719 1.4422 2.3050 1.2043 2.3777 1.4065 2.3753 1.2605 2.2487 1.3634 
Paasche Quantity Index 2.3029 1.0979 2.8538 1.3030 2.2764 1.0940 2.6444 1.2684 2.3287 1.1439 2.4797 1.2482 
Normalized Laspeyres Quantity Index 
by Relative Population Size 4.7912 1.7442 3.7724 2.0888 4.7770 1.7737 3.4903 2.0323 4.9286 1.8571 3.3041 1.9655 
Normalized Paasche Quantity Index  
by Relative Population Size 4.7727 1.6165 4.1859 1.8872 4.7178 1.6112 3.8817 1.8327 4.8319 1.6853 3.6435 1.7995 
Population Ratio (Comparison/SPN) 2.0725 1.4724 1.4667 1.4484 2.0725 1.4728 1.4679 1.4449 2.0750 1.4733 1.4693 1.4417 
Pp/Lp=Pq/Lq 0.9961 0.9268 1.1096 0.9035 0.9876 0.9084 1.1122 0.9018 0.9804 0.9075 1.1027 0.9155 
r -0.0007 -0.1296 0.0502 -0.0492 -0.0003 -0.2261 0.1227 -0.1022 -0.0090 -0.2202 0.0473 -0.0879 
Vp 0.6560 0.3607 0.4627 0.8024 0.6686 0.3707 0.4238 0.8001 0.6694 0.3709 0.4013 0.7553 
Vq 8.0652 1.5659 4.7176 2.4459 68.146 1.0926 2.1567 1.2005 3.2668 1.1321 5.4115 1.2731 
r.Vp.Vq -0.0039 -0.0732 0.1096 -0.0965 -0.0124 -0.0916 0.1122 -0.0982 -0.0196 -0.0925 0.1027 -0.0845 
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Table A.7 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for All Molecules, Relative to Spain 
1997 1998 1999 Index Measures GR FR UK ITY GR FR UK ITY GR FR UK ITY 
Number of ATC/Molecule Matching 77 65 68 74 78 69 68 75 77 66 66 73 
Laspeyres Price Index (SPN weighted) 1.1929 1.3553 1.3137 1.3165 1.1559 1.3937 1.2885 1.2978 1.1565 1.4089 1.2701 1.3178 
Paasche Price Index (Own weighted) 1.1423 1.2391 1.4314 1.2074 1.0924 1.2606 1.3847 1.2032 1.0748 1.3154 1.3463 1.2239 
Laspeyres Quantity Index 2.3843 1.2934 2.1498 1.2633 2.3024 1.3120 2.0025 1.2147 2.2541 1.3322 1.9368 1.2151 
Paasche Quantity Index 2.2831 1.1825 2.3424 1.1586 2.1758 1.1867 2.1520 1.1261 2.0949 1.2438 2.0531 1.1285 
Normalized Laspeyres Quantity Index 
by Relative Population Size 4.9471 1.9057 3.1610 1.8180 4.7662 1.9327 2.0366 1.7273 4.6459 1.9607 2.8465 1.7375 
Normalized Paasche Quantity Index  
by Relative Population Size 4.7374 1.7423 3.4442 1.6673 4.5042 1.7481 3.1650 1.6167 4.3177 1.8306 3.0174 1.6137 
Population Ratio (Comparison/SPN) 2.0749 1.4735 1.4703 1.4391 2.0701 1.4731 1.4707 1.4356 2.0611 1.4717 1.4697 1.4299 
Pp/Lp=Pq/Lq 0.9576 0.9143 1.0896 0.9171 0.9450 0.9045 1.0746 0.9271 0.9294 0.9336 1.0600 0.9288 
r -0.0222 -0.0933 0.0456 -0.1073 -0.0398 -0.1098 0.0302 -0.0207 -0.0413 -0.0991 0.0741 -0.0143 
Vp 0.6367 0.3640 0.3832 0.6963 0.5776 0.3860 0.3487 0.6146 0.5245 0.3573 0.3166 0.5521 
Vq 2.9994 2.5251 5.1234 1.1090 2.3900 2.2530 7.0822 5.7195 3.2576 1.8747 2.5596 8.9937 
r.Vp.Vq -0.0424 -0.0857 0.0896 -0.0829 -0.0550 -0.0955 0.0746 -0.0729 -0.0706 -0.0664 0.0600 -0.0712 
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Table A.7 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for All Molecules, Relative to Spain 
2000 2001 2002 Index Measures GR FR UK ITY GR FR UK ITY GR FR UK ITY 
Number of ATC/Molecule Matching 78 65 64 72 76 63 65 70 74 63 62 69 
Laspeyres Price Index (SPN weighted) 1.1759 1.4349 1.2938 1.3770 1.2274 1.4384 1.2964 1.3824 1.1980 1.4492 1.2680 1.3870 
Paasche Price Index (Own weighted) 1.0767 1.3567 1.3402 1.2773 1.1141 1.3513 1.3029 1.2768 1.0671 1.3633 1.2643 1.2938 
Laspeyres Quantity Index 2.2703 1.3576 1.9679 1.2270 2.3042 1.4704 1.9692 1.2806 2.3495 1.5478 1.8747 1.2126 
Paasche Quantity Index 2.0787 1.2836 2.0385 1.1382 2.0916 1.3814 1.9789 1.1827 2.0927 1.4560 1.8693 1.1312 
Normalized Laspeyres Quantity Index 
by Relative Population Size 4.6576 1.9927 2.8891 1.7441 4.6828 2.1433 2.8773 1.8023 4.7283 2.2374 2.7230 1.6872 
Normalized Paasche Quantity Index  
by Relative Population Size 4.2646 1.8840 2.9927 1.6179 4.2508 2.0136 2.8915 1.6645 4.2116 2.1047 2.7151 1.5738 
Population Ratio (Comparison/SPN) 2.0515 1.4678 1.4681 1.4215 2.0323 1.4576 1.4612 1.4074 2.0125 1.4456 1.4525 1.3913 
Pp/Lp=Pq/Lq 0.9156 0.9455 1.0359 0.9276 0.9077 0.9395 1.0050 0.9236 0.8907 0.9407 0.9971 0.9328 
r -0.0539 -0.1530 0.0530 -0.1562 -0.0983 -0.1670 0.0061 -0.1786 -0.1061 -0.1698 -0.0034 -0.1665 
Vp 0.5106 0.3418 0.2980 0.4875 0.4550 0.3450 0.3394 0.4594 0.4513 0.3367 0.3591 0.4283 
Vq 3.0649 1.0428 2.2700 0.9506 2.0631 1.0508 2.3968 0.9319 2.2818 1.0373 2.3538 0.9425 
r.Vp.Vq -0.0844 -0.0545 0.0359 -0.0724 -0.0923 -0.0605 0.0050 -0.0764 -0.1093 -0.0593 -0.0029 -0.0672 
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Table A.7 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes  
for All Molecules, Relative to Spain 
2003 Index Measures GR FR UK ITY 
Number of ATC/Molecule Matching 72 61 61 71 
Laspeyres Price Index (SPN weighted) 1.0989 1.4487 1.2392 1.3054 
Paasche Price Index (Own weighted) 0.9975 1.3730 1.2339 1.1987 
Laspeyres Quantity Index 2.4817 1.6173 1.8352 1.2398 
Paasche Quantity Index 2.2528 1.5328 1.8275 1.1384 
Normalized Laspeyres Quantity Index 
by Relative Population Size 4.9164 2.3072 2.6365 1.7057 
Normalized Paasche Quantity Index  
by Relative Population Size 4.4628 2.1867 2.6254 1.5663 
Population Ratio (Comparison/SPN) 1.9810 1.4266 1.4366 1.3758 
Pp/Lp=Pq/Lq 0.9077 0.9478 0.9958 0.9183 
r -0.0840 -0.1388 -0.0009 -0.1599 
Vp 0.4386 0.3509 0.3353 0.4292 
Vq 2.5050 1.0722 14.448 1.1907 
r.Vp.Vq -0.0923 -0.0522 -0.0042 -0.0817 
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Table A.8 
Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for Global Molecules, Relative to Spain 
1994 1995 1996 Index Measures GR UK FR ITY GR UK FR ITY GR UK FR ITY 
Number of ATC/Molecule Matching 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Laspeyres Price Index (SPN weighted) 1.2340 1.3125 1.2547 1.2163 1.1609 1.3057 1.2838 1.0890 1.1102 1.3025 1.2958 1.1345 
Paasche Price Index (Own weighted) 1.2961 1.2632 1.3138 1.2831 1.2111 1.2342 1.3294 1.1414 1.1427 1.2224 1.3255 1.1800 
Laspeyres Quantity Index 2.3180 1.3020 2.3520 1.4253 2.3544 1.3519 2.2150 1.4134 2.4347 1.4448 2.0988 1.3784 
Paasche Quantity Index 2.4345 1.2531 2.4627 1.5036 2.4561 1.2779 2.2937 1.4814 2.5060 1.3559 2.1468 1.4337 
Normalized Laspeyres Quantity Index 
by Relative Population Size 4.8040 1.9171 3.4498 2.0643 4.8794 1.9911 3.2514 2.0422 5.0519 2.1286 3.0838 1.9871 
Normalized Paasche Quantity Index  
by Relative Population Size 5.0455 1.8450 3.6121 2.1778 5.0902 1.8821 3.3670 2.1404 5.1998 1.9977 3.1543 2.0669 
Population Ratio (Comparison/SPN) 2.0725 1.4724 1.4667 1.4484 2.0725 1.4728 1.4679 1.4449 2.0750 1.4733 1.4693 1.4417 
Pp/Lp=Pq/Lq 1.0503 0.9624 1.0470 1.0550 1.0432 0.9453 1.0355 1.0481 1.0293 0.9385 1.0229 1.0402 
r 0.0698 -0.1073 0.0976 0.2661 0.0615 -0.1625 0.0726 0.2386 0.0385 -0.1885 0.0424 0.1898 
Vp 0.3816 0.3611 0.2755 0.3078 0.4081 0.3790 0.2725 0.2993 0.4400 0.3894 0.2915 0.2988 
Vq 1.8860 0.9701 1.7490 0.6710 1.7209 0.8893 1.7967 0.6733 1.7273 0.8378 1.8489 0.7081 
r.Vp.Vq 0.0503 -0.0376 0.0470 0.0550 0.0432 -0.0547 0.0355 0.0481 0.0293 -0.0615 0.0229 0.0402 
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Table A.8 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for Global Molecules, Relative to Spain 
1997 1998 1999 Index Measures GR UK FR ITY GR UK FR ITY GR UK FR ITY 
Number of ATC/Molecule Matching 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Laspeyres Price Index (SPN weighted) 1.0546 1.2847 1.2949 1.1479 1.0275 1.3251 1.2857 1.1662 1.0300 1.3596 1.2707 1.2059 
Paasche Price Index (Own weighted) 1.0562 1.2171 1.3064 1.1724 1.0209 1.2331 1.2730 1.1778 1.0060 1.2802 1.2474 1.2099 
Laspeyres Quantity Index 2.3727 1.4794 2.0031 1.2827 2.2814 1.5418 1.9653 1.2414 2.2590 1.5841 1.8558 1.2458 
Paasche Quantity Index 2.3762 1.4015 2.0208 1.3101 2.2667 1.4347 1.9459 1.2537 2.2064 1.4916 1.8218 1.2500 
Normalized Laspeyres Quantity Index 
by Relative Population Size 4.9231 2.1799 2.9452 1.8459 4.7226 2.2713 2.8904 1.6909 4.6561 2.3314 2.7274 1.7814 
Normalized Paasche Quantity Index  
by Relative Population Size 4.9305 2.0651 2.9713 1.8853 4.6922 2.1136 2.8618 1.7999 4.5476 2.1953 2.6775 1.7873 
Population Ratio (Comparison/SPN) 2.0749 1.4735 1.4703 1.4391 2.0701 1.4731 1.4707 1.4356 2.0611 1.4717 1.4697 1.4299 
Pp/Lp=Pq/Lq 1.0015 0.9473 1.0088 1.0213 0.9936 0.9306 0.9901 1.0099 0.9767 0.9416 0.9817 1.0033 
r 0.0018 -0.1654 0.0152 0.0938 -0.0071 -0.1966 -0.0164 0.0434 -0.0247 -0.1685 -0.0303 0.0140 
Vp 0.4710 0.3857 0.3009 0.2983 0.4592 0.4211 0.2875 0.2782 0.4347 0.3951 0.2702 0.2646 
Vq 1.8240 0.8252 1.9343 0.7624 1.9879 0.8386 2.0952 0.8211 2.1714 0.8770 2.2367 0.9004 
r.Vp.Vq 0.0015 -0.0527 0.0088 0.0213 -0.0064 -0.0694 -0.0099 0.0099 -0.0233 -0.0584 -0.0183 0.0033 
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Table A.8 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for Global Molecules, Relative to Spain 
2000 2001 2002 Index Measures GR UK FR ITY GR UK FR ITY GR UK FR ITY 
Number of ATC/Molecule Matching 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Laspeyres Price Index (SPN weighted) 1.0231 1.3745 1.2870 1.2717 1.0922 1.3833 1.3311 1.3591 1.0643 1.4404 1.3229 1.3533 
Paasche Price Index (Own weighted) 0.9884 1.3077 1.2444 1.2639 1.0380 1.2974 1.2440 1.3193 0.9909 1.3461 1.2277 1.3147 
Laspeyres Quantity Index 2.2897 1.5810 1.8399 1.2399 2.3449 1.7193 1.8959 1.2854 2.4456 1.7984 1.8710 1.2391 
Paasche Quantity Index 2.2120 1.5041 1.7790 1.2323 2.2286 1.6126 1.7719 1.2477 2.2771 1.6806 1.7363 1.2038 
Normalized Laspeyres Quantity Index 
by Relative Population Size 4.6974 2.3206 2.7011 1.7625 4.7655 2.5061 2.7703 1.8091 4.9217 2.5997 2.7176 1.7240 
Normalized Paasche Quantity Index  
by Relative Population Size 4.5381 2.2078 2.6117 1.7517 4.5292 2.3505 2.5890 1.7560 4.5826 2.4295 2.5220 1.6748 
Population Ratio (Comparison/SPN) 2.0515 1.4678 1.4681 1.4215 2.0323 1.4576 1.4612 1.4074 2.0125 1.4456 1.4525 1.3913 
Pp/Lp=Pq/Lq 0.9661 0.9514 0.9669 0.9939 0.9504 0.9379 0.9346 0.9707 0.9311 0.9345 0.9280 0.9715 
r -0.0337 -0.1378 -0.0520 -0.0264 -0.0552 -0.1665 -0.0847 -0.1164 -0.0715 -0.1786 -0.0811 -0.0964 
Vp 0.4524 0.3770 0.2747 0.2510 0.3975 0.3795 0.3389 0.2787 0.4103 0.3652 0.3660 0.3137 
Vq 2.2262 0.9358 2.3193 0.9243 2.2585 0.9828 2.2785 0.9036 2.3503 1.0042 2.4245 0.9442 
r.Vp.Vq -0.0339 -0.0486 -0.0331 -0.0061 -0.0496 -0.0621 -0.0654 -0.0293 -0.0689 -0.0655 -0.0720 -0.0285 
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Table A.8 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes  
for Global Molecules, Relative to Spain 
2003 Index Measures GR UK FR ITY 
Number of ATC/Molecule Matching 38 38 38 38 
Laspeyres Price Index (SPN weighted) 0.9443 1.4832 1.3183 1.3119 
Paasche Price Index (Own weighted) 0.9107 1.3923 1.2291 1.2507 
Laspeyres Quantity Index 2.7505 1.8956 1.8777 1.2621 
Paasche Quantity Index 2.6528 1.7794 1.7506 1.2032 
Normalized Laspeyres Quantity Index 
by Relative Population Size 5.4488 2.7043 2.6976 1.7364 
Normalized Paasche Quantity Index  
by Relative Population Size 5.2552 2.5385 2.5150 1.6553 
Population Ratio (Comparison/SPN) 1.9810 1.4266 1.4366 1.3758 
Pp/Lp=Pq/Lq 0.9645 0.9387 0.9323 0.9533 
r -0.0388 -0.1616 -0.0118 -0.1207 
Vp 0.3891 0.3522 0.3369 0.3517 
Vq 2.3560 1.0771 17.0891 1.1002 
r.Vp.Vq -0.0355 -0.0613 -0.0677 -0.0467 
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Table A.9 
Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for All Molecules,  
Relative to 1994  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Germany 
Number of 
ATC/Molecule 
Matching 
156 152 148 144 143 141 138 135 130 
Laspeyres 
Price Index 0.9742 0.9582 0.9223 0.8931 0.8842 0.8694 0.8691 0.8358 0.7993 
Laspeyres 
Quantity Index 1.0842 1.1919 1.2274 1.2385 1.2652 1.3397 1.4593 1.6497 1.8903 
Paasche Price 
Index 0.9695 0.9406 0.8909 0.8518 0.8330 0.7997 0.7951 0.7405 0.6853 
Paasche 
Quantity Index 1.0790 1.1700 1.1857 1.1812 1.1919 1.2322 1.3351 1.4615 1.6207 
United Kingdom 
Number of 
ATC/Molecule 
Matching 
93 93 92 92 90 87 82 81 81 
Laspeyres 
Price Index 1.0072 1.0075 1.0047 1.0217 1.0819 1.1046 1.0319 1.0225 1.0333 
Laspeyres 
Quantity Index 1.1164 1.2987 1.4457 1.5747 1.7187 1.8432 2.1377 2.4391 2.6650 
Paasche Price 
Index 1.0071 1.0070 1.0097 1.0268 1.0695 1.0749 1.0293 1.0357 1.0485 
Paasche 
Quantity Index 1.1162 1.2981 1.4529 1.5826 1.6990 1.7935 2.1324 2.4705 2.7041 
France 
Number of 
ATC/Molecule 
Matching 
101 99 97 95 92 89 88 85 84 
Laspeyres 
Price Index 1.0221 1.0346 1.0348 1.0306 1.0235 1.0049 0.9910 0.9711 0.9485 
Laspeyres 
Quantity Index 1.0154 1.0206 1.0437 1.0357 1.0197 1.0495 1.0909 1.1269 1.1445 
Paasche Price 
Index 1.0194 1.0248 1.0168 1.0029 0.9849 0.9653 0.9571 0.9405 0.9338 
Paasche 
Quantity Index 1.0126 1.0109 1.0256 1.0078 0.9813 1.0082 1.0536 1.0913 1.1268 
Italy 
Number of 
ATC/Molecule 
Matching 
116 111 104 101 99 97 95 91 88 
Laspeyres 
Price Index 0.9015 0.9497 0.9686 0.9861 1.0162 1.0378 1.0479 1.0274 0.9574 
Laspeyres 
Quantity Index 1.0667 1.1160 1.1118 1.1172 1.1658 1.2233 1.3335 1.3837 1.4648 
Paasche Price 
Index 0.8997 0.9422 0.9511 0.9626 0.9874 1.0067 1.0162 1.0031 0.9387 
Paasche 
Quantity Index 1.0646 1.1072 1.0917 1.0905 1.1326 1.1867 1.2931 1.3510 1.4362 
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Table A.9 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for All Molecules,  
Relative to 1994  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Spain 
Number of 
ATC/Molecule 
Matching 
100 98 95 94 93 88 86 84 81 
Laspeyres 
Price Index 1.0161 1.0328 1.0516 1.0627 1.0619 1.0385 1.0023 0.9886 0.9924 
Laspeyres 
Quantity Index 1.0950 1.1744 1.2461 1.2762 1.3187 1.3815 1.4652 1.5697 1.6227 
Paasche Price 
Index 1.0145 1.0258 1.0345 1.0342 1.0719 0.9986 0.9632 0.9481 0.9407 
Paasche 
Quantity Index 1.0933 1.1665 1.2258 1.2420 1.3312 1.3284 1.4080 1.5053 1.5383 
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Table A.10 
Pharmaceutical Price and Quantity Indexes for Global Molecules, Relative to 1994  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Number of 
ATC/Molecule 
Matching 
38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Germany 
Laspeyres 
Price Index 0.9609 0.9345 0.8837 0.8549 0.8454 0.8167 0.8084 0.7622 0.7020 
Laspeyres 
Quantity Index 1.0920 1.2154 1.2801 1.2837 1.3281 1.4367 1.6112 1.8680 2.1973 
Paasche Price 
Index 0.9538 0.9104 0.8468 0.8173 0.8070 0.7696 0.7618 0.6967 0.6300 
Paasche 
Quantity Index 1.0840 1.1840 1.2267 1.2272 1.2677 1.3539 1.5184 1.7076 1.9721 
United Kingdom 
Laspeyres 
Price Index 1.0064 1.0075 1.0033 1.0160 1.0995 1.0713 0.9986 0.9876 0.9980 
Laspeyres 
Quantity Index 1.1067 1.2744 1.4106 1.5281 1.6626 1.7569 2.0333 2.3407 2.5819 
Paasche Price 
Index 1.0061 1.0070 1.0086 1.0247 1.0932 1.0504 1.0068 1.0146 1.0319 
Paasche 
Quantity Index 1.1064 1.2738 1.4181 1.5412 1.6531 1.7226 2.0501 2.4048 2.6696 
France 
Laspeyres 
Price Index 1.0282 1.0453 1.0501 1.0455 1.0360 1.0242 1.0208 1.0068 0.9892 
Laspeyres 
Quantity Index 1.0199 1.0388 1.0645 1.0748 1.0550 1.0980 1.1625 1.2273 1.2693 
Paasche Price 
Index 1.0255 1.0358 1.0338 1.0204 1.0061 0.9905 0.9910 0.9773 0.9769 
Paasche 
Quantity Index 1.0172 1.0294 1.0481 1.0490 1.0245 1.0619 1.1286 1.1913 1.2536 
Italy 
Laspeyres 
Price Index 0.9095 0.9602 0.9814 1.0025 1.0380 1.0614 1.0724 1.0427 0.9749 
Laspeyres 
Quantity Index 1.0676 1.1188 1.1151 1.1149 1.1671 1.2357 1.3554 1.4095 1.4925 
Paasche Price 
Index 0.9068 0.9500 0.9580 0.9713 0.9979 1.0179 1.0326 1.0197 0.9601 
Paasche 
Quantity Index 1.0643 1.1069 1.0885 1.0802 1.1220 1.1851 1.3051 1.3783 1.4699 
Spain 
Laspeyres 
Price Index 1.0186 1.0372 1.0574 1.0715 1.0792 1.0578 1.0114 0.9969 0.9928 
Laspeyres 
Quantity Index 1.0795 1.1618 1.2523 1.3038 1.3664 1.4528 1.5588 1.6939 1.7708 
Paasche Price 
Index 1.0167 1.0287 1.0377 1.0389 1.0369 1.0104 0.9683 0.9525 0.9376 
Paasche 
Quantity Index 1.0774 1.1523 1.2289 1.2641 1.3129 1.3877 1.4924 1.6185 1.6724 
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Table A.11 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for All Molecules by Country 
Country Germany France United Kingdom 
Variable N Overall Mean 
Overall 
SD 
Within 
SD N 
Overall 
Mean 
Overall 
SD 
Within 
SD N 
Overall 
Mean 
Overall 
SD 
Within 
SD 
Suthnds 940 100,061 187,300 67,855 700 97,023 104,881 26,537 710 67,201 126,892 42,091 
Leuthnds 940 21,105 33,634 13,395 700 26,278 36,961 12,509 710 17,958 42,364 21,945 
Leusuprice 940 0.58 1.79 0.13 700 0.27 0.22 0.02 710 0.54 1.93 0.98 
Quality Characteristics 
Strengthg 940 0.15 0.55 0.03 700 0.133 0.48 0.01 710 0.12 0.47 0.13 
Molage 940 20.77 12.65 2.87 700 18.9 10.2 2.87 710 21.23 15.28 2.87 
Packsize 940 88.42 27.74 9.25 700 32.26 9.57 3.54 710 88.39 130.71 80.58 
Formcode 940 16.66 19.1 4.32 700 3.27 2.98 1.18 710 8.56 9.57 2.72 
Globpenet 940 3.79 1.42 0.32 700 4.24 1.15 0.24 710 4.30 1.10 0.29 
Market(Competition) Characteristics 
Gencompet 940 9.86 12.03 4.23 700 2.80 3.16 1.84 710 2.42 2.81 0.99 
Thsubsmol 940 21.05 7.64 1.50 700 13.94 4.34 1.16 710 13.51 3.82 1.33 
Thsubsolentlag 930 20.46 15.45 0.00 700 15.5 9.88 0.00 710 14.97 10.69 0.00 
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Table 11 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics by Country 
Country Italy Spain 
Variable N Overall Mean 
Overall 
SD 
Within 
SD N 
Overall 
Mean 
Overall 
SD 
Within 
SD 
Suthnds 750 50,636 72,026 19,584 690 43,078 55,333 16,430 
Leuthnds 750 15,267 26,607 8,800 690 10,272 17,515 6,619 
Leusuprice 750 0.30 0.30 0.05 690 0.21 0.17 0.02 
Quality Characteristics 
Strengthg 750 0.14 0.44 0.05 690 0.21 0.76 0.01 
Molage 750 18.97 11.04 2.87 690 17.85 10.33 2.87 
Packsize 750 27.89 9.93 2.01 690 40.13 15.09 2.02 
Formcode 750 3.49 3.16 1.26 690 3.51 3.58 0.93 
Globpenet 750 4.18 1.15 0.18 690 4.43 0.91 0.28 
Market(Competition) Characteristics 
Gencompet 750 3.46 3.78 1.28 690 3.82 5.06 2.29 
Thsubsmol 750 15.40 4.72 1.52 690 14.16 5.64 1.21 
Thsubsolentlag 750 19.21 12.65 0.00 690 17.39 11.45 0.00 
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Table A.12 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for Global Molecules by Country 
Country Germany France United Kingdom 
Variable N Overall Mean 
Overall 
SD 
Within 
SD N 
Overall 
Mean 
Overall 
SD 
Within
SD N 
Overall 
Mean 
Overall 
SD 
Within 
SD 
Suthnds 380 176,624 232,607 103,012 380 123,465 105,591 30,273 380 100,552 139,457 48,511 
Leuthnds 380 35,317 42,138 19,520 380 35,337 44,564 16,444 380 29,019 53,787 28,876 
Leusuprice 380 0.29 0.22 0.05 380 0.27 0.19 0.02 380 0.32 0.25 0.05 
Quality Characteristics 
Strengthg 380 0.13 0.32 0.05 380 0.19 0.64 0.00 380 0.18 0.64 0.17 
Molage 380 21.66 11.81 2.88 380 20.13 10.97 2.88 380 21.13 12.28 2.88 
Packsize 380 88.12 15.69 2.23 380 32.84 8.65 1.95 380 102.05 149.72 92.66 
Formcode 380 25.79 24.26 6.14 380 4.20 3.55 1.53 380 11.97 11.54 3.43 
Globpenet 380 5.00 0.00 0.00 380 5.00 0.00 0.00 380 5.00 0.00 0.00 
Market(Competition) Characteristics 
Gencompet 380 16.81 14.90 5.77 380 3.71 3.81 2.25 380 3.19 3.59 1.28 
Thsubsmol 380 19.16 6.85 1.44 380 13.63 4.49 1.11 380 12.91 3.71 1.24 
Thsubsolentlag 380 14.08 11.57 0.00 380 11.95 8.63 0.00 380 12.97 8.90 0.00 
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Table A.12 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics  
for Global Molecules by Country 
Country Italy Spain 
Variable N Overall Mean 
Overall 
SD 
Within 
SD N 
Overall 
Mean 
Overall 
SD 
Within 
SD 
Suthnds 380 78,600 87,262 24,399 380 59,079 63,228 20,453 
Leuthnds 380 22,462 32,826 11,203 380 14,078 21,154 8,419 
Leusuprice 380 0.28 0.24 0.05 380 0.21 0.17 0.02 
Quality Characteristics 
Strengthg 380 0.19 0.60 0.07 380 0.20 0.64 0.01 
Molage 380 20.32 11.47 2.88 380 19.68 11.30 2.88 
Packsize 380 27.04 9.77 2.58 380 40.33 11.26 1.74 
Formcode 380 3.77 2.96 1.36 380 4.11 4.37 1.13 
Globpenet 380 5.00 0.00 0.00 380 5.00 0.00 0.00 
Market(Competition) Characteristics 
Gencompet 380 3.95 3.94 1.57 380 4.63 6.21 2.71 
Thsubsmol 380 14.48 3.74 1.43 380 13.44 5.40 1.14 
Thsubsolentlag 380 14.61 10.09 0.00 380 14.05 10.31 0.00 
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Table A.13 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for All Molecules by Country by Year 
Country: Germany Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Mean 91,341 94,200 97,565 96,550 94,591 94,139 97,388 102,283 110,876 121,675 
St.Dev. 197,718 192,491 189,559 179,558 171,411 166,979 171,646 179,957 199,644 223,877 Suthnds 
N 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Mean 0.5818 0.5809 0.5805 0.5719 0.5678 0.5680 0.5805 0.5963 0.5888 0.5838 
St.Dev. 1.7368 1.7368 1.7254 1.7007 1.7019 1.7015 1.8159 1.9337 1.9505 1.9648 Leusuprice 
N 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Mean 18,819 19,838 21,193 20,701 19,989 20,007 20,372 22,102 23,299 24,727 
St.Dev. 30,386 29,658 30,389 29,043 28,792 29,638 31,483 36,453 41,151 45,850 Leuthnds 
N 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Quality Characteristics 
Mean 0.1418 0.1439 0.1456 0.1474 0.1488 0.1506 0.1520 0.1533 0.1545 0.1562 
St.Dev. 0.5390 0.5417 0.5441 0.5473 0.5503 0.5549 0.5587 0.5626 0.5667 0.5723 Strengthg 
N 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Mean 16.2660 17.2660 18.2660 19.2660 20.2660 21.2660 22.2660 23.2660 24.2660 25.2660 
St.Dev. 12.3812 12.3812 12.3812 12.3812 12.3812 12.3812 12.3812 12.3812 12.3812 12.3812 Molage 
N 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Mean 88.6616 86.9820 86.9964 87.6721 88.8467 88.9582 88.7587 88.8862 89.1031 89.3121 
St.Dev. 42.4639 33.0368 30.5640 27.2622 25.0869 23.8694 22.9830 22.4613 21.9649 21.8510 Packsize 
N 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Mean 16.5000 16.0426 16.2553 16.2447 16.4894 16.7340 16.7128 17.2340 17.3085 17.0745 
St.Dev. 19.028 18.5507 19.1928 18.5829 18.7093 18.8965 18.6689 19.5879 20.4135 20.1015 Formcode 
N 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Mean 3.8192 3.8192 3.8617 3.8404 3.8085 3.7872 3.7660 3.7553 3.7340 3.7234 
St.Dev. 1.3675 1.3675 1.3804 1.4165  1.4239 1.4208  1.4400 1.4568 1.4678 1.5127 Globpenet 
N 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
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Table A.13 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for Molecules by Country by Year 
Country: Germany Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Market (Competition) Characteristics 
Mean 6.8618 7.5852 8.2128 8.7660 9.9681 10.3936 11.0745 11.3936 11.7660 12.5851 
St.Dev. 9.0739 9.8771 10.4572 11.4351 12.3432 12.4721 12.6807 12.7290 13.50548 13.9588 Gencompet 
N 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Mean 21.7979 21.4894 21.3936 21.6170 21.2447 21.2234 20.8404 20.7660 20.6915 19.4575 
St.Dev. 8.8956 8.7838 8.8076 7.6074 7.2047 6.9207 6.6661 6.9645 7.5020 6.6812 Thsubsmol 
N 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Mean 20.4624 20.4624 20.4624 20.4624 20.4624 20.4624 20.4624 20.4624 20.4624 20.4624 
St.Dev. 15.5295 15.5295 15.5295 15.5295 15.5295 15.5295 15.5295 15.5295 15.5295 15.5295 Thsubsmol- entrylag N 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 
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Table A.13 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for All Molecules by Country by Year 
Country: France Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Mean 101,660 100,599 97,956 98,079 95,477 93,620 94,809 96,060 96,284 95,787 
St.Dev. 105,062 102,405 98,983 101,014 101,152 102,217 105,804 109,388 113,001 115,067 Suthnds 
N 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Mean 0.2666 0.2706 0.2740 0.2741 0.2735 0.2742 0.2727 0.2715 0.2691 0.2657 
St.Dev. 0.2267 0.2245 0.2250 0.2248 0.2240 0.2242 0.2249 0.2255 0.2231 0.2259 Leusuprice 
N 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Mean 25,201 26,121 26,439 26,840 26,327 25,483 25,684 26,524 26,957 27,201 
St.Dev. 28,465 29,733 31,465 33,227 34,938 34,002 36,017 40,896 45,616 51,180 Leuthnds 
N 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Quality Characteristics 
Mean 0.1324 0.1326 0.1329 0.1330 0.1333 0.1332 0.1335 0.1336 0.1337 0.1324 
St.Dev. 0.4812 0.4813 0.4814 0.4814 0.4814 0.4813 0.4814 0.4813 0.4814 0.4809 Strengthg 
N 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Mean 14.4000 15.4000 16.4000 17.4000 18.4000 19.4000 20.4000 21.4000 22.4000 23.4000 
St.Dev. 9.8487 9.8487 9.8487 9.8487 9.8487 9.8487 9.8487 9.8487 9.8487 9.8487 Molage 
N 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Mean 31.8639 31.8353 31.9500 32.0411 32.1769 32.0760 32.3648 32.6652  32.7235  32.9488 
St.Dev. 9.1641 8.9247 9.0061 9.1370 9.0886 9.5272 9.8104 10.1974  10.4168  10.7817 Packsize 
N 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Mean 2.7714 2.6857 2.8714 3.1143 3.3000 3.5286 3.7143 3.6286   3.5429   3.5857 
St.Dev. 2.1814 2.0039 2.3277 2.7586 2.9750 3.4963 3.7500 3.5105   3.0960  3.1091 Formcode 
N 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Mean 4.3000 4.2857 4.3000 4.2857 4.2857 4.2429 4.2286 4.2000   4.1571  4.1571 
St.Dev. 1.0948 1.1183 1.1209 1.1183 1.1183 1.1602 1.1443 1.1869  1.2469  1.2469 Globpenet 
N 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
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Table A.13 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for All Molecules by Country by Year 
Country: France Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Market (Competition) Characteristics 
Mean 1.9143 1.8714 2.0857 2.3143 2.6429 2.8143 3.1143 3.3429      3.8000   4.1286 
St.Dev. 1.4915 1.39275 1.7590 2.1839 2.7295 2.9747 3.4538 3.7836  4.4055  4.6685 Gencompet 
N 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Mean 14.8143 14.0857 14.3143 14.3000 14.2571 13.9857 13.6000 13.6143 13.2714   13.1286 
St.Dev. 5.2483  4.6054  4.2683   4.5248  4.4516 4.5028  4.3218  3.9647  3.6153   3.6828 Thsubsmol 
N 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Mean 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 
St.Dev. 9.9488 9.9488 9.9488 9.9488 9.9488 9.9488 9.9488 9.9488 9.9488 9.9488 Thsubsmol- entrylag N 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
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Table A.13 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for All Molecules by Country by Year 
Country: Italy Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Mean 46,682 48,395 50,129 49,193 48,513 49,447 50,817 53,763 53,815 55,612 
St.Dev. 66,011 66,638 69,011 67,751 67,963 70,521 73,589 78,333 79,016 83,040 Suthnds 
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Mean 0.2894 0.2646 0.2800 0.2891 0.2952 0.3042 0.3100 0.3125 0.3126 0.2984 
St.Dev. 0.2945 0.2611 0.2823 0.3007 0.3024 0.3087 0.3159 0.3179 0.3178 0.3102 Leusuprice 
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Mean 13,075 12,542 13,775 13,861 14,094 15,090 16,159 17,795 18,233 18,049 
St.Dev. 20,816 19,397 21,791 22,168 22,830 25,104 27,843 31,874 34,237 35,113 Leuthnds 
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Quality Characteristics  
Mean 0.1322 0.1329 0.1334 0.1346 0.1476 0.1483 0.1484 0.1481 0.1485 0.1486 
St.Dev. 0.3965 0.3987 0.3876 0.3784 0.4751 0.4799 0.4798 0.4797 0.4798 0.4798 Strengthg 
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Mean 14.4667 15.4667 16.4667 17.4667 18.4667 19.4667 20.4667 21.4667 22.4667 23.4667 
St.Dev. 10.7242 10.7242 10.7242 10.7242 10.7242 10.7242 10.7242 10.7242 10.7242 10.7242 Molage 
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Mean 27.9435 27.9282 27.9028 27.7540 27.7421 27.8486 27.9149 28.0924 27.9160 27.8151 
St.Dev. 9.9150 9.8735 9.9394 10.0877 10.0829 9.9887 9.9177 10.0440 10.0108 10.0791 Packsize 
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Mean 3.4933 3.4533 3.4400 3.4133 3.3333 3.3733 3.5067 3.6000 3.61330 3.6800 
St.Dev. 3.4656 3.2768 3.0369 2.9459 2.7427 2.7202 3.0330 3.4011 3.4363 3.5723 Formcode 
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Mean 4.1867 4.1867 4.21337 4.2000 4.2133 4.1867 4.1600 4.1600 4.1467 4.1467 
St.Dev. 1.1472 1.1472 1.1306 1.1508 1.1542 1.1589 1.1745 1.1745 1.1705 1.1705 Globpenet 
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
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Table A.13 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for All Molecules by Country by Year 
Country: Italy Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Market(Competition) Characteristics 
Mean 3.2400 3.3200 3.3333 3.2533 3.2267 3.2533 3.4933 3.6400 3.85330 4.000 
St.Dev. 3.2708 3.3978 3.4222 3.4371 3.3715 3.4410 3.8882 4.2542 4.4591 4.6702 Gencompet 
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Mean 16.5467 16.4000 15.9733 15.3467 15.4800 15.4533 15.3867 15.0133 14.3333 14.0933 
St.Dev. 5.8663 5.7657 4.8601 4.2569 4.4032 4.4700 4.6438 4.0520 4.1275 3.9837 Thsubsmol 
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Mean 19.2133 19.2133 19.2133 19.2133 19.2133 19.2133 19.2133 19.2133 19.2133 19.2133 
St.Dev. 12.7272 12.7272 12.7272 12.7272 12.7272 12.7272 12.7272 12.7272 12.7272 12.7272 Thsubsmol- entrylag N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
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Table A.13 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for All Molecules by Country by Year 
Country: Spain Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Mean 38,772 40,293 41,373 42,429 42,390 42,742 43,766 45,188 46,565 47,256 
St.Dev. 51,009 51,949 52,499 53,422 53,697 54,523 56,228 58,283 60,739 62,791 Suthnds 
N 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Mean 0.2072 0.2084 0.2099 0.2120 0.2135 0.2134 0.2087 0.2069 0.2053 0.2057 
St.Dev. 0.1698 0.1692 0.1692 0.1688 0.1676 0.1669 0.1641 0.1658 0.1661 0.1690 Leusuprice 
N 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Mean 7,822 8,691 9,436 10,112 10,368 10,641 10,847 11,098 11,704 12,004 
St.Dev. 12,392 13,607 14,684 15,781 16,501 17,375 18,189 19,187 21,906 23,155 Leuthnds 
N 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Quality Characteristics  
Mean 0.2072 0.2075 0.2082 0.2099 0.2105 0.2109 0.2112 0.2115 0.2111 0.2122 
St.Dev. 0.7619 0.7620 0.7622 0.7629 0.7631 0.7633 0.7635 0.7636 0.7637 0.7638 Strengthg 
N 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Mean 13.3478 14.3478 15.3478 16.3478 17.3478 18.3478 19.3478 20.3478 21.3478 22.3478 
St.Dev. 9.9836 9.9836 9.9836 9.9836 9.9836 9.9836 9.9836 9.9836 9.9836 9.9836 Molage 
N 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Mean 40.6834 40.6355 40.6007 40.1174 39.9884 39.8821 39.8462 39.8963 39.8558 39.7986 
St.Dev. 15.1235 15.1269 15.3012 15.1153 15.0211 15.1568 15.1621 15.2691 15.2716 15.2803 Packsize 
N 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Mean 3.3478 3.3768 3.4058 3.4493 3.4203 3.4783 3.6087 3.6957 3.6522 3.6232 
St.Dev. 3.1381 3.3082 3.3752 3.5253 3.4145 3.4878 3.9266 3.9790 3.9064 3.8810 Formcode 
N 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Mean 4.4203 4.4493 4.4928 4.4783 4.4493 4.4203 4.4203 4.4058 4.3768 4.3768 
St.Dev. 0.8644 0.8666 0.8335 0.8679 0.9161 0.9299 0.9300 0.9750 0.9717 0.9717 Globpenet 
N 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
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Table A.13 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for All Molecules by Country by Year 
Country: Spain Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Market (Competition) Characteristics  
Mean 3.0580 3.1594 3.1739 3.3043 3.4493 3.6087 3.9565 4.3913 4.9420 5.1304 
St.Dev. 3.1243 3.3678 3.3779 3.6312 3.9090 4.4465 5.2087 6.2006 7.0521 7.6233 Gencompet 
N 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Mean 15.0435 14.3333 14.4348 14.1884 14.8696 14.4348 13.9855 13.7971 13.5507 12.9565 
St.Dev. 6.3765 5.8251 6.1822 5.9267 6.0729 5.8648 5.6944 5.0631 4.9809 4.0960 Thsubsmol 
N 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Mean 17.3913 17.3913 17.3913 17.3913 17.3913 17.3913 17.3913 17.3913 17.3913 17.3913 
St.Dev. 11.5214 11.5214 11.5214 11.5214 11.5214 11.5214 11.5214 11.5214 11.5214 11.5214 Thsubsmol- entrylag N 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
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Table A.13 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for All Molecules by Country by Year 
Country:  
United Kingdom Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Mean 50,900 53,770 58,921 61,324 64,127 67,759 68,702 76,668 82,708 87,136 
St.Dev. 100,046 102,315 109,760 112,259 116,617 124,097 125,245 142,848 154,858 166,074 Suthnds 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Mean 0.4178 0.5119 0.8223 0.5085 0.5925 0.4795 0.4738 0.5508 0.5590 0.5078 
St.Dev. .9723 1.724 4.3158 1.6306 2.1351 0.9227 0.9210 1.5446 1.5928 1.1460 Leusuprice 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Mean 9,984 11,258 13,124 14,676 16,274 18,514 19,968 22,168 25,455 28,164 
St.Dev. 21,531 23,474 26,867 30,259 33,912 37,465 40,047 47,892 60,288 71,467 Leuthnds 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Quality Characteristics 
Mean 0.1605 0.1125 0.1139 0.1132 0.1131 0.1129 0.1132 0.1114 0.1086 0.1079 
St.Dev. 0.6221 0.4768 0.4768 .4760 0.4704 0.4702 0.4673 0.4449 0.4192 0.4115 Strengthg 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Mean 16.7324 17.7324 18.7324 19.7324 20.7324 21.7324 22.7324 23.7324 24.7324 25.7324 
St.Dev. 15.1072 15.1072 15.1072 15.1072 15.1072 15.1072 15.1072 15.1072 15.1072 15.1072 Molage 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Mean 124.6009 125.0463 122.1820 109.1184 102.8499 81.8099 58.1690 54.9476 53.4879 51.6353 
St.Dev. 176.9906 179.8889 180.3949 155.8690 153.4981 106.6297 53.1618 46.4842 43.1163 39.3169 Packsize 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Mean 7.2676 7.4366 7.7887 8.3521 8.8451 9.3662 9.4085 9.2394 8.9155 9.0141 
St.Dev. 7.7367 7.9977 8.5522 9.5620 10.0933 11.1153 10.5919 10.2378 9.8282 9.6651 Formcode 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Mean 4.3239 4.3239 4.3521 4.3380 4.3380 4.3099 4.2817 4.2535 4.2254 4.2254 
St.Dev. 0.9968 1.0250 1.0433 1.0683 1.0683 1.1031 1.1487 1.2038 1.1976 1.1976 Globpenet 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
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Table A.13 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for All Molecules by Country by Year 
Country:  
United Kingdom Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Market(Competition) Characteristics  
Mean 1.9155 2.0423 2.1127 2.3099 2.3944 2.4366 2.5211 2.7887 2.7887 2.8451 
St.Dev. 1.8107 2.0663 2.3758 2.8009 3.1052 2.9215 2.9074 3.4555 3.1934 3.0503 Gencompet 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Mean 13.3802 13.3803 13.7324 14.0282 14.1690 14.0282 13.5775 12.9155 12.7465 13.0986 
St.Dev. 4.5556 4.5556 4.3588 4.2392 4.0602 3.6877 3.2145 3.1018 2.9506 2.8593 Thsubsmol 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Mean 14.9718 14.9718 14.9718 14.9718 14.9718 14.9718 14.9718 14.9718 14.9718 14.9718 
St.Dev. 10.7597 10.7597 10.7597 10.7597 10.7597 10.7597 10.7597 10.7597 10.7597 10.7597 Thsubsmol- entrylag N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
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Table A.14 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for Global Molecules by Country by Year 
Country: Germany Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Mean 154,306 160,153 167,148 168,119 162,890 164,158 172,419 183,792 204,108 229,144 
St.Dev. 245,310 238,622 233,069 224,878 207,050 205,637 211,184 220,526 252,621 291,580 Suthnds 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 0.3080 0.3032 0.3023 0.2981 0.2940 0.2944 0.2913 0.2893 0.2745 0.2519 
St.Dev. 0.1985 0.1949 0.1965 0.2061 0.2141 0.2209 0.2333 0.2408 0.2461 0.2188 Leusuprice 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 31,065 32,358 34,381 33,675 32,621 33,295 34,350 37,988 40,430 43,005 
St.Dev. 36,526 35,633 36,125 35,027 34,550 36,720 39,544 46,870 53,988 60,798 Leuthnds 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Quality Characteristics  
Mean 0.1168 0.1215 0.1245 0.1282 0.1315 0.1357 0.1391 0.1422 0.1454 0.1494 
St.Dev. 0.2544 0.2683 0.2797 0.2949 0.3087 0.3288 0.3448 0.3605 0.3767 0.3974 Strengthg 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 17.1579 18.1579 19.1579 20.1579 21.1579 22.1579 23.1579 24.1579 25.1579 26.1579 
St.Dev. 11.5981 11.5981 11.5981 11.5981 11.5981 11.5981 11.5981 11.5981 11.5981 11.5981 Molage 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 85.5251 86.0092 86.2022 87.3814 88.9049 89.0981 88.9529 89.1485 89.7112 90.3038 
St.Dev. 15.9256 15.7505 15.7250 15.7112 15.7485 15.7806 15.8148 15.8579 15.8178 15.8275 Packsize 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 24.9737 24.6316 25.2105 24.9211 25.0789 26.0263 26.1053 27.1579 27.1842 26.5789 
St.Dev. 24.2359 23.7889 24.8891 23.8864 24.2814 24.3160 23.8234 24.8624 25.9791 25.2315 Formcode 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
St.Dev. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Globpenet 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
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Table A.14 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for Global Molecules by Country by Year 
Country: Germany Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Market(Competition) Characteristics  
Mean 11.3158 13.0000 14.210 15.2368 16.9474 17.6842 18.8684 19.3947 20.1053 21.3684 
St.Dev. 11.7338 12.7513 13.2056 14.5592 15.6377 15.5148 15.2938 15.1239 16.2776 16.5667 Gencompet 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 19.3421 19.0263 19.1053 19.8947 19.6316 19.6842 19.2632 19.1316 18.8158 17.7368 
St.Dev. 8.1548 7.9270 8.1067 7.2328 6.8396 6.4352 6.0390 6.1035 6.2379 5.3407 Thsubsmol 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 14.0789 14.0789 14.0789 14.0789 14.0789 14.0789 14.0789 14.0789 14.0789 14.0789 
St.Dev. 11.7137 11.7137 11.7137 11.7137 11.7137 11.7137 11.7137 11.7137 11.7137 11.7137 Thsubsmol- entrylag N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
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Table A.14 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for Global Molecules by Country by Year 
Country: France Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Mean 127,328 126,144 123,101 123,032 120,912 118,308 120,800 123,526 125,324 126,174 
St.Dev. 109,921 106,117 101,089 102,219 102,264 100,450 104,124 108,503 114,037 118,120 Suthnds 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 0.2636 0.2701 0.2752 0.2761 0.2735 0.2712 0.2701 0.2701 0.2677 0.2644 
St.Dev. 0.2004 0.1962 0.1966 0.1967 0.1961 0.1966 0.1978 0.1987 0.1928 0.1983 Leusuprice 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 31,951 33,417 34,378 35,163 35,040 33,914 34,752 36,809 38,322 39,620 
St.Dev. 31,438 33,114 36,154 38,829 41,850 40,525 43,508 50,576 57,310 65,306 Leuthnds 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Quality (Market) Characteristics  
Mean 0.1926 0.1931 0.1937 0.1939 0.1937 0.1936 0.1939 0.1940 0.1940 0.1940 
St.Dev. 0.6459 0.6459 0.6459 0.6459 0.6459 0.6459 0.6460 0.6459 0.6460 0.6460 Strengthg 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 15.6316 16.6316 17.6316 18.6316 19.6316 20.6316 21.6316 22.6316 23.6316 24.6316 
St.Dev. 10.7186 10.7186 10.7186 10.7186 10.7186 10.7186 10.7186 10.7186 10.7186 10.7186 Molage 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 32.7990 32.6109 32.4992 32.4883 32.6507 32.7460 33.0276 33.2668 33.1910 33.1579 
St.Dev. 9.3614 9.2018 9.1312 9.0082 8.8119 8.7658 8.3847 8.3167 8.2380 8.2098 Packsize 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 3.3684 3.1842 3.5263 3.9737 4.2368 4.5789 4.9474 4.8421 4.6316 4.6842 
St.Dev. 2.5300 2.2763 2.7187 3.2507 3.5446 4.2339 4.5259 4.2140 3.6423 3.6621 Formcode 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
St.Dev. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Globpenet 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
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Table A.14 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for Global Molecules by Country by Year 
Country: France Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Market (Competition) Characteristics  
Mean 2.2105 2.1579 2.55269 3.0000 3.6053 3.8947 4.2895 4.6579 5.1579 5.5263 
St.Dev. 1.7267 1.6362 2.1270 2.6610 3.3574 3.6449 4.1323 4.5398 5.1282 5.4263 Gencompet 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 14.2632 13.6579 13.8158 13.7632 13.8684 13.8158 13.4474 13.4737 13.1579 13.0789 
St.Dev. 5.5395 4.8339 4.5432 4.7558 4.6625 4.6374 4.4339 4.0653 3.7742 3.8088 Thsubsmol 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 11.9474 11.9474 11.9474 11.9474 11.9474 11.9474 11.9474 11.9474 11.9474 11.9474 
St.Dev. 8.7300 8.7300 8.7300 8.7300 8.7300 8.7300 8.7300 8.7300 8.7300 8.7300 Thsubsmol- entrylag N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
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Table A.14 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for Global Molecules by Country by Year 
Country: Italy Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Mean 72,514 75,073 77,957 76,583 75,321 76,959 79,191 83,609 83,220 85,570 
St.Dev. 81,844 81,868 84,434 82,710 83,105 86,145 89,584 95,191 95,360 99,768 Suthnds 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 0.2676 0.2428 0.2581 0.2675 0.2729 0.2837 0.2916 0.2977 0.2959 0.2832 
St.Dev. 0.2371 0.1978 0.2140 0.2314 0.2320 0.2424 0.2567 0.2682 0.2742 0.2676 Leusuprice 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 18,911 18,307 20,100 20,208 20,478 22,082 23,787 26,467 27,179 27,099 
St.Dev. 25,141 23,657 26,719 27,278 28,070 30,883 34,262 39,621 42,924 44,171 Leuthnds 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Quality Characteristics 
Mean 0.1756 0.1770 0.1778 0.1796 0.2046 0.2061 0.2058 0.2057 0.2059 0.2060 
St.Dev. 0.5371 0.5400 0.5234 0.5091 0.6489 0.6556 0.6553 0.6550 0.6550 0.6549 Strengthg 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 15.8158 16.8158 17.8158 18.8158 19.8158 20.8158 21.8158 22.8158 23.8158 24.8158 
St.Dev. 11.2391 11.2391 11.2391 11.2391 11.2391 11.2391 11.2391 11.2391 11.2391 11.2391 Molage 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 27.3968 27.3100 27.2803 26.9495 26.7784 26.7462 26.8004 27.1335 27.0267 26.9813 
St.Dev. 9.5066 9.4423 9.5875 9.9184 10.0963 10.0612 9.8308 10.0760 10.1157 10.1591 Packsize 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 3.3158 3.3158 3.4474 3.5000 3.5263 3.6842 3.9474 4.1579 4.2895 4.5526 
St.Dev. 2.1699 2.1699 2.2263 2.3795 2.4576 2.6108 3.0839 3.6057 3.9105 4.1700 Formcode 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
St.Dev. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Globpenet 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
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Table A.14 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for Global Molecules by Country by Year 
Country: Italy Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Market (Competition) Characteristics 
Mean 3.2895 3.3684 3.5263 3.5000 3.5263 3.6842 4.1053 4.4474 4.8947 5.1579 
St.Dev. 2.5352 2.8037 3.0733 3.2529 3.3590 3.4882 4.2477 4.8418 5.2029 5.3753 Gencompet 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 15.0000 14.9211 14.7632 14.5000 14.7105 14.6842 14.6579 14.5000 13.7105 13.3947 
St.Dev. 4.8990 4.6230 3.8304 3.2777 3.4634 3.5421 3.6854 3.3430 3.3281 3.1153 Thsubsmol 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 14.6053 14.6053 14.6053 14.6053 14.6053 14.6053 14.6053 14.6053 14.6053 14.6053 
St.Dev. 10.2074 10.2074 10.2074 10.2074 10.2074 10.2074 10.2074 10.2074 10.2074 10.2074 Thsubsmol- entrylag N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
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Table A.14 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for Global Molecules by Country by Year 
Country: Spain Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Mean 51,162 53,068 54,806 56,982 57,673 58,805 60,943 63,471 66,094 67,786 
St.Dev. 59,583 59,411 58,957 59,923 60,683 62,113 64,462 67,196 70,371 73,228 Suthnds 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 0.2076 0.2088 0.2104 0.2136 0.2165 0.2187 0.2157 0.2135 0.2116 0.2103 
St.Dev. 0.1714 0.1689 0.1679 0.1670 0.1660 0.1677 0.1680 0.1713 0.1708 0.1702 Leusuprice 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 10,340 11,348 12,358 13,437 14,006 14,650 15,179 15,607 16,683 17,168 
St.Dev. 14,540 15,768 17,035 18,530 19,658 21,002 22,179 23,549 27,237 28,779 Leuthnds 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Quality Characteristics  
Mean 0.1940 0.1946 0.1961 0.1991 0.1999 0.2005 0.2010 0.2012 0.2013 0.2017 
St.Dev. 0.6483 0.6485 0.6489 0.6506 0.6510 0.6514 0.6518 0.6521 0.6523 0.6527 Strengthg 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 15.1842 16.1842 17.1842 18.1842 19.1842 20.1842 21.1842 22.1842 23.1842 24.1842 
St.Dev. 11.0572 11.0572 11.0572 11.0572 11.0572 11.0572 11.0572 11.0572 11.0572 11.0572 Molage 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 40.9292 40.7530 40.6194 40.3590 40.1945 40.0689 40.0768 40.1406 40.1108 40.0166 
St.Dev. 11.9422 11.8425 11.6951 11.3057 11.2812 11.2371 11.1980 11.1785 11.1456 11.0794 Packsize 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 3.6842 3.7632 3.8684 4.0000 3.9211 4.0526 4.2632 4.5000 4.5263 4.5526 
St.Dev. 3.6101 3.8934 4.0281 4.2490 4.1680 4.2487 4.8862 4.9688 4.9415 4.9193 Formcode 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
St.Dev. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Globpenet 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
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Table A.14 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for Global Molecules by Country by Year 
Country: Spain Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Market (Competition) Characteristics 
Mean 3.4737 3.6579 3.6579 3.8947 4.0789 4.4211 4.8947 5.4211 6.2632 6.5789 
St.Dev. 3.7034 4.1085 4.1347 4.4829 4.8120 5.5343 6.5669 7.6463 9.2871 8.5793 Gencompet 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 14.0526 13.5000 13.6053 13.4211 14.0789 13.7895 13.3158 13.1579 13.0000 12.5263 
St.Dev. 6.0402 5.5641 5.9436 5.7452 5.8558 5.7664 5.5513 4.8576 4.8267 3.9094 Thsubsmol 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 14.0526 14.0526 14.0526 14.0526 14.0526 14.0526 14.0526 14.0526 14.0526 14.0526 
St.Dev. 10.4389 10.4389 10.4389 10.4389 10.4389 10.4389 10.4389 10.4389 10.4389 10.4389 Thsubsmol- entrylag N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
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Table A.14 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for Global Molecules by Country by Year 
Country:  
United Kingdom Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Mean 80,298 83,879 90,308 93,006 96,537 100,756 100,849 111,846 120,814 127,227 
St.Dev. 122,753 123,225 128,652 128,780 131,682 137,061 134,530 151,547 162,743 173,136 Suthnds 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 0.2965 0.3014 0.3060 0.3080 0.3224 0.3308 0.3266 0.3234 0.3238 0.3252 
St.Dev. 0.2224 0.2281 0.2361 0.2446 0.2601 0.2657 0.2571 0.2680 0.2760 0.2764 Leusuprice 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 17,005 18,936 21,825 24,195 26,628 29,711 31,382 34,813 40,388 45,309 
St.Dev. 27,598 30,002 34,274 38,623 43,236 47,376 49,965 59,890 76,642 91,943 Leuthnds 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Quality Characteristics  
Mean 0.2665 0.1759 0.1767 0.1771 0.1766 0.1770 0.1773 0.1731 0.1676 0.1665 
St.Dev. 0.8392 0.6464 0.6464 0.6451 0.6373 0.6369 0.6329 0.6020 0.5666 0.5559 Strengthg 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 16.6316 17.6316 18.6316 19.6316 20.6316 21.6316 22.6316 23.6316 24.6316 25.6316 
St.Dev. 12.0818 12.0818 12.0818 12.0818 12.0818 12.0818 12.0818 12.0818 12.0818 12.0818 Molage 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 145.2151 148.0258 146.2829 124.6675 119.4850 93.2642 66.3229 61.2544 58.9442 57.0293 
St.Dev. 202.9629 209.2266 208.3658 173.3241 172.0150 123.1002 65.1457 57.0984 52.4440 46.5931 Packsize 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 9.9211 10.1579 10.7105 11.6316 12.2368 13.2368 13.2632 13.1053 12.6316 12.8421 
St.Dev. 9.2543 9.6493 10.4103 11.7161 12.3626 13.6232 12.8771 12.3284 11.7068 11.4880 Formcode 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
St.Dev. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Globpenet 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
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Table A.14 (Continued) 
Pharmaceutical Drug Quality and Market (Competition) Characteristics for Global Molecules by Country by Year 
Country:  
United Kingdom Year 
Variable Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Market (Competition) Characteristics 
Mean 2.2895 2.5789 2.6579 3.0789 3.2105 3.2895 3.4474 3.8684 3.7632 3.7632 
St.Dev. 2.3005 2.6573 3.0868 3.6271 4.0414 3.7626 3.7032 4.4001 4.0366 3.7592 Gencompet 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 12.5263 12.5263 12.9474 13.3421 13.5263 13.4474 13.1053 12.5000 12.3684 12.7895 
St.Dev. 4.4826 4.4826 4.2359 4.1151 3.9232 3.6145 3.1860 3.0202 2.8798 2.8867 Thsubsmol 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Mean 12.9737 12.9737 12.9737 12.9737 12.9737 12.9737 12.9737 12.9737 12.9737 12.9737 
St.Dev. 9.0060 9.0060 9.0060 9.0060 9.0060 9.0060 9.0060 9.0060 9.0060 9.0060 Thsubsmol- entrylag N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
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Table A.15 
Quality Adjusted (by RE) Standard Unit Price Differentials  
for All Molecules, Relative to Spaina 
Year Spain France Italy United  Kingdom Germany 
1994 - 39.63% 27.09% 80.21% 105.06% 
1995 2.25% 42.17% 18.46% 79.93% 100.96% 
1996 4.25% 42.12% 24.26% 78.87% 100.62% 
1997 6.91% 39.62% 25.36% 72.73% 93.15% 
1998 7.84% 39.45% 28.19% 83.87% 89.94% 
1999 9.30% 38.94% 31.54% 90.54% 86.88% 
2000 8.55% 40.26% 35.24% 86.94% 87.43% 
2001 8.30% 40.15% 37.86% 85.04% 88.77% 
2002 8.11% 40.03% 39.86% 83.54% 80.51% 
2003 8.93% 37.12% 33.99% 81.30% 76.76% 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.16 
Quality Adjusted (by FE) Standard Unit Price Differentials  
for All Molecules, Relative to Germanyb 
Year Germany France Italy United  Kingdom Spain 
1994 - 30.43% 36.76% 11.62% 50.02% 
1995 0.02% 27.80% 39.93% 10.07% 49.10% 
1996 1.44% 27.70% 36.90% 10.47% 49.04% 
1997 0.01% 26.34% 33.97% 10.24% 47.14% 
1998 0.92% 25.35% 31.51% 3.03% 46.34% 
1999 1.39% 24.45% 28.63% 2.20% 45.50% 
2000 1.99% 24.02% 26.88% 0.08% 45.72% 
2001 1.81% 24.61% 26.02% 1.59% 46.11% 
2002 6.42% 21.28% 21.62% 1.99% 43.71% 
2003 7.81% 21.43% 23.46% 2.72% 42.61% 
 
                                                 
a These are the coefficients of country/time effects (θj,t) in the random effect quasi-hedonic regression 
model. Percentages are calculated as 100[Exp(θ)-1]. 
b These are the coefficients of country/time effects (θj,t) in the fixed effect quasi-hedonic regression model. 
Percentages are calculated as 100[Exp(θ)-1]. 
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Table A.17  
Quality Adjusted (by FE) Standard Unit Price Differentials  
for All Molecules, Relative to Spaina 
Year Spain France Italy United  Kingdom Germany 
1994 - 39.19% 26.53% 76.83% 100.07% 
1995 1.86% 41.85% 18.01% 76.67% 96.46% 
1996 3.41% 41.88% 23.83% 75.70% 96.24% 
1997 5.74% 39.36% 24.92% 69.80% 89.19% 
1998 6.38% 39.10% 27.63% 80.70% 86.35% 
1999 7.52% 38.63% 30.96% 87.51% 83.48% 
2000 6.43% 39.98% 34.72% 84.39% 84.24% 
2001 5.86% 39.91% 37.28% 82.62% 85.57% 
2002 5.39% 39.83% 39.23% 81.17% 77.64% 
2003 5.85% 36.92% 33.38% 78.98% 74.25% 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.18 
Quality Adjusted (by RE) Standard Unit Price Differentials  
for Global Molecules, Relative to Spainb 
Year Spain France Italy United  Kingdom Germany 
1994 - 31.87% 21.32% 81.81% 103.44% 
1995 3.45% 36.58% 12.63% 76.92% 99.13% 
1996 6.98% 37.68% 17.94% 73.35% 95.62% 
1997 12.30% 34.21% 17.22% 63.23% 82.23% 
1998 16.06% 30.90% 18.65% 67.24% 76.20% 
1999 20.52% 27.09% 21.15% 66.06% 71.83% 
2000 21.76% 27.95% 24.11% 61.13% 68.77% 
2001 22.55% 29.17% 27.65% 55.96% 68.81% 
2002 23.94% 29.29% 27.94% 51.86% 58.79% 
2003 25.72% 26.75% 23.81% 50.34% 51.59% 
 
                                                 
a These are the coefficients of country/time effects (θj,t) in the fixed effect quasi-hedonic regression model. 
Percentages are calculated as 100[Exp(θ)-1].  
b These are the coefficients of country/time effects (θj,t) in the random effect quasi-hedonic regression 
model. Percentages are calculated as 100[Exp(θ)-1].  
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Table A.19 
Quality Adjusted (by FE) Standard Unit Price Differentials  
for Global Molecules, Relative to Germanya 
Year Germany France Italy United  Kingdom Spain 
1994 - -34.7% -40.2% -10.7% -50.6% 
1995 0.7% -30.9% -43.3% -11.4% -49.5% 
1996 1.7% -29.1% -39.6% -11.5% -48.6% 
1997 -1.0% -25.8% -35.6% -10.6% -44.9% 
1998 -1.7% -25.1% -32.5% -5.2% -42.9% 
1999 -0.9% -25.5% -29.3% -3.4% -41.5% 
2000 -2.3% -23.6% -26.2% -4.5% -40.4% 
2001 -2.2% -22.9% -24.2% -7.7% -40.4% 
2002 -7.5% -18.0% -19.2% -4.4% -36.7% 
2003 -11.0% -15.7% -18.0% -0.7% -33.6% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.20 
Quality Adjusted (by FE) Standard Unit Price Differentials  
for Global Molecules, Relative to Spaina 
Year Spain France Italy United  Kingdom Germany 
1994 - 32.16% 20.88% 80.66% 102.29% 
1995 2.83% 36.87% 12.29% 75.52% 98.02% 
1996 5.78% 37.97% 17.55% 72.05% 94.50% 
1997 10.43% 34.51% 16.82% 62.17% 81.36% 
1998 13.60% 31.09% 18.25% 66.09% 75.14% 
1999 17.28% 27.32% 20.78% 65.04% 70.88% 
2000 17.78% 28.20% 23.81% 60.23% 67.84% 
2001 17.88% 29.44% 27.34% 55.01% 67.91% 
2002 18.54% 29.55% 27.54% 50.94% 57.93% 
2003 19.52% 27.06% 23.45% 49.60% 50.64% 
                                                 
a These are the coefficients of country/time effects (θj,t) in the fixed effect quasi-hedonic regression model. 
Percentages are calculated as 100[Exp(θ)-1]. 
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Table A.21 
Results for Price Convergence Estimations for All Molecules 
(Adjusted by RE) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent 
Variable: ΔPi,k,t 
Base: 
SPN Base: GR 
Base: 
SPN Base: GR 
βa 0.01 -0.02 -0.19 -0.18 
Half-life of Shock 
(in years) - 34.3 3.3 3.5 
FRb - - 0.02 0.00 
GRb - - 0.09 - 
UKb - - 0.10 0.00 
SPNb - - - -0.09 
ITYb - - 0.07 -0.07 
Lags of ΔPi,k,t Yes(1)c Yes(1)c Yesd Yesd 
t-star 
P>t 
8.80 
1.000 
-19.89 
0.000 
-8.92 
0.000 
-8.16 
0.000 
Molecule/Country 
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
Time Trend No No No No 
N 2,940 3,210 2,940 3,210 
 
 
                                                 
a β coefficients are estimated by the Levin et al. (1992) panel unit root test module in StataTM 9.2 (levinlin).  
b Country fixed effects are estimated for each molecule/country by the Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root 
test module in StataTM 9.2 (dfuller) and then averaged for each country. 
c The average number of lags for each molecule/country is 1.  
d The number of lags is determined by using the Campbell and Perron top-down approach.  
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Table A.22 
Results for Price Convergence Estimations for All Molecules (Unadjusted) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent 
Variable: ΔPi,k,t 
Base: 
SPN 
Base: 
GR 
No 
Base 
Base: 
SPN 
Base: 
GR 
No 
Base 
Base: 
SPN 
Base: 
GR 
No 
Base 
βa -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.33 -0.14 -0.30 -0.77 -0.68 -0.65 
FRb - - - 0.16 -0.02 -0.66 0.16 -0.02 -0.90 
GRb - - - 0.02 - -0.32 0.02 - -0.44 
UKb - - - -0.17 0.02 -0.25 -0.17 -0.17 -0.81 
SPNb - - - - -0.19 -1.08 - -0.79 -1.50 
ITYb - - - 0.06 -0.00 -0.35 0.06 -0.30 -0.94 
Lags of ΔPi,k,t Yes(1)c Yes(1) Yes(1) Yes(1) Yes(1) Yes(1) Yes(1) Yes(1) Yes(1) 
t-star 
p>t 
-14.19 
0.000 
-8.52 
0.000 
0.18 
0.575 
-30.00 
0.000 
-15.82 
0.000 
-30.78 
0.000 
-94.37 
0.000 
-27.88 
0.000 
-41.37 
0.000 
Molecule/Country 
Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
N 2940 3210 3790 2940 3210 3790 2940 3210 3790 
                                                 
a β coefficients are estimated by Levin et al. (2002) panel unit root test module in StataTM 9.2 (levinlin). 
b Country fixed effects are estimated for each molecule/country by Augmented Dickey Fuller regressions 
(dfuller) in StataTM 9.2 and then averaged for each country.  
c The average number of lags for each molecule/country is 1.  
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Table A.23 
Results for Price Convergence Estimations for  
Global  Molecules (Adjusted by FE) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent 
Variable: ΔPi,k,t 
Base: 
SPN Base: GR 
Base: 
SPN Base: GR 
βa 0.02 -0.02 -0.14 -0.21 
Half-life of Shock 
(in years) - 34.3 4.6 2.9 
FRb - - 0.00 0.07 
GRb - - 0.08 - 
UKb - - 0.19 0.06 
SPNb - - - -0.08 
ITYb - - 0.07 -0.09 
Lags of ΔPi,k,t Yes(1)c Yes(1)c Yesd Yesd 
t-star 
P>t 
11.96 
1.000 
-12.69 
0.000 
-5.95 
0.000 
-12.69 
0.000 
Molecule/Country 
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
Time Trend No No No No 
N 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 
 
                                                 
a β coefficients are estimated by the Levin et al. (2002) panel unit root test module in StataTM 9.2 (levinlin).  
b Country fixed effects are estimated for each molecule/country by the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
regressions in StataTM 9.2 (dfuller) and then averaged for each country. 
c The average number of lags for each molecule/country is 1.  
d The number of lags is determined by using the Campbell and Perron top-down approach.  
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Table A.24 
Results for Price Convergence Estimations for Global Molecules (Unadjusted) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent 
Variable: ΔPi,k,t 
Base: 
SPN 
Base: 
GR 
No 
Base 
Base: 
SPN 
Base: 
GR 
No 
Base 
Base: 
SPN 
Base: 
GR 
No 
Base 
βa 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.14 -0.08 -0.19 -0.64 -0.65 -0.62 
FRb - - - 0.05 0.14 -0.17 0.29 0.04 -0.02 
GRb - - - 0.20 - 0.12 0.74 - 0.60 
UKb - - - 0.08 0.04 -0.03 0.15 -0.20 -0.24 
SPNb - - - - -0.20 -0.19 - -0.74 -0.29 
ITYb - - - 0.08 0.02 -0.09 0.17 -0.27 -0.38 
Lags of ΔPi,k,t Yes(1)c Yes(1) Yes(1) Yes(1) Yes(1) Yes(1) Yes(1) Yes(1) Yes(1) 
t-star 
P>t 
10.78 
1.000 
-18.85 
0.000 
0.33 
0.630 
-7.99 
0.000 
-6.16 
0.000 
-13.13 
0.000 
-25.76 
0.000 
-21.94 
0.000 
-27.72 
0.000 
Molecule/Country 
Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
N 1900 1900 1900 1900 1900 1900 1900 1900 1900 
                                                 
a β coefficients are estimated by Levin et al. (2002) panel unit root test module in StataTM 9.2 (levinlin). 
b Country fixed effects are estimated for each molecule/country by Augmented Dickey Fuller regressions  
(dfuller) in StataTM 9.2 and then averaged for each country 
c The number of lags for each molecule/country is 1. 
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Appendix B: Figures 
 
Figure B.1 
Summary of EU Pharmaceutical Background 
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Figure B.2 
Pharmaceutical Production in the European Union  
(In million dollars at exchange rate) 
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Source: OECD Health Data (2003) 
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Figure B.3 
Total Pharmaceutical Sales in the European Union  
(In million dollars at exchange rate)  
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Figure B.4 
Bilateral Price Differences for All Molecules Between 1994-2003  
by Laspeyres Index, Relative to Germany 
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Figure B.5 
Bilateral Price Differences for All Molecules Between 1994-2003  
by Paasche Index, Relative to Germany 
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Figure B.6 
Bilateral Price Differences for All Molecules Between 1994-2003  
by Laspeyres Index, Relative to Spain 
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Figure B.7 
Bilateral Price Differences for All Molecules Between 1994-2003  
by Paasche Index, Relative to Spain 
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Figure B.8 
Bilateral Price Differences for Global Molecules Between 1994-2003 
 by Laspeyres Index, Relative to Germany 
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Figure B.9 
Bilateral Price Differences for Global Molecules Between 1994-2003 
 by Paasche Index, Relative to Germany 
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Figure B.10 
Bilateral Price Differences for Global Molecules Between 1994-2003 
 by Laspeyres Index, Relative to Spain 
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Figure B.11 
Bilateral Price Differences for Global Molecules Between 1994-2003 
by Paasche Index, Relative to Spain 
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Figure B.12 
Country Price Changes for All Molecules by Laspeyres Index, Relative to 1994 
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Figure B.13 
Country Price Changes for Global Molecules by Laspeyres Index,  
Relative to 1994 
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Figure B.14 
Quality Adjusted (by RE) Standard Unit Price Differentials  
for All Molecules, Relative to Spain 
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Figure B.15 
Quality Adjusted (by FE) Standard Unit Price Differentials  
for All Molecules, Relative to Germany  
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Figure B.16 
Quality Adjusted (by FE) Standard Unit Price Differentials  
for All Molecules, Relative to Spain 
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Figure B.17 
Quality Adjusted (by RE) Standard Unit Price Differentials  
for Global Molecules, Relative to Spain  
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Figure B.18 
Quality Adjusted (by FE) Standard Unit Price Differentials  
for Global Molecules, Relative to Germany  
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Figure B.19 
Quality Adjusted (by FE) Standard Unit Price Differentials  
for Global Molecules, Relative to Spain  
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